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

NATURAL THEOLOGY

CONSIDERED

WITH REFERENCE TO

LORD BROUGHAM'S DISCOURSE

ON THAT SUBJECT.

By THOMAS TURTON, D.D.,

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

AND

DEAN OF PETERBOROUGH.

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PREFACE.

THE *Discourse of Natural Theology* by Lord Brougham could not fail to attract very general attention; and on the publication of the work, I for my own part anxiously looked forward to a season of leisure—being confident that I should derive from the perusal of it both pleasure and advantage. Having, besides, heard the Noble Author's volume mentioned, even by some of his Lordship's friends, as "obscure" and as "hard reading," I wished to ascertain how a Discourse on such a subject could have been composed, so as to be spoken of in that manner. On examining Lord Brougham's production, I found it, as might be expected from the great talents and attainments of the Author, abounding in enlarged and philosophical views of things; but still there was an impression left upon my mind, by the entire work, that the complaints, respecting obscurity and hard

reading, were by no means unwarranted. I was moreover astonished at the *inaccuracies*, which were presented without being sought for, in almost every part; for of them I had received no intimation.

With regard to the work now in the reader's hands, it was not till I had surveyed the brief remarks which had been put down during the perusal of the Discourse, that I thought of preparing any thing, upon the subject, for the press. It occurred to me that, however I might fail to elucidate what was "obscure" or to facilitate the reading of what was "hard," I certainly should, in many instances, be enabled to correct what was erroneous. The endeavour to effect what I could, in these several ways, would at least require a statement of my own views of Natural Theology; and there probably was no disinclination to leave some permanent foot-marks, on ground over which I had been accustomed to wander from my earliest years.

The Treatise, which suggested the observations contained in the following pages, is in fact a Preliminary Discourse to Paley's Natural Theology,

illustrated by Lord Brougham and Sir Charles Bell; and we are informed, in the Dedication to Earl Spencer, that the plan of publishing the work, by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, was abandoned, from the apprehension "that the adoption of it might open the door to the introduction of religious controversy among the members of the Society, against their fundamental principles." There is something curious in the notion of a Society not unlikely to be drawn into religious controversy, by a work designed to prove the Being and Attributes of God; but be that as it may, we cannot but rejoice that the plan has been carried into execution, by the individual exertions of the two eminent persons already named. In the remarks now offered to the world, I have no intention to "open the door to the introduction of religious controversy," among the members of any Society whatever. The remarks might have been made by one whose views of Natural Religion are not very different from those of Lord Brougham; and they are addressed to such readers as are of opinion that what is written ought to be under-

stood—and that what is understood ought to be in accordance with truth.

It has long been deemed the glory of Socrates, that he brought philosophy from the schools of the learned to the habitations of men—by stripping it of its technicalities, and exhibiting it in the ordinary language of life. There is no one, in modern times, who has possessed this talent to an equal extent with Paley; and we can scarcely conceive any one to have employed it with greater success. The transmutation of metals into gold was the supreme object of the Alchemist's aspirations. But Paley had acquired a more enviable power. Knowledge however abstruse, by passing through his mind, became plain common sense—stamped with the characters which ensured its currency in the world. At present, the tendency is in the opposite direction. The disposition is to dignify almost every thing with the semblance of science. Matters which have long been understood, sufficiently for all practical purposes, are worked up into a system; and the most pliant of ancient languages is ransacked for combinations

of syllables, to be employed in the service of the new scheme of classification. To correspond with all this, the infant science is taught to speak in phrases of large import, and to use expressions familiar only to the Mathematical Philosophers. Now, it is undoubtedly *possible* to give, to many departments of knowledge, the formalities here described; and so, by their aspect at least, to recommend them to men of science: and this appears to have been Lord Brougham's intention with respect to Natural Theology; for he informs us that "the composition of his Discourse was undertaken in consequence of an observation which he had often made, that scientific men were apt to regard the study of Natural Religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits." The intention, indeed, is manifest throughout the Discourse; and if I do not mistake, the *obscurity*, which has been felt to pervade the work, arises from His Lordship's *manner* of communicating to Natural Theology a more scientific character than, in his opinion, had been previously assigned to it.... Beyond doubt, the truth of science may exist with

little or nothing of the form; and in that state the great object of inquiry is, after all, the most accessible to inquirers of every order. Such being the case, whoever ventures to invest any portion of human knowledge with a more scientific exterior, ought to take especial care that it do not, from want of clearness or consistency, appear, to those for whom the change is designed, to have the form of science, with little or nothing of the truth.... The reader will bear in mind that these remarks are intended to direct his attention, and not to bias his opinion. His decision, in the matter under consideration, will depend upon the evidence to be adduced.

It is difficult to speak of the *inaccuracies* presented by the 'Discourse of Natural Theology.' Of their number, I will only observe, that those persons who would rather go wrong with Lord Brougham, than right with the author of the present volume, will have sufficient opportunities of showing that mark of respect for His Lordship's character. As to the origin of the inaccuracies, they seem to have arisen from the habit of taking

rapid glances at subjects:—from seeing a little, and so conjecturing the rest. If truth be sought in this manner, the probability is that it will not be found; and no proceeding can be imagined more fatal to the reputation for knowledge.

But however obscure and inaccurate the Discourse may be deemed, it contains many things well deserving the attention of those "scientific men," for whom it appears to have been mainly designed:—some of whom are described as "men of religious habits of thinking;" others as "free from any disposition towards scepticism, rather because they have not much discussed the subject, than because they have formed fixed opinions upon it after inquiry;" while "the bulk of them rely little upon Natural Theology, which they seem to regard as a speculation built rather on fancy than on argument—or, at any rate, as a kind of knowledge quite different from either physical or moral science." Considering Lord Brougham's extensive acquaintance with men of science, this account of them cannot but be thought important. The whole of it is very remarkable; and there is

something far from satisfactory in the information respecting the prevailing opinions on the subject of Natural Theology. In what way the men of science, within Lord Brougham's sphere of observation, have become obnoxious to such a reproach, does not appear. At all events, it is in the highest degree creditable to His Lordship, to have taken so much trouble to effect its removal.

As to the following pages, the object of them is not less to maintain what is conceived to be right in Lord Brougham's Discourse, than to correct what is apprehended to be wrong. Moreover, in executing this latter purpose, the author will not in any instance be found to manifest the slightest disposition *to make the most* (as it is termed) of his own views of the matter under consideration; for an attempt of that sort is very seldom much better than an endeavour to leave a false impression on the reader's mind. On the contrary, his great aim will be to state facts and opinions as accurately as his power of language will enable him to state them; at the same time taking the utmost care, that no inferences shall be drawn, without furnishing

the amplest means of determining their propriety or impropriety.

That, in discussions like those to which the subsequent pages are devoted, the present writer is incapable of adding or altering a single word, for the sake of effect—Lord Brougham would, it is imagined, at any moment, readily avow his belief. The Noble Author would assuredly give the writer credit for the resolution to make truth the object of his researches, and for the intention to state things exactly as they are. His Lordship would probably number him among those who are entitled to express their admiration of the sentiment contained in the following passage: "I look upon the discovery of any thing which is true as a valuable acquisition to society; which cannot possibly hurt or obstruct the good effect of any other truth whatsoever: for they all partake of one common essence, and necessarily coincide with each other; and like the drops of rain which fall separately into the river, mix themselves at once with the stream, and strengthen the general current*."

* Middleton's Works, Vol. I. p. viii. 8vo.

At the head of each division of the present volume, I have specified those pages of the 'Discourse of Natural Theology,' to which the division relates; and previously to the perusal of any such division, I would recommend an attentive consideration of the corresponding portion of the 'Discourse.'

It may be proper to add that the references are made to the second edition of Lord Brougham's work.

INTRODUCTION.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS—ARRANGEMENT.

(Discourse, Introduction, pp. 5—14.)

Lord Brougham, in the outset of his Discourse, notices the frequent use of the words *Theology* and *Religion* as synonymous; and observes that "*Natural Theology* and *Natural Religion* are by many confounded together." His Lordship then proposes that *Theology* should be considered as the science, and *Religion* as its subject. According to this distinction, if I rightly apprehend it, we, by means of *Theology*, investigate and establish the truths of which *Religion* consists. There is great reason to lament that Lord Brougham, having thus marked the difference between *Theology* and *Religion* in general, did not at once present his views of *Natural* Theology and *Natural* Religion in particular; and state exactly the objects of the study which he was anxious to recommend to general attention:—for, in the first place—as His Lord-

ship complains—each of the terms *Natural Theology* and *Natural Religion* has had somewhat different significations attached to it by different writers; and in the second place, as the opening of the work is now left, the reader speedily becomes sensible of a degree of obscurity, which could scarcely have existed had such illustrations of the subject been duly afforded.

The noble and learned author next remarks that "there is, as regards *Natural Theology*, a more limited use of the word, which confines it to the knowledge and attributes of the Deity; and regards the speculation concerning his will, and our own hopes from and duties towards him, as another branch of the science, termed *Natural Religion*, in contradistinction to the former."....
Even here we begin to feel the want of those explanations of terms, the absence of which has already been alluded to. It is very difficult to perceive what is intended by "a more limited use" of the term *Natural Theology*—when nothing has been before mentioned of any use of it at all. Again, His Lordship probably *meant* to say that the term *Natural Theology*, in its "more limited use," had been employed to denote, not "the knowledge and

attributes of the Deity," but "the knowledge of the existence and attributes of the Deity."

It is also, I suppose, to be *inferred* that Natural Theology consists of two parts:—the first part, evincing the being and attributes of God; the second, His designs respecting our existence in another world, and our principles and conduct in the present:—but it would have added greatly to the clearness of the Introduction, if this had been specifically stated; instead of being left to be inferred or not inferred, according to the habits of the reader's mind.

Lord Brougham, however, goes on to exemplify his remark, by referring to Dr Paley and Bishop Butler.

Concerning Dr Paley, His Lordship thus writes:

"Dr Paley hardly touches on this latter branch [the will of God, and our own hopes from and duties towards him] in his book; there being only about one-sixtieth part devoted to it, and that incidentally in treating of the attributes. Indeed, though in the dedication he uses the word *Religion* as synonymous with *Theology*, the title and the arrangement of his discourse show that he generally employed the term *Natural Theology* in its restricted sense." (pp. 5, 6.)

There is ample scope for doubt whether Dr Paley held the distinction here attributed to him.

So far, indeed, as I can judge, neither the title nor the execution of his work tends to prove that he did hold that distinction. When he entitled his Volume —*Natural Theology ; or, Evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity, collected from the appearances of Nature*—it is to be inferred that he assumed the term *Natural Theology* as a compendious and convenient indication of the contents immediately subjoined—rather than that he had any intention of assigning what he conceived to be proper limits to the province of Natural Theology as connected with Natural Religion :—a view of the subject, which his use of the term *Natural Religion*, as the equivalent of *Natural Theology*, seems to confirm. Moreover, since the work simply professed to contain *Evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity, collected from the appearances of Nature*—any systematic and extended observations, on the " will of God, and our own hopes from and duties towards him," would have been entirely out of place. At the same time, the observations on those topics, which are found towards the close of the work, entitle the Author to greater honour than could have been derived from the most rigid adherence to a faultless plan. They afford an in-

teresting proof of his reluctance to take leave of an important study, which had long engaged his thoughts; and of his anxiety to impress upon the reader's mind those moral and religious considerations, which were so familiar to himself, and so suited to the subject under discussion.

In what manner Dr Paley disposed of "the speculation concerning the will of God, and our own hopes from and duties towards him," may perhaps appear from a few remarks, which I shall venture to offer, on Dr Paley's works, when regarded *as parts of a system.* A little attention to them, in that point of view, will render it as certain, as any thing of the kind can be, that the author had no purpose of nicely marking the boundaries between Natural Religion, and the departments of knowledge the most nearly related to it; and indeed may be the means of preventing some not quite trifling mistakes, in estimating the literary labours of that extraordinary man.... Dr Paley's great object, then, appears to have been—to place every portion of that knowledge, which to responsible agents is of deeper moment than any other, upon what *he deemed* its firmest foundations. His intention was, that the student

should begin with his *Natural Theology;* in which are to be found, "collected from the appearances of nature," evidences of that fact which supports all the rest; viz. the existence of a Creator and Preserver of all things; a Being of boundless power and wisdom—whose providential arrangements are obviously formed to promote the happiness of his sensitive creation. Taking this fact as established, Dr Paley's next step—in the first few pages of his *Evidences of Christianity*—is to show that there are circumstances which appear to give countenance to the supposition, that the Supreme Being may vouchsafe to his rational creatures an express revelation of his will. There are moreover, in the present condition of human life, various indications of a future state of existence. Yet, in Dr Paley's view of the case, these matters need not be strenuously insisted upon. In the *Preparatory Considerations* to his *Evidences of Christianity*, after stating these two propositions—namely, 1. that a future state of existence may be destined by God for his human creation; and 2. that, being so destined, he may acquaint them with it—the author thus proceeds:—

"It is not necessary for our purpose that these propositions be capable of proof; or even that, by arguments drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable. It is enough that we are able to say concerning them, that they are not so violently improbable, so contradictory to what we already believe of the Divine power and character, that either the propositions themselves, or facts strictly connected with the propositions (and therefore no farther improbable than *they* are improbable), ought to be rejected at first sight, and to be rejected by whatever strength or complication of evidence they be attested."

Let us now see by what steps the argument advances:—It is not impossible—say, not utterly improbable—that a Divine Revelation may be afforded to the human race; but if there ever has been a Revelation, the only method, by which we can conceive its reality to have been evinced, is by MIRACLES: have then miracles ever been professedly wrought for such a purpose? It is the object of *The Evidences of Christianity* to prove that on Miracles really wrought was founded the Christian dispensation—a dispensation which, by its internal excellence, recommends itself to our best judgment and feelings, as worthy of the previously-ascertained attributes of God. The truth of Christianity being so established, a new

importance is given to the present state of existence, by the certainty of its connexion with another: in this way "life and immortality are brought to light." . . . . Dr Paley thus determines that great truth, the probabilities of which, as manifested by the condition of the human race in this world, have been collected by various writers, and made to form part of their systems of Natural Theology. And what is the practical bearing of all the information, natural and revealed, which has been thus afforded? The answer to this question is to be found in Dr Paley's *Moral Philosophy;* in which he shows that there are grounds for considering the deductions of reason as combining with the precepts of Christianity, in pointing out the principles and conduct which become us, as probationers for eternity. With such intentions, Dr Paley laid before the world, to adopt his own language, "the evidences of Natural Religion, the evidences of Revealed Religion, and an account of the duties that result from both*." If his entire object be kept in view, there will be no difficulty in understanding why he dwelt but little on several parti-

* Dedication of Natural Theology to Bishop Barrington.

culars, which many will deem—and rightly deem—of real consequence in inquiries of this kind; which indeed he might, under other circumstances, have himself enlarged upon, as deserving the most serious attention. For instance, it is not, I am persuaded, to be inferred, from Dr Paley's language, that he cared not for "the presumptive proofs of a future retribution from the light of nature*;" but that he held his own system to be strong and complete without them. In confirmation of this account of Dr Paley's purposes, I refer the reader to a passage near the close of his *Evidences of Christianity;* from which it appears that he considered "the argument drawn from the light of nature" as quite sufficient to show the probability of a future state—that "one truth" which "gives order to confusion," and "makes the moral world of a piece with the natural." To the same end, I extract the following passage from the concluding chapter of his Natural Theology.

"The existence and character of the Deity is, in every view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of *Revelation*. It is a step to

* See Moral Philosophy, Book II. chap. 3. end.

have it proved that there must be something in the world more than what we see. It is a farther step to know that, amongst the invisible things of nature, there must be an intelligent mind, concerned in its production, order and support. These points being assured to us by Natural Theology, we may well leave to Revelation the disclosure of many particulars which our researches cannot reach, as respecting either the nature of this Being as the original cause of all things, or his character and designs as a moral governor; and not only so, but the more full confirmation of other particulars, of which, although they do not lie altogether beyond our reasonings and our probabilities, the certainty is by no means equal to the importance."

Having thus endeavoured to elucidate the respective bearings of these popular productions upon each other, let me also state that there are several portions of one of them at the least, I mean his *Moral Philosophy*, of which I should be very sorry to express any approbation. My notion is that, jealous of the simplicity of his whole plan, Dr Paley rejected much that would have added to the beauty as well as the stability of his structure; and yet, which is singular, he admitted, in various parts, that which was not wanted—the main effect of such admission being to encumber his ground with objects of weakness and deformity. I may have another occasion to discuss more fully the subject thus inci-

dentally noticed.... From the preceding estimate of Dr Paley's views, we shall, at least, be warranted in concluding, that he did not draw the distinction, attributed to him by Lord Brougham, between Natural Theology and Natural Religion.*

But to proceed—Lord Brougham animadverts on the term *Natural Religion*, as used by Bishop Butler, in the following manner:—

"Bishop Butler seems to have used *Natural Religion* in a sense equally restricted, but certainly little warranted by custom; for that portion of his work which treats of Natural Religion is confined to a future state and the moral government of God, as if he either held Natural Religion and Natural Theology to be two branches of one subject, or Natural Religion to be a branch of Natural Theology." (p. 6.)

* In the account of the principal productions of Dr Paley, I have not mentioned the *Horæ Paulinæ;* which admirable work must be considered as intended to strengthen the *Evidences of Christianity*. It has been called the most original of the author's productions; and in its execution it appears to have been so. It was suggested however, if I mistake not, by the following remarks, at the conclusion of Dr Doddridge's Introduction to his Paraphrase and Notes on the first Epistle to the Thessalonians.—"Whoever reads over St Paul's Epistles with attention will discern such intrinsic characters in their genuineness, and the Divine authority of the doctrines they contain, as will perhaps produce in him a stronger conviction than all the external evidence with which they are attended. To which we may add, that the exact coincidence observable, between the many *allusions* to particular facts in this as well as in other *Epistles*, and the account of the facts themselves as they are recorded in the history of the *Acts*, is a remarkable confirmation of the truth of each."

Whoever will examine *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the constitution and course of Nature*, will find that the author undertook to arbitrate between the friends of Religion and the adversaries of Religion—meaning, by Religion, a system of moral, practical truths, whether deduced by the faculties of the mind or promulgated by Revelation:—in other words, between the friends and the adversaries of Religion, Natural and Revealed. Now, however widely persons may differ, there must be some principles in common, or the matter in dispute can never be decided. What, then, were the common principles in the case under review? They were two: the being of a God—and the actual constitution and course of nature. And thus, Bishop Butler was led to trace the analogy existing between Religion, Natural and Revealed, on the one hand—and the course of nature, on the other; thereby endeavouring to prove the high probability of their having both proceeded from the same Divine Being, whose existence was admitted on all hands. The signification, therefore, given to the term *Natural Religion*, may be well accounted for, without supposing the author to have adopted either of the alleged

distinctions between Natural Religion and Natural Theology. In confirmation of this opinion, it may be observed that, when Bishop Butler is not writing with reference to the *Analogy*, he assigns to Natural Religion a much wider range; as will appear from the following extract from his *Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Durham:* "Now, the evidence of religion [meaning, both natural and revealed] may be laid before men without any air of controversy. The proof of the being of God, from final causes or the design and wisdom which appears in every part of nature, together with the law of virtue written upon our hearts; the proof of Christianity from miracles, and the accomplishment of prophecies — .... these evidences of religion might properly be insisted on, in a way to affect and influence the heart, though there were no professed unbelievers in the world." From this extract it appears that, in Bishop Butler's judgment, "the proof of the being of God, from final causes or the design and wisdom which appears in every part of nature," belongs to Religion; that is, undoubtedly, Natural Religion.... With respect to the Bishop's notions of *Natural Theology*, as distinguished from Natural Religion, it is not likely that they should be ascertained; for I very

much question whether the term Natural Theology is to be found in his writings.

In support of the opinion, which I have virtually avowed, that any science may, when compared with the different departments of knowledge to which it is related, be not improperly held to comprise very different particulars—I take the liberty of adducing some remarks of Lord Brougham, in a note on the Classification of the Sciences (p. 218): "In all such classifications," His Lordship writes, "we should be guided by views of convenience, rather than by any desire to attain perfect symmetry; and that arrangement may be best suited to a particular purpose, which plants the same things in one order, and separates them and unites them in one way, when an arrangement which should dispose those things differently might be preferable, if we had another purpose to serve." This is precisely the consideration by which I conceive Dr Paley and Bishop Butler to have been influenced, in the cases under review; and by which they may be completely justified in what they have done.

To be fully aware of the propriety of Bishop Butler's great work, taking its nature from his own representation, it must be borne in mind that,

during the eighteenth century, appeared certain eminent philosophers, who admitted the being and natural attributes [wisdom and power] of God, and a Divine Providence in the world around us; but denied his moral attributes, and a future state of rewards and punishments for the human race. Amongst such philosophers Lord Bolingbroke is to be numbered.... This casual mention of Lord Bolingbroke brings to recollection that *he* was inclined to distinguish between Natural Theology and Natural Religion; but in what manner, I believe he has not explained.

The foregoing comments on the terms Natural Religion and Natural Theology would appear to render it needless to do more than quote Lord Brougham's concluding observations upon them:—

"The older writers, Clarke, Bentley, Derham, seem to have sometimes used the words indifferently, but never to have regarded Natural Religion in its restricted acceptation. The ancients generally used *Religion* in a qualified sense, either as connected with an obligation, or as synonymous with superstition." (p. 6.)

It is, however, requisite to point out the peculiar infelicity with which it is stated that Clarke, Bentley and Derham "seem to have sometimes used

the words indifferently, but never to have regarded Natural Religion in its restricted acceptation." The facts of the cases are these: After Dr Clarke had published his *Demonstration of the being and attributes of God*, he published his *Discourse on the unchangeable obligations of Natural Religion, and the truth and certainty of the Christian Revelation*— more briefly denominated, *The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion.** We shall therefore have an opportunity to ascertain what Dr Clarke here understood by the term Natural Religion. Nor have we far to seek for information. In the very outset of his latter work he observes—" I proceed, *upon this foundation, of the being and attributes of God*, to demonstrate *in the next place* the unalterable obligations of Natural Religion." Natural Religion therefore, as Dr Clarke at that time understood it, did not comprise the proof of the being and attributes of God; and so it is undeniably certain that he regarded Natural Religion in as restricted an acceptation as Bishop Butler has done. Nay, in a far more restricted acceptation;

* Under this latter title it is referred to by Lord Brougham (Discourse, p. 201) in connexion with the *Demonstration of the being and attributes of God.*

for Dr Clarke had demonstrated—or believed that he had demonstrated—even the *moral* attributes of God, in the first work, which was the foundation of the second. That he never used the term *Natural Religion* in a more extensive signification, I will not affirm; because I do not suppose that he at that time intended, any more than Bishop Butler in the case of the Analogy intended, formally to assign limits to Natural Religion.... It is, at least, not unreasonable that, under circumstances so similar as those of Dr Clarke and Bishop Butler, their language should be interpreted on similar principles. ....With regard to Bentley—there appears not, in his *Confutation of Atheism*, the slightest mention either of Natural Theology or Natural Religion. Throughout his Sermons, the terms Religion and Atheism are opposed to each other .... And, finally, from what I have observed of Derham's style of writing, I should be much surprised to find the words Natural Theology and Natural Religion "used indifferently."... The matter may not be thought important; but as it has been brought forward, let justice be done to all parties.

Leaving the distinctions which have now been considered, Lord Brougham gives us a glimpse of

Natural Theology, by means of the information, that it is "a science, the truths of which are discovered by induction, like the truths of Natural and Moral Philosophy;" and also that "it is a branch of science partaking of the nature of each of those great divisions of human knowledge, and not merely closely allied to them both." (p. 7.) Now, a science the truths of which are discovered by induction, "like" the truths of two other sciences—which partakes "of the nature of each"—and "is not merely closely allied to them both"—seems to be in some respects *different* from both; but as neither the points of connexion nor those of separation are hinted at, we are yet in uncertainty as to the real nature of Natural Theology.

It may here be observed that, through the whole Discourse, Lord Brougham has laid great stress upon *Induction*, as a mode of arriving at truth. For the sake therefore of those who may not be very conversant with terms of this kind, I will venture upon a few words of explanation. When by long continued observation of particular facts, or by manifold experiments on particular substances, in any department of inquiry—certain laws or properties or truths are inferred, as uni-

versally belonging to the subjects of observation or experiment—which laws &c. may be employed as established principles from which, by means of reasoning, other laws &c. may be derived—the method of proceeding is called the *method of induction*. On this, the physical sciences very much depend; and Lord Brougham takes great pains, in various parts of his work, to show that the psychological and moral sciences equally rest upon induction.

Subsequently to all this, His Lordship employs nearly three pages in discriminating between *intellectual* and *moral* science—the *intellectual* and *active* powers—*Ontology* and *Deontology*. He then determines—not on the ground of rigorous exactness, but that of great convenience—that all inductive science may be considered "as consisting of three compartments—Natural, Mental and Moral; or, taking the Greek terms—Physical, Psychological and Ethical." The first of these divisions, then, will be appropriated to *matter;* the second, to *mind;* the third, to *duty:* with this understanding however, that, from the very nature of things, the lines of demarcation between these divisions are but faintly drawn. Lord Brougham

concludes by deciding that Natural Theology is co-extensive with inductive science; and in like manner, has its Physical, Psychological and Ethical branches.

Here we at length find a tolerably distinct account of the objects of Natural Theology; which are stated to be, 1. "the discovery of the existence and attributes of a Creator, by investigating the evidences of design in the works of the creation, material as well as spiritual;" and 2. "the discovery of his will and probable intentions with regard to his creatures, their conduct and their duty." We are also informed that, with respect to the former of these objects, Natural Theology "*resembles* the physical and psychological sciences;" and that, with regard to the latter, it "*resembles* rather the department of moral science." Now resemblance, when thus spoken of, implies at the same time some distinction: implies, in other words, that the things which *resemble* each other are not *identical*. As, however, no distinction is pointed out, the uncertainty already alluded to (p. 30.) still remains. There is in fact — and I believe from this cause — a mist hanging over the whole subject.

The Introduction terminates with an analysis of the Discourse; which consists of two parts:—the first part treating "of the nature of the subject, and the kind of evidence on which Natural Theology rests" —the second, of "the advantages derived from the study of the science." ... The three-fold distribution, into matters Physical, Psychological and Ethical, forms the ground-work of Lord Brougham's subdivisions, in the first and most important part of his Discourse; and upon that distribution will entirely depend the arrangement of the work now in the reader's hands.

SECTION I.

PHYSICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

(Discourse, Section I. & II. pp. 15—51.)

EXPERIENCE is the school appointed for the human race. In infancy, the senses are impressed by external objects. Impressions are continually repeated. Then, observation is awakened; and with it a fondness for things new and strange. Soon after, another kind of feeling shows itself:—a new curiosity about things—an eagerness to know what they are—what they contain—what is their construction—what they are intended for. Meanwhile, this lesson is thoroughly learned—that things are *made*—that they are *contrived*—that there are those by whom they are contrived and made. There has been going on, at the same time, a process of thinking and willing and acting—of which the individual becomes more and more conscious to himself; and those faculties—of thinking, willing and acting—of which he is himself conscious, he is unavoidably led to attribute also to

others. They are ultimately perceived to be the regular means by which effects are produced. In this manner arises a conviction never to be effaced —that whatever manifests arrangement for a purpose must have originated in thought — understanding—mind. There is an irresistible feeling that—without skill to adapt means to ends, together with a disposition to second that skill, and power to carry designs into execution—the objects with which the individual is mainly conversant could not have been formed as they are. Hence the knowledge of the existence of agents possessing intelligence and will and effective power.... Nor, is it absolutely necessary to ascertain the ultimate purpose of an object, in order to be assured of its having had a contriver. To produce the final result, be it what it may, the subordinate parts of the machinery—so to call it—must be adjusted to each other; and thus the existence of a contriving mind may be inferred, even from the working of individual portions of the machinery.

If any one should think that it elucidates the subject, to say that the knowledge thus acquired is the result of induction, he may justly say so. From the continual observation of particular in-

stances, a general conclusion has been drawn. Experience has led to the belief that wherever adaptation can be traced, it must have proceeded from design—there must have been an intelligent designer.

In our earliest years, our attention is mainly directed to the effects consequent upon that degree of ingenuity and power which is possessed by our own species; but we are placed in the midst of objects in the formation of which, if they *were* formed, it is clearly impossible that human faculties can have had any concern. What account can be given of such things? Do they attest their adaptation to certain ends? Do such parts of them, as come under our observation, indisputably display contrivance? If we are satisfied that there do exist marks of adaptation and contrivance, what inference is to be drawn from the fact? Such are the questions suggested by what are called the appearances of nature. Now most undoubtedly, experience has so constantly proved to us that adaptation and contrivance have had their origin in intelligence, that it has become, as it were, an inalienable part of our mental constitution, to believe that to intelligence only can contrivance and adapta-

tion in any case be primarily ascribed. Moreover, we have no difficulty in imagining the existence of intelligence and power far superior to our own; such indeed as to produce results obviously impossible to human forethought and agency. It is under the kind of circumstances now detailed that we engage in the contemplation and study of the material world.

On an actual survey of external nature, we find things on all sides so related to each other, that the idea of adaptation and contrivance irresistibly forces itself upon the understanding. We feel that they could not exist in their present relations, unless it had been previously intended that they *should* so exist. Every object therefore, in the natural world, must have been foreseen, contrived, formed to be—exactly as it is. Moreover, it is contrary to all our experience that any thing should foresee and contrive, except *mind*—that is, an intelligent being, exercising volition and possessing power. In other words, we find ourselves surrounded by objects, none of which can we conceive to have begun to exist, otherwise than by the agency of some intelligent and powerful Being. And yet more, the various instances of adaptation and contrivance have such

a decided tendency to the completion of one grand plan, that we are led to the conclusion, that the entire scheme of nature must have originated with One supremely wise and powerful Being—whom we call God.

Such are, in brief, the leading principles of the first, or physical branch of Natural Theology. The student is directed by it to evidences without number of the existence of a Deity; but the full and practical belief of that great truth will depend upon the fairness of mind and the diligence with which he conducts his inquiries.

The science then, of which we are treating, rests upon observation; such observation, in the first instance, as any one, who is endowed with the ordinary powers of reason, is competent to undertake with success. Even the most obvious facts, in every department of Natural Knowledge, afford undeniable proofs of design and adaptation; and thus may be collected, without the necessity of formal study, very striking evidences of the existence of a Creator and Preserver of all things. But new and surprising instances of design and contrivance await the more scientific inquirer at every step; and it is to him, who is enabled to range

through the vast expanse of Physical Knowledge, that the attestations to the Divine wisdom and power will come with the full force of demonstration. It is indeed possible—there may be an understanding so dull and insensible to every thing that is not materially present—that the marks of adaptation may be unheeded from first to last; and so, not a thought be directed to Him who formed the system which is the object of study, and commissioned it to bear unceasing witness to himself. Of such a case I will only say that it is an anomaly in the intellectual world; which, however it is to be accounted for, may be considered as of at least some service, in reminding us, by its rare occurrence, of the law by which the human mind is generally governed in such investigations.

On the whole, Natural Theology—I mean, the present branch of it—is founded on the observation of nature;—on the study of nature, by whatever means—mathematical or experimental—it may be conducted. It *is*, in fact, Natural Philosophy—Physical science in its utmost extent—studied with especial attention to the marks of design, which are in succession furnished by the objects of inquiry.

The first teachers and preachers of Christianity were of course aware that there must be some fact or principle, universally admitted, which should form the basis of their instructions and exhortations; and that which they required was furnished by the world around them. It is indeed interesting to observe in what manner they dwelt upon the natural evidences of a Divine Being, and a Providence ruling over all. St Paul, when writing to the Romans, avails himself of the "great argument" arising from "the things that do appear," to prove that while the Gentiles thus knew God, or might have known him, they were "without excuse" in that "they glorified him not as God;" and when addressing the inhabitants of Lycaonia, he appeals to the bounties showered down upon them on every side, as indications of a God whose attribute is goodness. On leaving the Apostolic age, we find the argument, from contrivance and adjustment for beneficial purposes, much employed by the antient Apologists for Christianity; and at no subsequent period has the state of mankind, in a religious point of view, rendered the argument of little consequence. As we descend to ages nearer to our own, there is satisfaction in the

thought that the argument sustained no injury from the lapse of time; but that, on the contrary, every accession to human knowledge has constantly given it new stability. Modern science has thus abundantly ministered to the cause of Religion. It is indeed, comparatively speaking, but recently that the great discoveries in science have been made; and he who has penetrated the farthest, into regions of knowledge previously unexplored, never fancied that, as he travelled onward, the marks of design were growing dim. It never, for a moment, occurred to him, that he was tending towards the boundary line of Intelligence—beyond which lie the domains of darkness and confusion. Into whatsoever new region the adventurer may have advanced, he always found himself, as he went along, surrounded by the manifestations of the Deity. We have, indeed, lately seen the most recondite departments of science attesting the attributes of God, in characters as vivid, to the eye of the Philosopher, as those in which the grand and obvious processes and appearances of nature attest the same attributes, to the common eye.*

* It cannot but be understood that allusion is here made to the great variety of important information communicated to the world, by the Authors of the Bridgewater Treatises.

Let

Such are my views of this branch of Natural Theology; which, I am inclined to believe, are not far from coinciding with those of Lord Brougham, although they are somewhat differently unfolded. The first section of His Lordship's Discourse, entitled *Introductory view of the method of investigation pursued in the physical and psychological Sciences*, appears to be occupied by the statement and refutation of an objection to the plan of deducing Theological knowledge of any kind, from the observation and study of natural phenomena. Now, it is very seldom that either an objection, or the reply to it, can be fairly estimated, till the matter objected to is tolerably well understood; and therefore, in addition to the preceding account of Natural Theology, I shall give an abstract of Lord Brougham's opinions on the same subject, before I advert to the contents of the first section.

Let me here observe that, in imitation of Lord Brougham, I have directed attention solely to such material objects as, by their own manifest organisation, or by their indisputable relation to each other, prove contrivance. His Lordship has, in my opinion, done wisely in confining his remarks to such objects. Arguments indeed have been drawn, in proof of a Deity, from the very existence of the material world, independently of the contrivance which it displays; but arguments of that nature, whatever may be their validity, do not seem well adapted to Discourses like the present.

The second section (pp. 28—51) purports to furnish a *Comparison of the physical branch of Natural Theology with Physics*.... It has already been observed—not in so many words, but to the same effect—that nature may by possibility be observed and studied solely for the purpose of ascertaining facts:—and that it may also be studied with the additional purpose of tracing the marks of contrivance and adaptation which may be presented. In the one case, it is simply Physical Knowledge or Science; in the other, according to the degree of attention paid to the proofs of design, it partakes of the nature of Natural Theology—so called, because such indications of contrivance and adaptation are the natural evidences of the existence of a God all-wise and powerful. Lord Brougham states the matter thus:—

"The two inquiries—that into the nature and constitution of the universe, and that into the evidence of design which it displays—.... are not only closely allied one to the other, but are to a very considerable extent identical. The two paths of investigation for a great part of the way completely coincide." (p. 28.)

Some notice has already been taken (pp. 30 and 32) of Lord Brougham's account of the phy-

sical part of Natural Theology, namely, that it "partakes of the nature" of physical science, and "resembles" it; the conclusion being, that there was some difference between Natural Theology and physical science, although they were very like each other.... We are now informed that they are "to a very considerable extent identical" and "for a great part of the way completely coincide;" that is, are the *same* study. In all this there is an unsteadiness of view, which causes much embarrassment. If his Lordship had throughout the Discourse maintained the doctrine which here appears to be laid down—that the results of physical science are themselves the facts which prove design and adaptation, and so become principles of Natural Theology—much of that obscurity would have been avoided which is now, I believe very generally, felt to pervade the work. The purport of the following extract does not seem very clear:—

"It is impossible to deny, that what induction thus teaches forms the great bulk of all Natural Theology. The question which the theologian always puts upon each discovery of a purpose manifestly accomplished is this: 'Suppose I had this operation to perform by mechanical means, and were acquainted with the laws regulating the action of matter, should I attempt it in any other way than I here see

practised?' If the answer is in the negative, the consequence is irresistible, that some power capable of acting with design, and possessing the supposed knowledge, employed the means which we see used. But this negative answer is the result of reasoning founded upon induction, and rests upon the same evidence whereon the doctrines of physical science are discovered and believed. And the inference to which that negative answer so inevitably leads is a truth in Natural Theology; for it is only another way of asserting that design and knowledge are evinced in the works and functions of nature." (p. 32.)

Whatever effect, produced by the constitution of nature, is under consideration, it seems as if "the theologian" might go a step farther than Lord Brougham has allowed him to go, and ask, 'Is not the operation performed with far greater ease, and far more effectually, than it would beforehand be possible for me even to imagine?'—and the answer would certainly lead to the acknowledgment of an agent wise and powerful in the highest degree.... From what cause it arises, I know not; but the latter part of the quotation—beginning, 'But this negative answer,' &c.—seems to add nothing to the stability of the conclusion; and indeed, by multiplying words, tends rather to excite doubt. Physical knowledge, which is founded on

induction, furnishes results, which when duly examined present evidences of design; it is also manifest from constant observation, or if you please from an induction of particulars, that contrivance never exists except as the effect of an intelligent cause; and so the facts of physical knowledge become the principles of Natural Theology. Hence, Natural Theology is an inductive science. This is probably what Lord Brougham intended to state.

With the general views which are developed in this section, the noble and learned writer combines several appropriate instances of the manner in which, as knowledge of the subject is increased, the proofs of design and contrivance become more convincing. For example: Consider the relation between the eye and light. The effect is — distinct vision; and at the very first thought, we cannot help feeling that in some way the medium and the organ of vision must have been designedly adjusted to each other.... Again, in order that any object may be distinctly seen, it is requisite that an exact image of it should be formed in the back part of the eye: — in other words, that the light proceeding from each point of the object should pass through

the eye, and converge to a corresponding point on the retina. When the manner in which this takes place is understood, the impression, that there must have been an intentional adjustment, is exceedingly strengthened. Light is not only refracted, in passing from one medium into another, but refracted unequally; and the consequence, unless counteracted, would be, that objects would appear discoloured. Now the figure and constitution of the eye are such, that light, with all its different degrees of refrangibility, is made to converge upon the retina, and form the image required for distinct vision. The difficulty overcome is extreme, as is well known to all who are conversant with optical instruments. Here then must have been intelligence; here must have been contrivance; here must have been creative power. Moreover, the mode in which, as the Anatomist demonstrates, the eye is enabled to perform its various functions, introduces an almost endless series of instances of design, all confirming the same truth. It is thus that, while every department of physical knowledge contributes its own proofs of adaptation, it also gives new force to the proofs derived from correlative sources.

After dwelling upon the wonderful power of contrivance manifested in the structure of the human eye, Lord Brougham touches on the remarkable variations in the organ of sight, by which it is in the most exquisite manner adapted to the use of different animals, according to their respective conditions and habits of life. I should have great delight in describing, in my own language, these and several other instances of design adduced by the noble author; not from any hope of rendering them more striking than His Lordship has done—but because a person who takes his own point of view, and writes from the impression of his own mind, will generally hit on something, not generally noticed, which may be worthy of consideration. Believing, however, that neither Lord Brougham's interesting observations, nor Dr Paley's forcible arguments, on such subjects, will be unknown to any reader of these pages, I deem it needless to attempt to add strength to the conviction which their statements cannot fail to produce. If therefore I venture to offer a few remarks upon the example drawn from the Planetary System, it will be for the purpose of illustrating the mode of reasoning which leads to the truths of Natural Theology.

On the first intelligent survey of the heavens, we feel as if some Great Power had been in operation. "The heavens declare the glory of God: and the firmament showeth his handy work." Such is the first impression; and the feeling, arising from the vastness and magnificence of the scene, is strengthened by the adaptations which are successively presented to the attention. The obvious relation of the earth and moon to the sun—the general scheme of the solar system—the bodies of which it consists—their masses and distances from the common centre—their various revolutions, which are by degrees familiarized to our apprehension—all these things fill the mind with ideas of contrivance and power in combination—far exceeding any which had before been excited. But when, by the aid of principles derived from observation and experiment, and applied by means of the strictest mathematical processes—we trace the effects of the law by which the bodies "in their courses" gravitate towards each other;—when we prove that certain changes, which might be supposed to indicate an eventual derangement of the whole system, are the inevitable consequences of the bodies' mutual gravitation—and

that although such changes may go on increasing for thousands of years, yet the time must arrive when they will begin to decrease by similar degrees—and so on, by continual alternations of increase and decrease;—when it thus appears that, as the system now exists, its stability is secure;—and finally, when it is a matter of demonstration that, if the masses and distances and forms of the orbits of the bodies had been materially different from what they are, the disturbances arising from their mutual actions, instead of being periodical, would soon have thrown every thing into confusion;—we are lost in astonishment at the wisdom with which the whole has been ordained. There is, in all this, what no man can account for, otherwise than by saying, that it was the Will of the Supreme Being, that so it should be.

Here, then, we have observation, experiment, induction and the most refined processes of mathematical investigation—all conducing to the establishment of facts, which at once lead to the fundamental principle of Natural Religion. In what manner we learn to pass, as by necessary consequence, from facts displaying contrivance and adaptation, to the existence of some Great

Intelligence from whom they originated, I have endeavoured to explain, in the beginning of the present section. It is by the constant observation of the connexion between a thinking agent and the appearances of design; or, as Lord Brougham states the matter, by an induction of particulars. On this subject, His Lordship thus writes:

"The position which we reach by a strict process of induction, is common to Natural Philosophy and Natural Theology—namely, that a given organ performs a given function, or a given arrangement possesses a certain stability, by its adaptation to mechanical laws. We have said that the process of reasoning is short and easy, by which we arrive at the doctrine more peculiar to Natural Theology—namely, that some power acquainted with and acting upon the knowledge of those laws, fashioned the organ with the intention of having the function performed, or constructed the system that it might endure. Is not this last process as much one of strict induction as the other? It is plainly only a generalization of many particular facts; a reasoning from things known to things unknown; an inference of a new or unknown relation from other relations formerly observed and known.....When we see that a certain effect, namely, distinct vision, is performed by an achromatic instrument, the eye, why do we infer that some one must have made it? Because we nowhere and at no time have had any experience of any one thing fashioning itself, and indeed cannot form to ourselves any distinct idea of what such a process as self-creation means; and

further, because when we ourselves would produce a similar result, we have recourse to like means. Again, when we perceive the adaptation of natural objects and operations to a perceived end, and thence infer design in the maker of these objects, and superintender of these operations, why do we draw this conclusion? Because we know by experience that if we ourselves desired to accomplish a similar purpose, we should do so by the like adaptation; we know by experience that this is design in us, and that our proceedings are the result of such design; we know that if some of our works were seen by others, who neither were aware of our having made them, nor of the intention with which we made them, they would be right should they, from seeing and examining them, both infer that we had made them, and conjecture why we had made them." (pp. 42—44.)

In confirmation of these views of the subject, which for the most part appear to be correct, Lord Brougham adverts to the recent speculations on the remains of animals, the whole species of which are extinct; dwelling upon the conclusions, respecting the forms, magnitudes and habits of the animals, which have been drawn from a careful examination of those remains. His Lordship considers the inference "from examining a few bones, or it may be a single fragment of a bone"—that, "in the wilds where it was found there lived and ranged,

some thousands of years ago, an animal wholly different from any we ever saw, and from any of which any account, any tradition, written or oral, has reached us, nay, from any that ever was seen by any person of whose existence we ever heard"— as founded on a strict and rigorous induction; and not less so the inference of the being of an unseen God, from the consideration of the contrivances and adaptations which prevail throughout nature. Most assuredly, the facts of contrivance and adaptation in nature are as certain as the existence of the remains in question; and as certainly does the observation of design refer the mind to a designer, as the view of the remains to an animal to which they belonged; but I have some doubt whether the illustration from *the remains* will render the reasoning from *design* more cogent.

When we compare the grand operations of nature, as they are presented to us in the heavenly regions, with the minuter processes which prevail in the animal and vegetable kingdoms as existing on this earth, we find the latter remarkably distinguished from the former, by the law of production and reproduction which belongs to them.

Now, the evidences of contrivance and adaptation are nowhere so immediately conspicuous as in the individual instances of organised existence; hence Dr Paley and some other philosophers draw, from this latter source, what they consider to be the most convincing proofs of a creating and preserving power. It is not for the purpose of disputing the justness of such an opinion that I mention the subject; for indeed an argument of this sort will leave different impressions on different minds, and even on the same mind at different times. My intention is rather to point out the peculiarity of each mode of argument; without the least wish to exalt either of them, at the expense of the other.... In the language of Scripture, "the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear*;" and thus, with regard to one great division of the natural world, there is a cause of existence to which reference is immediately made. Throughout the animal kingdom also there is an immediate cause of existence. Now Dr Paley has shown, in the most admirable manner, that, if the subject be well considered, these proximate causes of existence

* Mark, iv. 28.

do not in the least impair the force of the argument for a First Cause, drawn from the appearances of contrivance and adaptation. Yet in some way or other—it may proceed from not duly considering the matter—but in some way or other, the proximate cause does with some minds, as I have frequently had occasion to observe, raise a difficulty in the reasoning, which it requires time and attention to surmount.... On the contrary, when we betake ourselves to the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, and think that they are still, as for ages they have been, performing their various revolutions—we can conceive no *material* cause of their existence; and we ascend without interruption to that Almighty Being, who "commanded, and they were created." Ever since the author of these pages has had the capacity to engage in speculations like the present, he has availed himself of such opportunities as occurred to him, to ascertain, as far as might be, the effects of natural appearances, upon the minds of intelligent persons, without pretensions to learning or science. On occasions of that kind, he has remarked the depth of religious feeling, produced by a view of the heavens. More than once he has witnessed some

particular phenomenon pointed out, as a full proof of the being of a God; and more than once heard the simple but emphatic declaration—*That is enough!*... It appears, therefore, that the marks of design and adaptation are, in the one case, more obvious; and that, in the other, the transition is easier from the work to the Artificer. But the fact is that, whether we direct our attention to the heavens or the earth, there is a voice which proclaims, in language not to be misunderstood, the greatness of that power and wisdom, by which "all things consist."

Having stated my own views of the physical branch of Natural Theology, in connexion with those of Lord Brougham, I now proceed to the objection—which was mentioned page 42—to the mode of reasoning adopted in this section. The reader will bear in mind that the observations, which immediately follow, are intended to present, in a compressed form, what is contained in the 'Discourse' from page 15 to page 27.

The objects of contemplation and those of active pursuit—into which all that occupies the attention of mankind may be divided—have influence upon each other. Physical science, even

when studied for its own sake, is frequently made subservient to the ordinary concerns of life: and the mind, while engaged in practical matters, may hit upon an important scientific truth. In the same way, the study of the mind may suggest practical means of regulating its own operations; and what is followed from a mere desire of mental enjoyment may suggest a valuable truth in mental science. Moreover, the objects of contemplation in these sciences, so connected with each other, are made known to us either by our senses or by internal consciousness; and it is of such objects, whether physical or mental, that we investigate the properties and relations. This is human science. But we may leave the study of individual objects; and betake ourselves to the consideration of mind and matter in general—the first cause of their existence—the purposes for which they exist—and their final destination. Hence, it is contended, arises another science, entirely distinct from the former, and resting upon evidence peculiarly its own. This is Divine Knowledge—Theology—Religion—or by whatever name the science may be called.

This, if I mistake not, is the substance of the objection detailed in the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th

pages of the 'Discourse.' It seems to be a vague reasoning beforehand—a mere theory—concerning that which is to be ascertained only by actual examination of the things themselves. Nothing, as it appears to me, can be more absurd, than thus to decide that the objects of contemplation, whether physical or mental, do *not* present indications of their having originated in creative power; and if, on inquiry, we find that they do present sufficient indications to that effect, it will become us to trace the consequences of such a fact, and see whether we have not the means of obtaining as much information as ought to satisfy us—respecting both their present existence and their final destination.

Lord Brougham answers the objection by putting the case of a "superficial reasoner," imagining that he had done a great thing when he had "divided the objects, with which philosophy, Natural and Mental, is conversant, into two classes—those objects of which we know the existence by our senses and our consciousness—and those objects of which we only know the existence by a process of reasoning, founded upon something originally presented by the senses or by consciousness." His Lordship then shows by examples that, however

distinct these objects may appear to be—the distinction cannot in point of fact be rigorously maintained; and concludes, that "the evidence upon which our assent to both classes of truths reposes is of the same kind, namely, the inferences drawn by reasoning from sensations or ideas, originally presented by the external senses, or by our inward consciousness." Hence, "there *may be* no better ground for admitting an essential difference" in the case previously stated, than in this of the "superficial reasoner." The result of the whole discussion is, that plausible as may appear the distinction between human science and divine science, it is too precarious an assumption for any one to adopt, who is in quest of real knowledge; and that we must actually study the science of Natural Theology, before we venture to determine the nature of its evidence, or the validity of the reasoning on which it depends.

Lord Brougham having appropriated twelve pages of his Discourse to the consideration of an objection to Natural Theology, which he thought it requisite to remove before the main subject was entered upon, I could not but present, as I have now done, at least an outline of the argument

on each side. That the matter is made very intelligible, I cannot expect; for—whether from His Lordship's mode of treating it, or from some inherent difficulty—it is exceedingly obscure from first to last. Having, however, ventured to intimate, that the objection, from its very nature and form, is of little or no weight, I need only say that, in my opinion, there is the less reason to be solicitous about the reply; the tendency of which is simply to furnish an answer, in the negative, to the Noble Lord's question—"If, then, the distinction which at first appeared solid, is found to be without any warrant in the different kinds of human science, has it any better grounds when we apply it to draw the line between that branch of philosophy itself, and the other which has been termed Divine, or Theology?"—And thus, the student is sent to the science itself, to ascertain the validity of its claims to attention.

To give a summary account of what has been laid before the reader, and so to bring this part of the subject to a close:—From a steady contemplation of the appearances of nature we deduce the being of a God, whose attributes are wisdom and power. Wisdom is knowledge manifesting

itself in action. Knowledge, therefore, and power belong unto God. In treatises on Natural Theology, it is usual to show the necessity of expanding our notions of these perfections to the uttermost, and of considering Omniscience and Omnipotence as the attributes of the Deity. These subjects are briefly discussed by Dr Paley; more fully by Dr Clarke; and at still greater length by Abernethy, in his *Discourses on the Being and Natural Perfections of God.* The same authors have dwelt, more or less, upon the Eternity, the Spirituality and the Unity of the Divine Being. The Attributes now enumerated are generally called the Natural Attributes of the Deity.

After all that has been observed with regard to the perfections of the Supreme, there is yet one point, connected with this branch of the subject, which deserves especial notice. In our survey of the material world, we can scarcely avoid being bewildered by the numberless manifestations of the Divine power and wisdom, which force themselves upon our attention. But what, it may be asked, are the general effects of the arrangements and operations we behold, upon the well-being and happiness of the myriads of sensitive creatures

which, in succession, live for a time on this earth? In other words, what is the character of the Deity, in relation to animated nature? The *Benevolence* of the Deity, in this respect, has been repeatedly evinced. Abernethy, already referred to, has written ably and warmly upon the subject. Dr Balguy, in his *Divine Benevolence asserted and vindicated*, discusses the matter philosophically. But whoever would wish to know nearly the whole of what can be advanced upon the subject, may experience the gratification of having it presented to him—with fairness and precision—with an imagination teeming with striking illustrations and in language which never loses its freshness—above all, with grateful piety towards God and kindliness of feeling towards every thing that breathes—by Dr Paley, in his chapter, *On the Goodness of the Deity.*

It is no mean proof of the real value of an argument, that its force has been acknowledged, by the most enlightened of our race, from the first moment of recorded time to the present. The simple mention of the Old Testament will suggest numerous passages, in which the glories of the world, and its various adaptations to the

well-being of mankind, are held forth, as clear manifestations of the greatness and power and wisdom and goodness of God. We find the obvious purposes and contrivances, prevailing on every side, mentioned by the most celebrated writers of Greece and Rome, as evidences of a Divine Creator and Natural Governor of the Universe. Socrates, according to the narrative of Xenophon, discourses with great intelligence on the proofs of the Divine wisdom exhibited by the various adaptations of the parts of the human frame; and, on a subsequent occasion, on the provision so beneficently made for mankind, by the constitution of nature.* Plato, towards the conclusion of his Timæus, discusses the same subjects, at considerable length. The greater part of the second book of Cicero's Treatise, *On the Nature of the Gods*, is occupied by a statement of the admirable arrangements of the visible world, in proof of an overruling Providence. It is not because the arguments employed, by these and other antient philosophers, are more convincing than those of modern writers, that the preceding references have been given; but because it is of importance to know

* Xen. Memorab. I. IV. 4—11, and IV. III. 3—10.

and recollect, that the appearances of design, which every where abound, have really had the effect of raising the minds of men, whose means of acquiring knowledge differed most widely from our own—men, whom we cannot think of without reverence—to the existence of an Intelligent Cause of all things.

On bringing this section to a close, I would exhort the younger students to read Dr Paley's Treatise again and again; not merely for the purpose of obtaining the information which it cannot fail to communicate, but also to learn from it, the art of observing nature for themselves. Let me also advise them, when in the midst of their philosophical speculations, to keep steadily in view the Theological bearings of the objects of their pursuits. Should they happily resolve to act upon this suggestion—whatever may be their future condition in life, they will be deeply sensible of the wisdom of their determination.

SECTION II.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

(Discourse, Section III. pp. 52—80.)

THE object of the preceding and the present branch of Natural Theology is the same—to trace the evidences of the being and attributes of God; which is also effected in each case by the same means—by the consideration of facts, and by reasoning on their relations to each other. In this consists the difference between the two branches—namely, that in the preceding, the argument depends upon the constitution of external nature—in the present, upon that of the human mind. Now, things material address themselves to our senses in a manner not to be gainsaid; many of their uses and adaptations are incontrovertible; and thus the characters of design stamped upon them are, to rational creatures, as certain as the existence of the things themselves:—whereas the faculties of the mind, becoming known to us by internal consciousness

and reflection, are — although, as facts, equally certain—yet of a more recondite nature; and do not very distinctly unfold their mutual relations, except to those persons who have been trained to somewhat of a subtile mode of thinking. From this account, it is clear that the physical branch of Natural Theology will always be more popular than the psychological; for the former well accords with the usual tendency to reason through the medium of sensible objects—while the latter, to adopt one of Lord Brougham's happy expressions, "requires a process of abstraction alien from the ordinary habits of most men." (p. 25.) What, however, is difficult, to the generality of people, is not on that ground dubious in itself. For any thing, therefore, that has here been stated, the truth may be that, to those who are able to pursue the inquiry, the result will prove as satisfactory in the psychological, as in the physical branch.

Very seldom, even under favourable circumstances, do the conformation and properties of any one's mental faculties begin to attract his own attention, till his understanding has been much exercised in the acquisition of knowledge; and

amidst the various pursuits of after-life, very seldom does the human mind, although so wonderful in its operations, become an object of continued study. Some information indeed, respecting the intellectual frame, is occasionally derived from Metaphysical Writers; and if, on a little reflection, that information appears to accord in a moderate degree with what people have experienced in themselves, they are for the most part satisfied with the knowledge so obtained. Those persons however, who are so disposed, have the means of making out a series of facts, concerning the various mental powers, their modes of operation, and their relations and adaptations to each other; which facts constitute the most valuable part of what is called psychological science, or the philosophy of the human mind. Moreover, as the conclusions, in the physical branch of Natural Theology, are drawn from the facts of physical science—so are the conclusions, in the psychological branch, from the facts of mental science. The adjustments discoverable in the intellectual system bear witness, no less than the marks of contrivance in the material world, to the existence and attributes of a Supreme Intelligence. From the foregoing ob-

servations, some general notions may possibly be obtained, respecting the nature of that branch of science which forms the subject of the present section.

That there are, on this earth, beings possessing the power of thought—is a fact which, the more it is considered, will of itself the more distinctly prove the existence of a Creator, from whom all power of thought is derived. Reason and understanding can be assigned to nothing less than "the inspiration of the Almighty*." If my purposes, in the course of the present section, did not require me to cite the opinions of several eminent writers, in relation to this subject, I should here venture briefly to state my own.

With regard to the various faculties of the human mind, Lord Brougham has shown, at some length, in what way they certify, by their adaptation to each other for the attainment of important ends, that they could have been formed only by that wisdom and power, to which we can assign no limits. On this subject, a few slight sketches, suggested by His Lordship's drawings, (pp. 59—71.) may not be uninteresting.

* Job xxxii. 8.

First, It is manifest that ideas, derived from external things and from internal consciousness, form but the *materials* of knowledge. Knowledge arises from the comparison of ideas, by the power of *reasoning*. But without the power of *attention*, to fix the mind upon the ideas to be compared, reasoning would be of little avail. For the production, therefore, of any considerable results, these two powers ought to bear some proportion to each other; and accordingly, we find each of them by exercise becoming more effective. This fact belongs to a law which pervades our mental frame—that those of its powers, on which its energy mainly depends, are strengthened by *habit*. Here then is design — contrivance. Two powers of eminent utility co-exist in the mind, which by their co-operation render the understanding capable of accomplishing great works; and they are strengthened by use and habit, when either or both of them might in that way have been enfeebled. Moreover, to mention another remarkable and apparently intended advantage of a similar kind—the exertion of those powers becomes more easy and agreeable by repetition, when it might in consequence have been more difficult and distasteful.

Secondly, To incite us to the exercise of the reasoning power, which exercise is in every respect of importance to us, there is the principle of *curiosity*—a desire of knowing what, as yet, we know not. This principle, by connecting the idea of gratification with fresh acquirements, still urges us onwards in the pursuit of them. For a very similar purpose, but of greater moment—although not mentioned by Lord Brougham—there is *the love of truth*; not as something that is new, but as something that is in conformity with the actual state of things—representing them exactly as they are. Correlative with the love of truth is the aversion to what is false or erroneous. This is a painful feeling; and to rid ourselves of it, we willingly encounter the most laborious exertions of the understanding. In all this there is contrivance. The exercise of the reasoning faculty conduces to the well-being—the improvement—of the mind; and we are prompted to that exercise by curiosity after what is new, when novelty might have had no charms for us. Many considerations, also, lead us to infer that we are designed for the attainment of truth; and we are so constituted as to love truth

and hate falsehood, when we might have been indifferent to them both.

Thirdly, There is the faculty of *memory*—the power of *retaining* knowledge. On this faculty we remark, as on the faculty of reasoning, that it depends upon *attention* and is strengthened by *habit*. In proof of the important purposes to which memory is subservient, the following particulars, amongst innumerable others, may be observed:—it is the most tenacious of things striking; things interesting; things felt to be intrinsically valuable; things well considered; things which there is an anxiety to remember. Can all this have possibly arisen, otherwise than from the will of a Being all-wise and powerful?... And yet more, what would have been the consequence, if there had not been such a faculty? Without such a faculty, in vain would the senses have presented objects to the mind, and reason have compared the ideas they excited. Knowledge, there could have been none. We could have had nothing approaching to it, but a succession of transient perceptions. We might indeed have derived a passing amusement from the aspect of what is new; but truth could have afforded

no gratification, for we should not have had the power or the consciousness of possessing it.... But still farther, how ill would memory, if unimproved by habit, have been adapted to the continual means of information, with which almost every condition of life abounds;—how fatally have been opposed to the beneficial tendencies of an increasing power of attention, and a more skilful exertion of the reasoning faculty. Aiding each other, then, as these intellectual powers are in fact found to do, the unavoidable conclusion seems to be that all this must have originally been so ordained.... Finally, if neither the attention bestowed on things, nor certain qualities appertaining to them, had the effect of fixing objects more firmly and more prominently in the memory —that is, if every portion of knowledge (however much or however little regarded) were carelessly and confusedly deposited there as a matter of course—how much would the difficulty be increased, of finding what might at any time be especially wanted; how much at variance would be the constitution of the memory, with that of other most important mental faculties, exercising as they do the powers of discrimination and pre-

ference! In this point of view then, as well as in the others, we find the evidences of design and contrivance signally displayed.

Fourthly, It is not only requisite that we should retain what we acquire, but in numberless instances of vast moment that our knowledge should be at hand when called for. Now, there can be no doubt that things similar, things connected by place or time, even things strongly contrasted with each other, are, to use a common expression, naturally associated in the mind—that is, by an arrangement independent of the will; so that the recollection of one thing brings its associates, almost to a certainty, along with it. Moreover, by habit, artificial associations of things may be formed, leading to the same result. Without the means of thus eliciting our knowledge when wanted, to what little purpose would our intellectual stores have been accumulated! In this manner, we find the proofs of design multiplying upon us at every step we take.

Fifthly, Although the effect of *habit*, upon the faculties of the mind, has been more than once mentioned, the subject is deserving of a separate notice. It is, indeed, almost entirely on practice

and habit that we rely, for acquiring the power of producing the most striking results we can hope to produce. In our first attempts, whatever the intellectual operation may be, we are able to perform but little; and that little with great labour, and very awkwardly withal. And this is not merely because our ability is defective; for it appears to be less than it really is, from being improperly applied. By degrees, under the influence of habit, our power is increased; and, what is of equal moment, applied to less disadvantage. The process goes on, till at last there is scarcely the consciousness of the slightest exertion. And thus, the ultimate effects of our faculties are frequently such as to astonish by the promptness and facility with which they are produced. Lord Brougham gives, as an instance of this, the performance of a practised *extempore* speaker; and, as might be expected, we every where trace, in his representation, the hand of a great master of the art. I cannot refrain from quoting the passage:—

"A practised orator will declaim in measured and in various periods—will weave his discourse into one texture—form parenthesis within parenthesis—excite the passions, or move to laughter—take a turn in his discourse from an

accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric for five minutes to come, and pursuing in like manner the illustrations to which it gives rise—mould his diction with a view to attain or to shun an epigrammatic point, or an alliteration, or a discord; and all this with so much assured reliance on his own powers, and with such perfect ease to himself, that he shall even plan the next sentence while he is pronouncing off-hand the one he is engaged with, adapting each to the other, and shall look forward to the topic which is to follow and fit in the close of the one he is handling to be its introducer; nor shall any auditor be able to discover the least difference between all this and the portion of the speech which he has got by heart, or tell the transition from the one to the other." (p. 63.)

This indeed is not an attainment which will rank high in the estimation of persons of sober judgment; but it admirably displays the effect of *habit* upon those faculties, which, of course, we are capable of directing to objects of greater or of less importance.... If it should be said that much time is consumed, before habit has communicated the power of producing the striking results just treated of—the remark is true; but, supposing the faculties to have been originally stronger, without being susceptible of improvement in point either of strength or adroitness, is there not ground to infer that, whether we consider the time which must have

been occupied by individual exertions or the aggregate of the results, the advantage is in favour of the present constitution of the human mind? Besides, the possession of faculties susceptible of improvement is an indication that they ought to be improved. This view of the matter, indeed, relates to man considered as a moral agent; and thus, encroaches upon what, according to Lord Brougham's division of Natural Theology, belongs to the *ethical* department of the science. The truth is, that it is very difficult to keep the departments perfectly distinct from each other; and in the endeavour to do so, almost impossible to avoid weakening the force of our conclusions.

Sixthly, There are the *passions* and *affections* and *sympathies* of our nature; without which, mankind would not have been fitted for the various relations of social life. To state the fact is to prove design: and that worthy of the highest wisdom. Then again, there is *hope;* to afford, even amidst prosperity and ease, something that may exercise and interest the mind—and sustain it amidst toil and trouble:—*fear;* to inspire prudence, and to protect from danger:—and so on. Indeed, imperfectly acquainted, as we still are, with the entire

workings of the human mind, there is scarcely a feeling or a sentiment, natural to man, which does not indicate to us that it exists for some end which may be referred to the providence of God.

After discussing these topics, the Noble and Learned Author once more adverts to the principle of *curiosity*, the object of which is novelty; and shows its great efficacy in exciting the mind to the acquisition of knowledge. In connexion with this principle, His Lordship mentions, as a powerful means of diffusing knowledge, *the desire of communicating* it. There might have been only a disposition to accumulate—to lock up the treasures amassed; but how much better does it accord with the condition of human existence, that he who possesses information should have satisfaction in communicating it to others.... In addition to this, I may perhaps be allowed—although it will occasion some repetition—to observe that, before the faculties of reason and judgment have been much brought into act, the attention is mainly excited by novelty; but as the powers of discrimination are developed, *the qualities* of things become more and more the objects of regard. To the last, indeed, there is some attraction in novelty; yet,

after a time, the mind is not contented without propriety, utility and truth. As life advances, we expect, even in fiction, the semblance of reality. Truth—in history and in natural and moral science—is pursued with avidity. The fascination of mathematical inquiries arises from this—that they present a succession of truths unmixed with error. Now, we can conceive that knowledge might have recommended itself solely by its novelty; and so, whether correct or erroneous, might have been equally acceptable; but truth being conducive to the well-being of the individual and of society, it appears to have been an appointment of the Supreme Will that the human mind should be attached to truth for its own sake. With regard also to the diffusion of knowledge, we feel that, supposing a man to have an equal opportunity of communicating solid truth and specious fallacy, there would be an unwarrantable perversion of the faculties, in giving currency to the latter. The tendency of all this, to prove design, is incontrovertible. So likewise is the evidence that our intellectual frame originated in that Being, whose purposes were to make every thing work together for good.... On these subjects, I only throw out

hints, which might be easily expanded into essays. While the structure of the body, by the wonderful adjustments of its various parts, affords a decisive proof of the existence of creative wisdom, the mental constitution—with all "its bearings and its ties, its strong connexions, nice dependencies" —proclaims, in no less convincing language, the primal agency and intelligence of its Divine Author.

Lord Brougham, having discussed the subjects thus imperfectly noticed, takes a view of "the intellectual world as a whole;" and of the progress which the mind of man has been able to make, in consequence of its capacity, structure and dispositions. His Lordship justly considers the discoveries in various departments of knowledge—the wonders of Chemistry, of Optical Science, of Astronomy and of Pure Mathematics—as proving the surprising strength, activity and variety of the mental faculties; and thereby affording irresistible evidence of their derivation from that Power and Knowledge, to which we are utterly incapable of assigning any bounds. Upon this subject, although of vast consequence, I need not here dwell; as there will be occasion to adduce

the sentiments of various writers, with respect to it, in the course of the following pages.

In Lord Brougham's enumeration of the qualities of the human mind, there are some extraordinary omissions—which I seem called upon in some measure to supply.

In the first place, the Noble Author takes no notice of the faculties appertaining to the *Imagination:* a class of faculties which are of great importance in themselves, and frequently exert very considerable influence over the understanding and the affections. These faculties, therefore, can scarcely fail to present sufficient indications of their purposes and their origin.... Now, it has already been more than once observed that, in our earliest years, we are for the most part moved by mere curiosity:—things please us simply because they are new. We afterwards expect that knowledge should be the vehicle of truth. This view of the matter has reference to the reason—the judgment. With respect to the imagination also, we learn to survey, with indifference, objects which appear to be only new; and they must possess various recommendations, besides novelty, effectually to secure our regard. We are by no

means greatly delighted, unless we discover some traces of the quality called beauty; nor are we forcibly impressed, but by certain modifications of grandeur and sublimity. And thus, through the medium of the Imagination, we become sensible of the glories of the material world. The symmetry, the magnificence and the immensity of external nature excite our admiration and astonishment; and under the impulse of such feelings, we at once attribute whatever we behold of good and fair and great—all that indicates beneficence and skill and power, throughout the Universe—to the Will of the Supreme.

Poetry and the fine arts are considered as the peculiar province of the faculty, of which we are now treating; and if it be recollected how surely the nobler productions of the Poet, the Painter and the Sculptor tend to carry the mind onward in the search after excellence which is unattained, unseen, unconceived—and so to shadow forth modes of being, unspeakably more exalted than any of which we have ever been witnesses—there will be no doubt of the effect of Imagination in raising the mind to thoughts of the Most High, with whom alone dwelleth perfection.

The bearings of Imagination, upon subjects generally held to be under the sole dominion of reason, have never, I believe, been duly estimated; and I suspect that they would be found to be of far greater moment than might in the first instance be supposed. By some operation of that faculty we are aided at almost every step we take in the attainment of knowledge. In demonstrative science, it might be thought that Imagination could scarcely interpose without some injury; and yet—to mention only one case, amongst many, to the contrary—I am persuaded that no student of Astronomy ever passes, from the contemplation of the diagrams required for the proof of his propositions to all that they represent in the heavenly regions, without a very considerable effort of Imagination.... Again, the love of truth of every kind, for itself, is a valuable principle; but too indefinite, as a principle of action: being indeed, without some other motive, almost incompatible with the pursuit of any one object. In the intellectual, as well as in the material world, the contrariety of equal attractions would be productive of rest. Imagination however, by communicating to some one class of truths a peculiar

power of attraction, determines the direction which the mind shall take. We thus behold the provision that has been made for the exertion of the mental faculties in the case of the individual; and at the same time for that diversity in the application of them, by different individuals, which tends to secure the cultivation of such various departments of knowledge, as may advance the general good.

Very striking, moreover, is the influence of the Imagination over the passions, the affections and the sympathies of our nature. It is, indeed, through that faculty that they mainly act. Divest their objects of all the colouring of the Imagination—and, instead of the feelings really existing, we should be left to little more than the perceptions of the senses and the conclusions of the understanding. How wisely therefore has it been ordained that an interest should thus be given to our relations to each other—by means of a power, which, at the same time, elevates the individual character, and ensures the most beneficial consequences to social life.

Lord Brougham, in the second place, omits to mention *the Human Will*;—the power of moving

and acting, according to the suggestions of the various faculties of the mind. Without such a power, indeed, we might indulge in contemplation, but what account could be given of the purposes of the bodily frame? The truth is, that the power of volition is that by which the mental and the corporeal faculties of man are *adapted* to each other; and it is quite impossible not to perceive, in that adaptation, the evidences of Supreme Wisdom.

But the last omission which I shall notice—and by far the most remarkable of all—is that of the power of *Conscience;*—the power by which every man is compelled to pass sentence of approbation or condemnation upon himself, on account of his own conduct. When, by means of the Will, the individual is enabled to carry his resolves—the combined result of his mental faculties—into effect, *who* sees not, and feels not, the important uses of this reflex operation of the mind, upon what has been done? In what manner the Conscience acquires the power, and vindicates to itself the right, of approbation and condemnation, needs not, for the present purpose, to be decided. The fact is sufficient; and every one becomes, in consequence, a moral agent—an accountable being. Now, con-

sider man apart from conscience, and there is nothing to restrain him from the exercise of his mental and corporeal faculties to the injury of others:—consider him under the controul of conscience, and he becomes *a law unto himself.* It is scarcely too much to assert that there is not, throughout the whole of external nature, a more striking instance of Divine adaptation, and Divine will, than is here presented. But this is not all. If God designed that man should thus become a moral agent, an accountable being—then has God intimated that He is Himself a Moral Governor of his intelligent creatures. In the preceding steps of our inquiry, we were enabled to discern the Natural Attributes of the Deity—as his power and wisdom; together with his benevolence in providing for the physical happiness of his sentient creatures; but having now taken into account the moral nature of man, as attested by the supremacy of conscience in the human constitution, we catch a glimpse of God's Moral Attribute of Justice—and of his purpose of finally rendering to every one according to his works.* . . . Whether Lord Brougham has omit-

* On this subject, thus writes Jeremy Taylor:—"It was soberly spoken of Tertullian, *Conscientia optima testis Divinitatis*; our conscience is the best argument in the world to prove there is a God. For

ted to notice this moral faculty, from inadvertence or from design—is uncertain. I have not observed, in any part of his 'Discourse,' that he has made the usual distinction between the Natural and the Moral Attributes of God.

Having, in this section, stated the proof, afforded by individual consciousness, of the existence of a thinking principle, possessing properties altogether distinct from those of matter; having touched on the intellectual powers of man, as attesting their derivation from the Divine Intelligence; having adduced a few of the adaptations of the faculties of the mind—as the reason, the affections, the imagination, the will and the conscience—to each other, and to the condition of human life; it is now time to advert to Lord Brougham's opinions, respecting the grounds of our confidence in the truth of this department of science. Of the nature and validity of those opinions the reader

For conscience is God's deputy; and the inferior must suppose a superior; and God and our conscience are like relative terms, it not being imaginable why some persons in some cases should be amazed and troubled in their minds for their having done a secret turpitude or cruelty; but that conscience is present with a message from God, and the men feel inward causes of fear, when they are secure from without; that is, they are forced to fear God, when they are safe from men." *Ductor Dubitantium*, p. 2. fol. 1676.

will have an opportunity of judging, from the following extract:

"The evidence for the existence of mind is to the full as complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of matter. Indeed it is more certain and more irrefragable. The consciousness of existence, the perpetual sense that we are thinking, and that we are performing the operation quite independently of all material objects, proves to us the existence of a being different from our bodies, with a degree of evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of those bodies themselves, or of any other part of the material world. It is certain—proved, indeed, to demonstration—that many of the perceptions of matter, which we derive through the senses, are deceitful, and seem to indicate that which has no reality at all. Some inferences which we draw respecting it are confounded with direct sensation or perception, for example, the idea of motion: other ideas, as those of hardness and solidity, are equally the result of reasoning, and often mislead. Thus we never doubt, on the testimony of our senses, that the different parts of matter touch, that different bodies come in contact with one another, and with our organs of sense; and yet nothing is more certain than that there still is some small distance between the bodies which we think we perceive to touch. Indeed it is barely possible that all the sensations and perceptions which we have of the material world may be only ideas in our own minds: it is barely possible, therefore, that matter should have no existence. But that mind—that the sentient principle—that the thing or the being, which we call "*I*" and "*we*," and which thinks, feels, reasons—should have no

existence, is a contradiction in terms. Of the two existences, then, that of mind as independent of matter is more certain than that of matter apart from mind." (p. 56.)

Had His Lordship been content to maintain that "the evidence of mind [arising from consciousness or reflection] is to the full as complete as that [of the senses] upon which we believe in the existence of matter"—his argument in defence of mental science would have assuredly been "to the full as complete" as it is now felt to be, when thus connected with observations unfavourable to the evidence for the existence of material objects. On this subject, Mr Dugald Stewart expresses himself more cautiously: "From these considerations," he writes, "it appears that we have the same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body; nay, if there be any difference between the two cases, that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our perceptions."* ... Lord Brougham might perhaps imagine that the loss (should there be any) sustained by physical science, in conse-

* Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I. p. 3. 8vo.

quence of his observations, would be more than counterbalanced by the advantage gained, in the comparison, by mental science; but such, I fear, will not generally be the result, in the estimation of people. Satisfactorily to discuss a matter of this kind falls not within the scope of the present work. I may, however, be allowed to say that, anxious as I am, for what I deem good reasons, to support the validity of the evidence afforded by the human mind to the attributes of the Supreme, I cannot persuade myself that "the perpetual sense that we are thinking, and that we are performing the operation quite independently of all material objects," has any distinct meaning; much less that it "proves to us the existence of a being different from our bodies, with a degree of evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of those bodies themselves, or of any other part of the material world."

Provided that the principles of any department of inquiry be sound, and the consequences deduced from them correct, there is no need to be solicitous by what term the mode of reasoning is designated. Lord Brougham, however, appears to think that additional weight will be given to the psychological

branch of Natural Theology, by considering it as a portion of inductive science; and thus, from the preceding statements, he draws the subsequent conclusions:—

"It follows that the constitution and functions of the mind are as much the subjects of inductive reasoning and investigation, as the structure and actions of matter. The mind equally with matter is the proper subject of observation, by means of consciousness, which enables us to arrest and examine our own thoughts: it is even the subject of experiment, by the power which we have, through the efforts of abstraction and attention, of turning those thoughts into courses not natural to them, not spontaneous, and watching the results." (p. 58.)

That an individual may, by long-continued attention to the operations of his own mind, acquire very considerable knowledge of its various faculties; that he may compare his own experience of its operations, with that of others, as mentioned or recorded by them; that he may also compare the results of its operations, with the results of the operations of other minds; and that he may in this manner arrive at important facts connected with the economy of the human mind—there can be no doubt. If, in consequence, we should be told that some advantage may arise from calling

this process—*induction*, the term may very properly be employed. But when we are given to understand that, as portions of matter may be submitted to experiment, so likewise may "our own thoughts;"—which, we learn, may be "arrested," and "examined," and "turned into courses not natural to them;"—we shall for the most part be slow to believe either that the thing is practicable—or, the practicability being granted, that any satisfactory conclusions can be drawn from it. We shall not fail to recollect that not every part even of external nature can be thus brought under our control. The philosopher may observe the bodies of the Planetary System, but he cannot subject them to his experiments.

Lord Brougham having given, in another part of his volume, some instances of experiments on the thoughts, the subject will again require notice. What, therefore, has already been stated with regard to it may suffice for the present. This, however, appears to be the proper place to lay before the reader His Lordship's views of that long-continued experiment, on the human mind, which is usually denominated Education.

"At first sight, it may be deemed that there is an essential difference between the evidence from mental and from physical phenomena. It may be thought that mind is of a nature more removed from our power than matter—that over the masses of matter man can himself exercise some control—that, to a certain degree, he has a plastic power—that into some forms he can mould them, and can combine into a certain machinery—that he can begin and can continue motion, and can produce a mechanism by which it may be begun and maintained and regulated—while mind, it may be supposed, is wholly beyond his reach; over it he has no grasp; its existence alone is known to him, and the laws by which it is regulated;—and thus, it may be said, the great First Cause, which alone can call both matter and mind into existence, has alone the power of modulating intellectual nature. But when the subject is well considered, this difference between the two branches of science disappears with all the rest. It is admitted, of course, that we can no more create matter than we can mind; and we can influence mind in a way altogether analogous to our power of modulating matter. By means of the properties of matter we can form instruments, machines and figures. So, by availing ourselves of the properties of mind, we can affect the intellectual faculties—exercising them, training them, improving them, producing, as it were, new forms of the understanding. Nor is there a greater difference between the mass of rude iron from which we make the steel, and the thousands of watch-springs into which that steel is cut, or the chronometer which we form of this and other masses equally inert—than there is

between the untutored indocile faculties of a rustic, who has grown up to manhood without education, and the skill of the artist who invented that chronometer, and of the mathematician who uses it to trace the motions of the heavenly bodies." (pp. 71—73.)

It appears then, according to Lord Brougham's view of the subject, that the process of education, so far as the mind is concerned, is "altogether analogous" to "that of modulating matter;" to that, for instance, of taking "a mass of rude iron" —and converting it into steel—and by hammering and tempering and filing and polishing, reducing it to forms adapted to the most refined purposes. Now, in my judgment, no two things can be more unlike than the processes in question. If, indeed, His Lordship could take "the untutored indocile faculties of a rustic, who has grown up to manhood without education"—and by some ingenious methods, that he has invented, work up the said faculties, without fail, into powers qualified to improve and adorn man's condition—we might then fancy that there was some analogy between the smelting, the hammering and whatever else is applied to "the mass of rude iron"—and the operations performed upon the human mind. But the

Noble Lord is too sagacious to engage in such a project. He knows that, unless education is commenced at almost the earliest period of life, and followed up with the greatest attention, there is but little chance of a result which he could contemplate with satisfaction. The effect of education, in developing the faculties of the mind, has been justly compared with that of constant exercise, in giving symmetry and strength and agility to the body; and who ever attempted to illustrate the exercise, so beneficial to the corporeal frame, by the method of converting a piece of iron ore into the main-spring of a chronometer? Again, the progress of the mind, when properly educated, has been held similar to that of a plant, under due cultivation; and this has been done, because there is, in each case, a principle of vitality and of increasing strength, which cannot exist in materials exposed to the action of the furnace and the hammer. In mental, as in vegetable culture, the true system seems to be, to give encouragement, direction and liberty, to the energies of nature. No one doubts the effects of education upon the mind; but every one, who reflects on the subject, must doubt the wisdom of presenting them under the semblance

of " instruments, machines and figures, formed by the properties of matter."—The preceding observations will enable the reader to ascertain the sense in which the principles of psychological science are said to be established by a process of induction.

From facts deduced from observation and reflection, as stated in this section, we conclude that the human mind—with all its various faculties, admirably adapted as they are to each other, and to the condition of man as connected with the external world and with society—must have been derived from the One Supreme. To this conclusion we come, as the only explanation, that can be given, of the facts before us. Lord Brougham, in his anxiety that every part of Natural Theology should be considered as inductive science, thus endeavours to make out the inductive character of the transition from the facts to the conclusion just mentioned.

" The facts thus collected and compared together we are enabled to generalize, and thus to show that certain effects are produced by an agency calculated to produce them. Aware that if we desired to produce them, and had the power to employ this agency, we should resort to it for accomplishing our purpose, we infer both that some being exists capable of creating this agency, and that he employs

it for this end. The process is not like, but identical with, that by which we infer the existence of design in others (than ourselves) with whom we have daily intercourse. This kind of evidence is not like, but identical with, that by which we conduct all the investigations of intellectual and natural science." (pp. 77, 78.)

With regard to the preceding sentences, I feel confident that they were intended to convey some information to the world; although they seem to have failed in executing their commission. This, indeed, appears to be one of the instances in which the love of system has involved a plain matter in obscurity—and that, without any recompense for the evil inflicted.

Lord Brougham's Discourse was designed to present a general view of the nature and objects of Natural Theology, without the details of the science. His Lordship, however, has discussed the psychological branch with an attention, to particulars, not to be found in any other part of the work; and has stated his reasons for having done so. Those reasons I now proceed to consider.... "Nothing is more remarkable," the Noble Author observes, "than the care with which all the writers upon this subject, at least among the moderns, have confined themselves to the proofs afforded by

the visible and sensible works of nature, while the evidence furnished by the mind and its operations has been wholly neglected." (p. 52.) It is, therefore, to supply the omissions of others—or what His Lordship deems their omissions—that he has devoted himself with so much ardour to the Psychological branch of Natural Theology. Not content with the general charge of "neglect," of "the mind and its operations," by preceding writers, Lord Brougham has specified four, who have to answer for the oversight—Ray, Derham, Clarke, Paley. Let us see what can be alleged in each of these cases, before we advert to "all the writers upon this subject, at least among the moderns."

Against a well-known production of the first of the above mentioned authors, His Lordship advances the following charge:—"The celebrated book of Ray, on the Wonders of the Creation, seems to assume that the human soul has no separate existence—that it forms no part of the created system." (p. 52).... Now, as Counsel for the Defendant—His Lordship himself being allowed to be Judge—I submit, 1. That a person about to publish a book, has a right to select his own subject; and 2. That he who fairly discusses his subject is

not to be censured because he does not discuss other subjects: for example, a writer on Optics is not to be blamed for neglecting Electricity. I would submit also that the second edition of Ray's *Wisdom of God manifested in the works of the Creation* was published in the year 1692; and therefore long before the days of universal knowledge in which it is our happiness to live. The author, moreover, informs us, in his title-page, what are *the works of the Creation* of which he treats, viz. "The heavenly bodies, elements, meteors, fossils, vegetables, animals," and so on. Furthermore, he tells us, in his preface, on what principle he had decided the course to be taken:—"I have," he writes, "made choice of this subject, as thinking myself best qualified to treat of it:"—a mode of considering matters well deserving attention, even in times subsequent to those of Ray. From the preceding account of the purposes of this excellent man, it might have happened that he had left the mental powers unmentioned—the mention of them not being absolutely required by his subject. Ray, however, was not only a Philosopher, but a Religious Philosopher; and therefore was very far indeed from "assuming," as Lord Brougham ima-

gines, " that the human soul had no separate existence," or " that it formed no part of the created system." In his 61st page, he mentions " the vital flame residing in the blood, that keeps the bodily machine in motion, and renders it *a fit organ for the Soul to work by.*" Again, in his 165th page, towards the conclusion of the work, he thus writes:

" Let us hence duly learn to prize and value our souls. Is the body such a rare piece, what then is the soul? The body is but the husk or shell, the soul is the kernel; the body is but the cask, the soul the precious liquor contained in it; the body is but the cabinet, the soul the jewel; the body is but the ship or vessel, the soul the pilot; the body is but the tabernacle, and a poor clay tabernacle or cottage too, the soul the inhabitant; the body is but the machine or engine, the soul that ἐνδόν τι that actuates and quickens it; the body is but the dark lanthorn, the soul or spirit is the candle of the Lord that burns in it."....And afterwards (p. 168.) " We highly esteem and stand much upon our nobility, our birth and breeding, though we derive nothing from our ancestors but our bodies and corporeal qualities; and it is useful so far to value and improve this advantage, as to provoke us to imitate the good examples of our progenitors, not to degenerate from them, nor to do anything unworthy of our breeding; and yet the divine original of our souls, which are beams from the Father of Lights, and the immediate offspring of God Himself—τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν—hath little influence upon us to engage us to walk

worthily of our extraction, and to do nothing that is base or ignoble and unsuitable to the dignity of our birth."

Admitting, therefore, that the great Naturalist did not introduce into his work — what did not belong to it — a formal disquisition on the Soul, as proving the existence of the Deity, yet how deeply was he impressed with the excellence of the nature of the Soul, compared with that of the body! Read the preceding extracts from "the celebrated book of Ray"—and then think of Lord Brougham's declaration, that it "seems to assume that the human soul has no separate existence—that it forms no part of the created system!" I should have thought that Ray's general character, with regard to religion, would have secured him from such a censure from his Lordship's pen.

I now proceed to the case of Derham; of whom the Noble Author writes in the following manner:

"Derham has written upon Astro-theology and Physico-theology as if the heavens *alone* proclaimed the glory of God, and the earth *only* showed forth his handy-work; for his only mention of intellectual nature is in the single chapter of the Physico-theology on the soul, in which he is content with two observations: one on the variety of man's inclinations, and another on his inventive powers—giving nothing which precisely proves design." (p. 53.)

Now, if Derham, after professing to give a view of all the evidences of every kind, for the being and attributes of God, had treated of "the heavens *alone*," or "the earth *only*," as bearing testimony to that great truth, Lord Brougham's observation would have had some weight; but when he denominated one of his works *Astro-theology*, what *could* he properly discuss, but the appearances presented by "the heavens?" He entitled his other work *Physico-theology;* and if in that work he had omitted all mention of the human soul—such a proceeding ought not to be deemed an objection, by One who draws a broad line of distinction between the physical and psychological branches of Natural Theology. Derham, however, giving an unusually extensive range to the physical department of Theology, has devoted a chapter, of this latter work, to the soul; and I now proceed to compare the materials of that chapter with Lord Brougham's account of them.

In the chapter alluded to, Derham, according to the Noble Author, is content with two observations. The reply is, that, whatever their number may be, the observations, together with the notes

attached to them, occupy rather more than six folio pages of the "Boyle's Lectures." With regard to the opinion that they contain "nothing which precisely proves design"—I would remark that the author *supposed*, at least, that design was abundantly proved. But to come to particulars. Derham opens the subject as follows:

"My survey of man I shall begin with the *soul* of man, by reason it is his most noble part, the copy of the Divine Image in us, in which we have enough to fill us with admiration of the munificence, power and wisdom of the Infinite Creator, when we contemplate the noble faculties of this our superior part; the vast reach and compass of its understanding, the prodigious quickness and piercingness of its thought, the admirable subtilty of its invention, the commanding power of its wisdom, the great depth of its memory, and, in a word, its Divine nature and operations." (B. v. c. 1.)

What, I would ask, are these but the very topics on which Lord Brougham has so eloquently expatiated, through three pages of his Discourse? (pp. 68—71.)—But Derham goes on:

"I shall not dwell on this, though the superior part of man, because it is the least known. Only there are two things I cannot easily pass by, because they manifest the especial concurrence and *design* of the infinitely wise Creator, as having a particular and necessary tendency to the management and good order of the world's affairs."

The subjects, which he was thus induced to dwell upon, are—the various inclinations of men's minds—and the inventive power of the soul; and it appears that he selected them because they eminently displayed adaptation—adaptation to the circumstances and condition of mankind in the world. These matters are discussed—if not very philosophically or with very good taste—yet with competent knowledge and strong indications of zeal in the cause in which the writer was engaged. He has given pertinent quotations from Cicero, Galen and other old writers; and if the substance of his remarks be compared with the purport of the passages from the ancient philosophers, adduced and praised by Lord Brougham, (pp. 223—226.) on the same subjects, there will not, I am persuaded, be found any inferiority on the part of Derham. In fact he has brought together as much that, "precisely proves design," as can easily be discovered in the whole of the passages just referred to, when taken together.

From Lord Brougham's censure of Derham, I pass on to his reprehension of a more celebrated individual—Dr Samuel Clarke. His Lordship's

dissatisfaction, with this great scholar, philosopher and divine, is expressed in the following terms:

"Dr Clarke maintains that the evidences of design are much more to be traced in the natural than in the moral world; but he plainly means, by this proposition, not so much to compare the proofs of Divine wisdom exhibited in the phenomena of the material with those exhibited in the phenomena of the intellectual world, as to show that the designs or intentions of the Deity are more easily perceived in the arrangements of the world with which we are most conversant, than his plans for our happiness, and his general intentions respecting our fate, are to be inferred from moral considerations. It is, however, to be remarked that, like all other reasoners upon Natural Theology, Dr Clarke confines his attention entirely to physical, and never adverts to psychological proofs." (p. 221, being a note to p. 52.)

There is something, in this paragraph, perplexing in the extreme. Dr Clarke—when proving the being and attributes of God—"confines his attention," as is generally supposed, to the argument *à priori;* that is, to abstract reasoning, intended to be independent of the material world: If so, how can it be said that he "confines his attention entirely to physical proofs?" Again, Lord Brougham has devoted an entire section (pp. 81—97) to a review of Dr Clarke's argu-

ment *à priori*, which purports to derive its force from other sources than experience; what then *can* be His Lordship's meaning, when he intimates that the argument is entirely drawn from "physical" considerations? To those who, in reading a book, happen to recollect, in one part, what they met with in another part, a paragraph of this kind cannot but cause the utmost embarrassment; and therefore, having formed some conjectures as to the origin of this (I have no doubt) undesigned misrepresentation, I will venture to detail what I conceive to be the facts of the case.... Dr Clarke's *Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, as I have already stated (p. 28), present no regular argument for the being and attributes of God; that subject having been fully discussed in the learned author's preceding work, *The demonstration of the being and attributes of God*, containing the argument *à priori*. Yet, Lord Brougham, judging from the title, *The Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, may possibly have supposed that *this* was intended to prove the being and attributes of God, amongst other matters; and finding a section purporting to show "why the wisdom of God is not so

clearly and plainly seen in his government of the moral, as in the fabric of the natural world"—made the mistake we are anxious to rectify. This part of the work belongs to what His Lordship has denominated the *Ethical* branch of Natural Theology—the object being to collect the natural intimations of a future state of rewards and punishments. Something of the kind, indeed, appears to have been perceived by Lord Brougham; who might also have discovered various psychological considerations made use of, in the same part of the same treatise. For instance, in the section immediately preceding that just referred to, the argument turns upon "the design of God's creating such rational beings as men are—endued with such noble faculties, and so necessarily conscious of the eternal and unchangeable differences of good and evil;" and in the section immediately following, upon "the immortality of the soul and the natural proofs we have of it."... I conclude therefore, that, in consequence of some misapprehension, respecting the object of the *Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, Lord Brougham was led to the notion that Dr Clarke "confines his attention to physical and never adverts to

psychological proofs." How injurious the notion is to the character of that Divine, will now be my business to evince, in a manner which no one shall be able to controvert.

On Dr Clarke's *Demonstration of the being and attributes of God*, I shall have occasion to offer a few remarks in a subsequent section. It will be sufficient, for my present purpose, to give some account of a portion of that work; from which the reader cannot fail to discern the exact truth of the matter now at issue.... Dr Clarke's eighth proposition is this—*The Self-existent and Original Cause of all things must be an Intelligent Being;* and, "in this proposition," he observes, "lies the main question between us and the Atheists." Respecting the method of proving the proposition, he thus writes:

"Now, that the self-existent Being is not such a blind and *unintelligent* necessity [as the Atheists hold] but in the most proper sense an *understanding* and *really active* Being—does not indeed so obviously and directly appear *to us* by considerations *à priori;* because (through the imperfection of our faculties) we know not *wherein* intelligence consists, nor can see the immediate and necessary connexion of it with Self-existence, as we can that of Eternity, Infinity, Unity, &c.: But *à posteriori*, almost

every thing in the world demonstrates to us this great truth; and affords undeniable arguments to prove that the world, and all things therein, are the effects of an *Intelligent* and *Knowing* Cause."

Dr Clarke, therefore, has recourse to arguments *à posteriori;* that is, derived from the experience of things actually existing;—amongst which arguments we find the following:—

"Since in *men in particular* there is undeniably that power which we call thought, *intelligence*, consciousness, perception or knowledge—there must of necessity *either* have been from eternity, *without any Original Cause at all*, an infinite succession of men, whereof *no one* has had a *necessary*, but *every one* a *dependent and communicated* being; *or else* these beings, indued with perception and consciousness, must at some time or other have arisen purely out of that which had no such quality as sense, perception or consciousness; *or else* they must have been produced by some *Intelligent* Superior Being."

And then, after proving how groundless are the first two suppositions, Dr Clarke dwells at great length upon the considerations which establish the last. At the conclusion of his work, also, he sums up the argument, depending upon observation and experience, in such a manner as to show how highly he estimated the evidence afforded by the intellectual powers, in proof of the existence and

attributes of the Deity. Of this, let the reader judge:—

"The notices, that God has been pleased to give us of himself, are so many and so obvious; in the constitution, order, beauty and harmony of the several parts of the world; in the frame and structure of our own bodies, and the wonderful powers and faculties of our souls; in the unavoidable apprehensions of our own minds, and the common consent of all other men; in every thing within us, and every thing without us: that no man of the meanest capacity and greatest disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most superficial observation of the works of God, and the lowest and most obvious attendance to the reason of things, can be ignorant of *Him*, but he must be utterly without excuse."

More than this it is needless to adduce, in order that the reader may know how to dispose of Lord Brougham's statement, that Dr Clarke "never adverts to psychological proofs."... It is well known that Bishop Butler, when a young man, wrote five letters to Dr Clarke, respecting some of the arguments employed in the *Demonstration;* and that to each of those letters Dr Clarke replied with great courtesy and ability. In the course of his treatise, Lord Brougham has referred to the correspondence two or three times; and in a manner which, connected with other circumstances, induces me to suspect that the Noble Lord's last im-

pressions respecting the *Demonstration* are derived from those letters. To decide upon the contents of works, by virtue of such imperfect recollections is very dangerous; and if my suspicion be just, I am surprised that His Lordship was not secured from the risk he encountered, by the tenor of professional studies and the habits of professional life.

It is now time to examine the case of Dr Paley; with regard to whose labours—together with those of his predecessors, Ray, Derham and Clarke—Lord Brougham delivers the following judgment:—

"Dr Paley, whose work is chiefly taken from the writings of Derham, deriving from them its whole plan and much of its substance, but clothing the harsher statements of his original in an attractive and popular style,* had so little of scientific habits, so moderate a power of generalising, that he never once mentions the mind, or any of the intellectual phenomena, nor ever appears to consider them as forming a portion of the works or operations of nature. Thus all these authors view the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, the structure of animals, the organisation of plants, and the various operations of the material world which we see carried on around us, as indicating the existence of

* "This observation in nowise diminishes the peculiar merit of the style, and also of the homely, but close and logical, manner in which the argument is put; nor does it deny the praise of bringing down the facts of former writers, and adapting them to the improved state of physical science—a merit the more remarkable, that Paley wrote his Natural Theology at the close of his life." Note by Lord B.

design, and leading to a knowledge of the Creator. But they pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the most singular work of divine wisdom and power—the mind itself. Is there any reason whatever to draw this line; to narrow within these circles the field of Natural Theology; to draw from the constitution and habits of matter alone the proof that one Intelligent Cause formed and supports the universe? Ought we not rather to consider the phenomena of the mind as more peculiarly adapted to help this inquiry, and as bearing a nearer relation to the Great Intelligence which created and which maintains the system?" (pp. 53, 54.)

I have already shown, in defence of Ray, that, although his undertaking led him only to the contemplation of external nature, yet he considered the human mind as bearing an incomparably stronger testimony, than the material world, to its Divine origin. In defence of Derham, I have alleged the mode in which he dwelt upon the mental faculties, in proof of the power and wisdom of the Supreme. In defence of Clarke, I have produced one passage, in which he decided "the main question between *us* and the Atheists," by means of an argument arising from the existence of the human soul; and another, in which he numbered "the wonderful powers and faculties of our souls" amongst the things which leave people, who believe not in a God, "without excuse."

Where, then, is Lord Brougham's warrant for asserting, that these authors "pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the most singular work of divine wisdom and power — the mind itself?" Where are the indications of any wish, on their part, "to narrow within these circles the field of Natural Theology;"—or "to draw, from the constitution and habits of matter alone, the proof that one Intelligent Cause formed and supports the universe?".... And, now, with regard to Paley:—let every one be estimated by what he does engage, and not by what he does not engage, to perform. As I stated in the introductory section, Paley entitled his work — *Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity, collected from the appearances of Nature:* and what was thus professed to have been done, the universal voice of mankind has declared to have been done well. To those who may be disposed to search the volume for psychological facts, I would suggest that the mind and its operations are *not* amongst "the *appearances* of Nature." If a work were entitled—as it properly might be—*Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity, collected from*

the operations of the Human Mind—who would expect the work to contain discussions on physical phenomena? To say the truth, there appears to be something beyond measure strange in Lord Brougham's objection; and, if I do not much mistake, the reader will agree with me in thinking that it is crushed to pieces by the very circumstances of the case.

Again, although Paley, so far as I recollect, does not adduce the mental faculties in proof of the Divine power and wisdom, the assertion is not quite correct that "he never once mentions the mind, or any of the intellectual phenomena." The whole argument of the volume depends upon the following position, which occurs in the second chapter: "Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence or mind." And, to omit other instances, after suggesting considerations which may lessen the difficulties, respecting a future state, felt by those "who have taken up the opinion that the acts of the human mind depend upon *organisation*," or "that the mind itself consists in organisation"—Paley declares such considerations to be

little, if at all, wanted by those "who refer the operations of mind to a substance totally and essentially different from matter;" who "adopt perhaps a juster reasoning and a better philosophy" —"as most certainly these operations, though affected by material causes, hold very little affinity to any properties of matter with which we are acquainted"*.... The fact indeed, that Paley has not employed the mental powers in support of his main argument, is attributed by Lord Brougham to his having had "so little of scientific habits—so moderate a power of generalising." His Lordship, however, lays no claim to infallibility. Let us, then, suppose—and there is nothing absurd in the supposition—that it was not from want of intelligence that Paley did not engage in psychological disquisitions; and see what account may still be given of the matter. Now, when a man of sense—such as, on the whole, I believe His Lordship holds Paley to have been—undertakes to write a book, for the instruction of all who ever read books, it behoves him to consider, not only the kind of reasoning which he can himself manage, but that also which his readers can

* Natural Theology, 4th and 3rd paragraphs from the end.

comprehend. Lord Brougham's opinion is, that psychological views were beyond Paley's "power of generalisation:"—would they then have come within the "power of generalisation" possessed by his readers? Locke is usually allowed to have been no mean proficient in mental science—let him therefore furnish a reply to the query:—"Though he that contemplates the operations of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them, yet unless he turn his thoughts that way, and consider them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it.... The first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so, growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all."*

* Essay on Human Understanding, B. II. c. i. s. 7, 8.

But if it should be thought that the difficulties, attending these abstract speculations, have subsequently been removed, and that to perceive the most subtile distinctions is now quite an ordinary attainment — Let Lord Brougham answer for the present times: "Although undoubtedly the process of reasoning [respecting the mind] is the shortest of all, and the least liable to deception, yet so connected are all its phenomena with those of the body, that it requires a process of abstraction alien from the ordinary habits of most men, to be persuaded that we have a more undeniable evidence of its separate existence than we have of the separate existence of the body." (p. 25.) Of all this, Dr Paley, as a man of sense, must assuredly have been aware; and however great his talents for metaphysical inquiries, must have known that to exert them on such an occasion would inevitably frustrate his own purposes. Had abstract disquisitions of the kind mentioned by Lord Brougham been scattered through the work, its author might have been praised by a few philosophers, but he could not possibly have instructed and convinced the thousands of all conditions who, as the work now

exists, have lingered over his pages with never-failing delight.

As I have already intimated, Dr Paley's Natural Theology was undoubtedly designed for the information of all classes of society. Lord Brougham, indeed, has noticed the "attractive and popular style" of the work; and yet His Lordship censures the omission of topics, which, even in his own opinion, are far removed from ordinary apprehension. Although I do not believe that, after the preceding remarks, His Lordship's censure will have much weight, I have satisfaction in presenting the view of the matter which has been taken by a philosopher of great celebrity—to whom the noble author of the 'Discourse' has repeatedly referred, in terms of high and well-deserved commendation. When Mr Dugald Stewart's predilection for psychological inquiries is borne in mind, his praise of Paley will be felt to be peculiarly creditable, as well to the giver as the receiver. Thus then writes the author of *The Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*:—"Among the disciples of Law, one illustrious exception to these remarks occurs in Dr Paley, whose treatise on Natural Theology is unquestion-

ably the most instructive as well as interesting publication on that subject which has appeared in our times. As the book was intended for popular use, the author has wisely avoided, as much as possible, all metaphysical discussions; but I do not know that there exists any other work, where the argument from *final causes* is placed in so great a variety of pleasing and striking points of view."*

With regard to Lord Brougham's statement—that Paley's work is "chiefly taken from the writings of Derham, deriving from them its whole plan, and much of its substance"—I remark, 1. that, in Paley's "Life" published by his Son, we

* Dissertation on the progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and Political Philosophy, Part II. p. 117.

Having mentioned my disposition to observe the effects of things upon minds not much improved by cultivation, I will venture, in a note, to state a fact which came under my own observation.... An intelligent working-gardener—who did me the justice to think that I should attend to such a matter—requested of me an old copy of Paley's Natural Theology. On inquiring in what manner he had become acquainted with the work, it was, I found, by means of some extracts, which had been met with, and had excited the greatest admiration and curiosity. From the extracts then specified, and from the remarks made after the perusal of the treatise, I am thoroughly convinced that, if the work had been of the metaphysical cast which would have pleased Lord Brougham, the individual in question would not have taken the slightest interest in the subject.... From this case, we may learn the mode in which Paley's writings are operating upon the public mind.

find the following information touching the preparations for the work on Natural Theology. "There are three or four large manuscript books filled with observations and short substantial hints taken from various authors, and in the order in which they are here set down: Boyle, Gregory, Cheselden, Derham [Physico-theology, I suppose], Ray, Monro, Derham's Astro-theology, Adams, Wilkins's Principles of Natural Religion, Search, Sturm, Goldsmith, Lesser, Smellie, Religious Philosopher, Spectator, Seed, Nature Displayed, Hervey, Addison, Keill, Watson, St Pierre, Cappe's Causes of Atheism, Memoirs of Natural History by the Royal Academy of Paris, Priestley, Maclaurin."* We see, therefore, from what a variety of sources, besides Derham—and there are many others referred to in the book itself—Paley collected "short substantial hints," which he worked up in his own peculiar and masterly manner:—I remark 2. that, according to the best of my judgment, no two books, on the same subject, can be well imagined more different, both as to plan and substance, than those of Derham and Paley:—and 3. that, from whatever quarters Paley may have derived "short

* Life of Dr Paley, by the Rev. Edmund Paley, p. 321.

substantial hints," he took care to see things with his own eyes, to examine them for himself, and to exercise the faculties of his own powerful mind upon every object that was presented to him. And thus, there is scarcely a page of his Volume which bears not the impress of decided originality.

But Lord Brougham's complaints of Paley's unfitness for his undertaking are not yet exhausted. Duly to understand the nature of the accusation now to be considered, the following extract, together with the note subjoined to it, must be read.

"Such is the process of reasoning by which we infer the existence of design in the natural and moral [qu. intellectual?] world. To this abstract argument, an addition of great importance remains to be made. The whole reasoning proceeds necessarily upon the assumption that there exists a being or thing separate from, and independent of, matter, and conscious of its own existence, which we call *mind*. For the argument is—"Had I to accomplish this purpose, I should have used some such means;" or, "Had I used these means, I should have thought I was accomplishing some such purpose." Perceiving the adaptation of the means to the end, the inference is, that some being has acted as we should ourselves act, and with the same views. But when we so speak, and so reason, we are all the while referring to an intelligent principle or existence; we are referring to our mind, and not to our bodily frame. The agency which we infer

from this reasoning is, therefore, a spiritual and immaterial agency—the working of something like our own mind—an intelligence like our own, though incomparably more skilful. The being of whom we thus acquire a knowledge, and whose operations as well as existence we thus deduce from a process of inductive reasoning, must be a spirit, and wholly immaterial. But his being such is only inferred, because we set out with assuming the separate existence of our own mind, independently of matter. Without that we never could conclude that superior *intelligence* existed or acted. The belief that mind exists is essential to the whole argument by which we infer that the Deity exists.... It is the foundation of Natural Theology in all its branches; and upon the scheme of materialism no rational, indeed no intelligible, account can be given of a first cause, or of the creation or government of the universe." (pp. 78, 79.)

To this passage, the note is as follows:

"It is worthy of observation, that not the least allusion is made in Dr Paley's work to the argument here stated, although it is the foundation of the whole of Natural Theology. Not only does this author leave entirely untouched the argument *à priori* (as it is called) and also all the inductive arguments derived from the phenomena of mind, but he does not even advert to the argument upon which the inference of design must of necessity rest—that design which is the whole subject of his book. Nothing can more evince his distaste or incapacity for metaphysical researches. He assumes the very position which alone sceptics dispute. In combating him they would assert that

he begged the whole question; for certainly they do not deny, at least in modern times, the *fact* of adaptation. As to the fundamental doctrine of causation, not the least allusion is ever made to it in any of his writings, even in his Moral Philosophy."

Now, with regard to the argument stated by Lord Brougham—to which, His Lordship says, "not the least allusion is made in Dr Paley's work"—it somehow seems—possibly in consequence of the *mode* of statement—rather to elude the understanding. The hand might almost as well attempt to grasp quicksilver. But, at a venture, I will produce a passage, from Paley's Natural Theology, which, I strongly suspect, *does* allude to the very same argument: which, if I am right in my conjecture, not only alludes to the argument, but expresses all that it was intended to support, in language so plain and forcible as at once to carry the most complete conviction to the mind. The following observations occur in his twenty-third chapter, on *The personality of the Deity:*

"Contrivance, if established, appears to me to prove every thing which we wish to prove. Amongst other things, it proves the *personality* of the Deity, as distinguished from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes called a principle: which terms, in the mouths of those who use them philosophically, seem to be intended to admit and

to express an efficacy, but to exclude and to deny a personal agent. Now, that which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpose; as well as the power of providing means, and of directing them to their end. They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; which is mind. The acts of a mind prove the existence of a mind; and in whatever a mind resides, is a person. The seat of intellect is a person."....

And afterwards, to show in what manner we arrive at such conclusions, he goes on:—"Wherever we see marks of contrivance, we are led for its cause to an *intelligent* author. And this transition of the understanding is founded upon uniform experience. We see intelligence constantly contriving; that is, we see intelligence constantly producing effects, marked and distinguished by certain properties; not certain particular properties, but by a kind and class of properties, such as relation to an end, relation of parts to one another, and to a common purpose. We see, wherever we are witnesses to the actual formation of things, nothing except intelligence producing effects so marked and distinguished. Furnished with this experience we view the productions of nature. We observe *them* also marked and distinguished in the same manner. We wish to account for their origin. Our experience suggests a cause perfectly adequate to this account. No experience, no single instance or example, can be offered in favour of any other. In this cause, therefore, we ought to rest; in this cause the common sense of mankind has, in fact, rested, because it agrees with that, which, in all cases, is the foundation of knowledge—the undeviating

course of their experience.... In like manner, and upon the same foundation (which in truth is that of experience) we conclude that the works of nature proceed from intelligence and design; because, in the properties of relation to a purpose, subserviency to a use, they resemble what intelligence and design are constantly producing, and what nothing except intelligence and design ever produce at all. Of every argument, which would raise a question as to the safety of this reasoning, it may be observed, that, if such argument be listened to, it leads to this inference, not only that the present order of nature is insufficient to prove the existence of an intelligent Creator, but that no imaginable order would be sufficient to prove it; that *no* contrivance, were it ever so mechanical, ever so precise, ever so clear, ever so perfectly like those which we ourselves employ, would support this conclusion. A doctrine, to which I conceive no sound mind can assent."

The subject now under discussion is really important; and I entreat the reader closely to compare the preceding extract, with the previous paragraphs from Lord Brougham's Discourse. In each instance, the object is—from the experience of contrivances and adaptations having originated in our own mind, and from the observation of similar effects having originated in the minds of others—to explain the manner in which we ascend to the Supreme Mind, as the great Cause of all the adaptations and contrivances throughout nature.

If I do not mistake, the transition, from Lord Brougham's account of the matter to Dr Paley's, will be somewhat like a transition from the *mirage* of the desert, to the living landscape of some genial climate.

But, continues Lord Brougham in the note cited pp. 121, 122, "Not only does this author"—meaning Dr Paley—"leave entirely untouched the argument *à priori* (as it is called)"—Now, in answer to this objection, 1. I must repeat that "this author" never undertook to give all the evidences of every kind, for the existence and attributes of God;—2. I remark that the argument *à priori*, if strictly so, has no concern whatever with the "evidences collected from the appearances of Nature," which the author did undertake to give;—and 3. that Lord Brougham himself, as will hereafter appear, condemns the argument *à priori*, as unintelligible and inconclusive. With what propriety, therefore, can His Lordship state, as a matter of reproach to Dr Paley, that he has left this argument "entirely untouched"?*... As

* Lord Brougham rejects the argument *à priori*, in the following terms: "This is another, and to my mind, a very strong, additional reason for resting the evidences of Natural Theology upon the argument *à posteriori* alone." (p. 238.)

to the Noble Author's opinions respecting Paley's not adverting to "the argument upon which the inference of design must of necessity rest," and his begging "the whole question"—I again refer to the two passages which I have brought together for the purpose of comparison; and if any one who is sceptical after reading Paley, should be convinced by Lord Brougham, I shall begin to think that there is some ground for relying upon His Lordship's judgment in the matter.... That to "the fundamental doctrine of causation, not the least allusion is ever made, in any of his [Paley's] writings, even in his Moral Philosophy"—may be true, if the remark be understood to apply to any notice of the doctrine of cause and effect in the abstract; but it is also true that the doctrine, as explained (p. 231) by Lord Brougham—namely, that from experience of the connexion between our own volitions and the movements resulting from them, we are enabled to rise to the notion of effects consequent upon the volitions of the Supreme Being—although not perhaps formally laid down by Paley, is frequently (as in the passage lately quoted) worked up into his argument, with a force which seldom attends the abstract statement of

things. Throughout His Lordship's sections, on the physical and psychological branches of Natural Theology, there is not, I believe, "the least allusion" to the doctrine of causation; and yet it would be difficult to show that the conclusions lose any portion of their probability on that account.... With regard to the final complaint against Paley, that, "even in his Moral Philosophy," there is no allusion to the doctrine, I can only confess my utter inability to imagine in what part of the work, or for what purpose, a chapter on that subject could have been introduced.

Although Lord Brougham has acquitted Paley's language, of any tendency to materialism, His Lordship seems to doubt whether he was "fully impressed with the evidence of mental existence." In my own opinion, the last extract from his Natural Theology could scarcely have been written by any one who was *not* "fully impressed" with that evidence. As however His Lordship has mentioned such a doubt, and has moreover avowed, without reserve, his conviction of Paley's "distaste or incapacity for metaphysical researches," I would refer the reader to the last three paragraphs of his Evidences of Christianity. On this occasion, it

may not, perhaps, be improper to state that the first inclination to such researches, felt by the present writer, was excited, very early in life, by those paragraphs; which he still believes to contain more information on such subjects than can easily be found in the same space. One of the paragraphs shall be transcribed.

"Thought is different from motion, perception from impact: the individuality of a mind is hardly consistent with the divisibility of an extended substance; or its volition, that is, its power of originating motion, with the inertness which cleaves to every portion of matter which our observation or our experiments can reach. These distinctions lead us to an *immaterial* principle: at least, they do this—they so negative the mechanical properties of matter, in the constitution of a sentient, still more of a rational being, that no argument drawn from these properties can be of any great weight in opposition to other reasons, when the question respects the changes of which such a nature is capable, or the manner in which these changes are effected. Whatever thought be, or whatever it depend upon, the regular experience of *sleep* makes one thing concerning it certain, that it may be completely suspended, and completely restored."

This is a mode of writing which excites curiosity, and enforces reflection. Such remarks are not to be forgotten: they become the materials of future contemplation. The author who can

so think, and so express his thoughts, can scarcely be said to have a "distaste," certainly not an "incapacity," for metaphysical researches. But now that we are adverting to Paley's supposed "distaste" and "incapacity," let us consider the circumstances under which his Natural Theology—with which alone we are concerned—was drawn up. And, in the outset, we are enabled to give, on his own authority, the reasons for undertaking what appeared to him "as, in all probability, his last labour." His "last" it proved to be.

"A weak, and, of late, a painful state of health, deprived me of the power of discharging the duties of my station in a manner at all suitable, either to my sense of those duties, or to my most anxious wishes concerning them. My inability for the public functions of my profession, amongst other consequences, left me much at leisure. That leisure was not to be lost. It was only in my study that I could repair my deficiencies in the church: it was only through the press that I could speak."*

We are also enabled to present a similar testimony from the pen of his Son:

"The circumstances under which he finished, and indeed, it may very fairly be said, begun his work, added a great interest to it for those who were anxions for his health. He had been long struggling with those attacks

* Natural Theology, Dedication to Bishop Barrington.

which are the usual symptoms of diseased viscera; and this constitutional disorder had gained so much upon him, that his intervals of ease became few and far between. It was quite admirable at such times to observe, not only how lively were his animal spirits, but how his mind, quite unsubdued, seemed to labour to show itself as happy as could be, with the very privilege of existence; but even this was not equal to the calmness and patience and composure which he showed under the severest bodily sufferings, even at the very time when he was busily engaged in contemplating and describing the benevolence of the Deity, and the provisions for man's enjoyment."*

Lastly, we are enabled to survey the same scene from the representation of Dr Clark, a highly-esteemed Physician at Newcastle, who had the satisfaction of contributing to the comfort of Dr Paley at that period:

"That truly eminent man [Dr Paley] was then engaged in finishing his Natural Theology; but the completion of that great undertaking was frequently interrupted by severe accessions of a painful disorder, under which he had long laboured. Dr Clark often expressed his admiration at the fortitude with which he bore the most painful attacks; and at the readiness, and even cheerfulness, with which, on the first respite from pain, he resumed his literary labours. When it is considered that the twenty-sixth chapter [on the Goodness of the Deity] was written under these circumstances, what he has said of *the alleviations*

* Life of Paley, by the Rev. Edmund Paley, p. 337.

of pain acquires additional weight. It is not a philosopher, in the full enjoyment of health, who talks lightly of an evil which he may suppose at a distance. When Dr Paley speaks of the power which pain has "of shedding a satisfaction over intervals of ease, which few enjoyments exceed;" and assures us that "a man resting from severe pain is, for the time, in possession of feelings which undisturbed health cannot impart;" the sentiment flowed from his own feelings."*

I will not injure the effect of these simple statements, by any observations upon them. They disclose, in a manner which attests their accuracy, the situation of our Christian Philosopher, when composing his Treatise on Natural Theology; and if borne in mind, cannot fail to give new interest to the perusal of the work. That great work, indeed, needs no allowance, on any ground whatever. It depends upon its own intrinsic value. But there are occasions when a few pages may again be read, for the purpose of refreshing our recollection of its aptness of illustration and precision of language; and while reading for that purpose, we may also have an opportunity of reassuring ourselves of the possibility of a production,

* Meadley's Life of Paley, p. 205, 2nd ed.; the passage, as there found, is taken from Dr Fenwick's *Sketch of the professional Life and Character of Dr Clark.*

so instinct with vigour of mind and kindliness of disposition, having been written during such precarious intervals of ease, as were allowed by a most painful disorder, which speedily consigned its author to the tomb.

Enough but, I trust, not more than enough—for it is right that these matters should be clearly understood—has now been laid before the reader, in defence of Ray, Derham, Clarke and Paley. Let us now proceed to consider what can be alleged, in favour of "all the writers" on Natural Theology, "at least among the moderns"—who, as Lord Brougham affirms, have in their speculations on that subject "wholly neglected the mind and its operations." This is the more needful, inasmuch as, according to His Lordship, "there cannot be a doubt that this extraordinary omission had its origin in the doubts which men are prone to entertain of the mind's existence independent of matter." (p. 54.) We have a farther reason for investigating the subject in the circumstance, that the affirmation, respecting "all the writers, at least among the moderns," has been, by a recent author, deemed adverse to the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul. "Did it not occur

to the Noble Lord," inquires the author alluded to, "that the writers on Natural Theology who had preceded him, and, as he admits, omitted to discuss or entertain this metaphysical and vexatious doctrine, did so with design, and because they were of opinion that it was neither necessary nor useful to introduce *doubtful* doctrines, in the hope of extending *certain* knowledge—and that therefore the negative precedent was one which ought to be followed?"* Now there is one maxim, in philosophy, which is on all sides allowed to be most excellent: it is this—First be sure of the fact, and then endeavour to account for it. Now, the fact, stated by Lord Brougham, is, that, "modern writers" on Natural Theology have "wholly neglected the mind and its operations." At this moment, I cannot but feel the awkwardness of my situation; for the fact, which I am under the necessity of stating and proving, is—that "modern writers" on Natural Theology have *very generally* employed "the mind and its operations," as evidences of the being and attributes of God. So far, indeed, as I can depend

* Observations on the Discourse of Natural Theology, by Henry Lord Brougham. By Thomas Wallace, Esq. LL.D. One of His Majesty's Counsel at Law in Ireland. p. 18.

upon my memory, that topic has scarcely ever been omitted by them. But be that as it may, I shall venture to show, by actual quotations from authors of no small account, the kind of consideration which has really been bestowed upon the subject. The following extracts are taken from such works as immediately occurred to recollection and were within reach; and I would persuade myself that they will amply reward the trouble of perusal.

Out of compliment to the Legal Profession, of which Lord Brougham is so distinguished a Member, I begin with the testimony of Sir MATTHEW HALE; who, in his *Primitive Origination of Mankind*, dwells at great length upon the intellectual faculties. Of the mode of thinking, with regard to them, adopted by the great Lord Chief Justice, I give the following specimens:

"There are many excellencies in the Human Nature, which manifest a far more eminent excellency in his First Efficient... The symmetry, beauty, majesty and admirable composure of his body: to which there can be nothing added, nor detracted without a blemish to it. The admirable faculties of his soul, those that concern him in his lowest rank of life, the faculty by which he is nourished; those that concern him in his middle rank of life, soul and

sensation, memory and appetite; those that concern him in his supreme rank of life, Intellect and Will. The admirable union of his soul to his body; whereby he becomes one intellectual being, though consisting of principles of different natures."

"His faculties of sense are accommodated to a sensible being: forasmuch as he is to converse in a corporeal world and with corporeal beings, there is no one quality of corporeal nature that he hath occasion to use or converse with, but he hath a faculty by one of his five senses to receive and discern. In his intellectual faculty, it admirably serves him for the ends of his being: he was appointed to govern, direct and rule other animals; and therefore he hath the advantage of a superior faculty above them, whereby he is able to exercise that direction and government. He was made to be the spectator of the great works of God, to consider and observe them, to glorify and serve that God that made them; and he is accordingly furnished with an Intellectual Faculty answerable to his condition."*

In the estimation of this learned writer, these and other considerations, arising from a survey of the mental constitution of man, lead the thoughts to the First Cause of all finite intelligence.

I now appeal to Bishop WILKINS; who mentions, as affording special evidence of an Intelligent Creator, "that kind of frame which relates to our Understanding Power, whereby we are

* Primitive Origination, pp. 326, 327.

able to correct the errors of our senses and imaginations; to call before us things past and future; and to behold things that are invisible to sense." We also find him writing as follows:

"If a man doth but consider how he is endowed with such a natural principle, whereby he is necessarily inclined to seek his own well-being and happiness: and likewise with one faculty whereby he is enabled to judge of the nature of things, as to their fitness or unfitness for this end: and another faculty whereby he is enabled to choose and prosecute such things as may promote this end, and to reject and avoid such things as may hinder it:—and this may be another argument to convince him that the Author of his being must be infinitely wise and powerful."

Bishop Wilkins moreover adduces, in proof of a Moral Governor of the world, "Natural Conscience, which is God's deputy, and doth internally witness for Him, as other creatures do externally."*

The next extracts shall be from Dr CUDWORTH'S *Intellectual System;* a work abounding in thought as well as learning. It ought to be premised that the language is somewhat rugged.

"The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature: The first—extension or magnitude,

* Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, pp. 82, 83, 90. 6th ed. 1710.

(really existing without the mind) which is a thing that hath no self-unity at all in it; but is infinite alterity and divisibility, as it is only mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within; nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move when it is moved:—The second—life and mind; or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which therefore (though unextended, yet) hath a certain inward recess, βάθος, or essential profundity. And this is a thing which can act all of it entirely, upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and co-existing in the same place with it." (p. 832.)

"And now we have made it manifest that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God, from this topic of cogitation, knowledge or understanding, that they cannot possibly salve the phenomenon thereof without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For first, If no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth and thickness—then is it so far from being true that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that of necessity, either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be One perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense

and sensibles; which is that that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole world." (p. 871).

In the seventh of Dr Barrow's Sermons on the Creed, entitled—*The being of God proved from the frame of human nature*—the bearing of the intellectual part of man, upon the argument, is discussed at considerable length. The views of the subject, entertained by this great man, may be collected from two quotations, which I shall here give.

"To think a gross body may be ground and pounded into rationality, a slow body may be thumped and driven into passion, a rough body may be filed and polished into a faculty of discerning and resenting things; that a cluster of pretty thin round atoms (as *Democritus* forsooth conceited), that a well-mixed combination of elements (as *Empedocles* fancied), that a harmonious contemperation (or *crasis*) of humours (as *Galen*, dreaming it seems upon his drugs and his potions, would persuade us), that an implement made up of I know not what fine springs, and wheels, such mechanick knacks (as some of our modern wisards have been busy in divining) should without more to do become the subject of so rare capacities and endowments, the author of actions so worthy and works so wonderful; capable of wisdom and virtue, of knowledge so vast and desires so lofty; apt to contemplate truth and affect good; able to recollect things past and to foresee things future;

to search so deep into the causes of things, and disclose so many mysteries of nature; to invent so many arts and sciences, to contrive such projects of policy and achieve such feats of prowess; briefly, should become capable to design, undertake and perform all those admirable effects of human wit and industry which we daily see and hear of; how senseless and absurd conceits are these; how can we, without great indignation and regret, entertain such suppositions?"

"I shall to these only subjoin one farther consideration worth attending to; that the wisest and most considerate men in several times, only by reflecting upon their own minds, and observing in them what was most lovely and excellent, most pure and straight, have fallen upon and conspired in notions concerning God, very suitable to those which we believe taught us by revelation; although contrary to the prejudices of their education, and to popular conceits: many admirable passages to this purpose we may find dropped from the mouth of *Socrates* and the pen of *Plato;* in *Cicero*, in *Epictetus*, yea in the least credulous or fanciful of men, *Aristotle* himself. Whence plainly enough we may collect how near affinity there is between God and us; how legible characters of the divinity are written upon our souls; how easily we may know God, if we be not ignorant of ourselves; that we need not go far to fetch aguments to prove that God is, nor to find lessons to learn what he is; since we always carry both, about us or rather within us; since our souls could indeed come from no other than such a Being, whom they so resemble and represent."*

* Works, Vol. II. pp. 104, 108. fol. 1683.

Bishop STILLINGFLEET discourses at great length on the human soul, in proof of the being of a God; as will appear from the intimations contained in the following passage:

"I come now to the third evidence of a deity; which is, That there are some beings in the world, which cannot depend upon matter and motion; *i.e.*, that there are some spiritual and immaterial substances, or beings; the consequence of this for the proving a Deity neither hath been, nor I suppose will be denied, by those who question an Infinite Being; the same principles leading to the denying and the proof of both, and immaterial beings being the strongest proof that there is something above matter in the world. If there be then such things in the world, which matter and motion cannot be the causes of, then there are certainly spiritual and immaterial beings, and that I shall make appear both as to the minds of men, and some extraordinary effects which are produced in the world."*

I next adduce WOLLASTON, the author of *The Religion of Nature delineated.* This learned writer, after maintaining that "the frame and constitution of the world, the astonishing magnificence of it, the various phenomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity observed in the productions of things, the uses and ends for which they serve, do all show that there is some Almighty

* Origines Sacræ, B. III. c. 1. s. 17.

Designer, an infinite wisdom and power at the top of all these things"—dwells upon this proposition, namely, that "Life, sense, cogitation and the faculties of our own minds show the existence of some Superior Being from whom they are derived." He also enlarges upon the distinction between the soul and the body; proving that the thinking faculty cannot arise from matter, whatever may be its magnitude, form, texture or motion.*

Lord Brougham has, on several occasions, referred to Dr Bentley's famous sermons at Boyle's Lecture; not indeed without a remark upon "the vituperation rather than sermon" with which the course is opened, but still with manifest respect for the talents of "that most learned preacher." Of Dr Bentley's sense of the value of the intellectual part of man, we may form some judgment, when he declares that—"if we consider the dignity of an Intelligent Being, and put that in the scales against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, without over-valuing human nature, that the soul of one virtuous and religious man is of greater worth and excellency than the sun and his planets,

* Religion of Nature, pp. 347—353, 7th ed. 1750.

and all the stars in the world."* His second sermon is entitled—*Matter and motion cannot think: or, a confutation of Atheism, from the faculties of the human soul.* From this discourse I will give two short extracts belonging to the same argument:

"And first, I say, there is an immaterial substance in us, which we call Soul, essentially distinct from our bodies. I shall lay it down as self-evident, that there is something, in our composition, that thinks and apprehends, and reflects and deliberates; that determines and doubts, consents and denies; that wills and demurs and resolves and chooses and rejects; that receives various sensations and impressions from external objects, and produces voluntary motions of several parts of our bodies."...."And now that I have sufficiently shown that sense and perception can never be the product of any kind of matter and motion, it remains that it must necessarily proceed from some incorporeal substance within us. And though we cannot conceive the manner of the soul's action and passion, nor what hold it can lay on the body when it voluntarily moves it, yet we are certain that it doth so as of any mathematical truth whatsoever.... I discern some excellent final causes of such a vital conjunction of body and soul; but the instrumental cause I know not, nor what invisible bands and fetters unite them together. I resolve all that into the sole pleasure and *fiat* of our Omnipotent Creator; whose existence is so plainly and nearly deducible from the established proof of an immaterial soul,

* Eighth Sermon, near the beginning.

that no wonder the resolved Atheists do so labour and bestir themselves to fetch sense and perception out of the power of matter. I will despatch it in three words. For, since we have shown that there is an incorporeal substance within us, whence did that proceed, and how came it into being? It did not exist from all eternity; that's too absurd to be supposed; nor could it come out of nothing into being, without an efficient cause. Something therefore must have created our souls out of nothing; and that something (since no thing can give more than it has) must itself have all the perfections that it hath given to them. There is therefore an immaterial and intelligent Being that created our souls; which Being was either eternal itself, or created immediately or ultimately by some other Eternal, that has all those perfections. There is therefore originally *an Eternal, Immaterial, Intelligent Creator;* all which together are *the attributes of God alone.*"*

Such was Dr Bentley's view of the faculties of the human mind, as affording a convincing proof of the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. On looking over the sermons preached at Boyle's Lecture, I find the intellectual powers of man adduced, in evidence of the same fact, by Gastrel, Harris, Clarke, Hancock, Woodward, Derham, Leng, and Gurdon.

The third sermon, in ABERNETHY's *Discourses concerning the being and natural perfections of*

* Sermons, pp. 51, 68. ed. 1735.

God, is entitled, 'The being of God proved from human intelligence and morality.' Instead of presenting any of the arguments employed in this Discourse—which are somewhat metaphysical, and too extended for brief extracts—I transcribe the general view which he takes of the subject at the beginning of that discourse.

"I have endeavoured, in the two preceding discourses, to prove the being of God from his works; that is, as the question is properly stated between Atheists and us, to prove an active intelligence in the formation of the universe. Indeed the existence of the very lowest things we see, the most contemptible pebble or clod of earth, cannot be accounted for without the agency of an intelligent and powerful Cause; much less this beautiful system of the world, disposed in such exquisite order, and having its parts so exactly fitted to each other, as to make up one regular whole. But above all, that understanding, which we are conscious of in ourselves, even constrains us to acknowledge the Supreme Eternal Mind as its Author. For if inanimate matter formed into a system discovers his glorious wisdom and activity, much more his own living image in our perceptive and self-determining powers. This last well deserves a more particular consideration, as containing a peculiarly illustrious manifestation of the divine wisdom; and I hope by a due attention to what passes in our own minds, we shall find ourselves obliged to recognize the All-ruling intelligence of our Maker, and to adore Him who is *perfect in knowledge.*"

We find Dr Foster writing of the mental faculties in the following strain:

"We have, as yet, only surveyed the tenement of man, and have not, properly speaking, conversed with man himself; nor taken a view of the essential, and more noble, principles in his constitution. Let us go on, therefore, to search a little into the make of his mind, his powers of *reason*, his *moral* faculties, his implanted *social* instincts and *benevolent* propensions; which are the things that most honourably distinguish, and mark out humanity, and render it capable of an association with angels, and the life of God. In the supreme directing and executive powers of human nature—powers by which alone man justly sustains his rank, prosecutes his end, and can arrive at due perfection—in these, I say, we may reasonably expect to find the plainest delineations and strongest characters of his *former*, his *father*, after whose image his mind was originally made. For, surely, it can never be imagined that the parent of being has lavishly expended his greatest care and art upon inferior designs and meaner compositions; and is least visible and has left the faintest traces of his divine skill, in his most excellent workmanship."*

Dr Foster proceeds to consider, at great length, the particulars thus laid down. Did my limits permit, I should be glad to give some extracts from his remarks. I must, however, be content to present his view of the relative value of the proofs,

* Discourses on all the principal branches of Natural Religion and Social Virtue. By James Foster, D.D. p. 101. 4to. 1749. This was the "Modest Foster" of Pope.

of the divine power and wisdom, as derived from external nature, and from the intellectual frame.

"Thus have I suggested several instances of most adorable and stupendous wisdom, that are apparent in the works of nature; and have endeavoured to fix on such, chiefly, as for the facts themselves are unexceptionable, and where the evidence lies most obvious to the common apprehension of mankind, unimproved by deep science and skill in philosophy. And as many of these are proofs that strike our very senses, which, by the wise appointment of the God of nature, are always open to let in some light upon passive minds; and prevent, by this means, the whole human race, a very few excepted, from sinking into rude and savage ignorance: these, I say, being *sensible* proofs, must be better adapted for yielding universal conviction, than more abstruse deductions of reason. It is natural for me to observe that the same method is taken in the Holy Scriptures, to impress the minds of men with a stronger idea of the supreme wisdom of the Deity; and that many of the most remarkable displays of wisdom in the fabrick of the world, which I have particularly mentioned, are therein also distinctly taken notice of, and especially by David, in the 104th Psalm; which shows the pious adoration therein expressed to be not the enthusiastic flight and transport of a poetical genius, but the result of deliberate reflection; and we may likewise collect from hence, in some measure, the general corresponding sense of human nature."*

From the Sermons of SAMUEL BOURN, an eminent Dissenting Minister, I select the following

* Discourses, p. 109.

excellent remarks, from many others which might be adduced:

"In the beginning of life the human soul, subsists with few ideas, according to its minute capacity. But they multiply fast: every thing is then new, and consequently an object of wonder; and the inquisitive curiosity is adapted to, and gratified with, a continual accession of new objects. And when the stock of ideas is sufficiently encreased, the comparing and judging faculty begins to operate upon the materials which sense hath furnished:—It orders and disposes, unites and separates, divides and compounds, distinguishes like and unlike, equal and unequal, fit and unfit, beautiful and deformed, good and evil. Here reason commenceth; and is henceforward continually employed in disposing the intellectual furniture of the mind; arranging every thing in due place and order, reviewing its internal fund of knowledge, and by new images and new reflections still adding to the number, variety, form and order of the whole; rising continually from things more simple, clear and easy, to things more complex, obscure and difficult; from material to moral and spiritual objects; and finally ascending to the highest and noblest degree in the scale of human knowledge; and from the whole of what we previously see and know, learning to know this: that an Eternal, All-perfect Being is the cause of all, to whom we belong, and from whom we derive all good.—Is there no design of Creative Wisdom in this admirable and evident process of nature?"*

* A series of Discourses on the Principles and Evidences of Natural Religion and the Christian Revelation. Vol. i. p. 39. 1760.

Mr BURKE having at one time been led to the consideration of some of the intellectual faculties, recorded in the following language his feeling with regard to the marks of their divine origin which are impressed upon them:

"The more accurately we search into the human mind, the stronger traces we every where find of His wisdom who made it. If a discourse on the use of the parts of the body may be considered as an hymn to the Creator—the use of the passions, which are the organs of the mind, cannot be barren of praise to Him, nor unproductive to ourselves of that noble and uncommon union of science and admiration, which a contemplation of the works of infinite wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind; whilst referring to Him whatever we find of right or good or fair in ourselves, discovering his strength and wisdom in our own weakness and imperfection, honouring them where we can discover them clearly, and adoring their profundity where we are lost in our search, we may be inquisitive without impertinence, and elevated without pride; we may be admitted, if I may dare to say so, into the counsels of the Almighty by a consideration of his works."*

In Dr CROMBIE's Natural Theology—a modern work of great value—this subject, namely, *The intellectual and moral faculties of man furnish evidence, that he is the production of an Intelligent*

* On the Sublime and Beautiful, Part I. s. 19.

and Wise Being, occupies more than one hundred pages. From the just-cited portion of the work, I shall select a single passage, and with it bring my series of quotations to a close.

"We are so habituated to the operation of these three powers [sensation, memory and imagination], and so familiarized to their effects, that they excite no astonishment; and yet they present to us a fact, to which in part we have already alluded, and which is calculated powerfully to excite admiration. It is this. By sensation we perceive present objects, and become acquainted with events now passing before us; by memory we are enabled to retain or recal past perceptions, and the ideas of objects now removed both in time and place; when by imagination we can look forward to future events and future ages. Thus does man bring the past and the future into combination with the present. Though existing only in one spot, and living only in the passing moment, he is capable of ranging through the varied events of preceding years, and through former scenes now far distant, and at the same time of expatiating through the ages of futurity and the boundless regions of space. He lives in the present, the future and the past. There is something, in this capacity, astonishing and incomprehensible. It presents a phenomenon which strikes us with wonder; combining contrarieties which seem mutually irreconcilable; indicating the ordination of an Intelligent Power, whose eye embraces eternal ages and immeasurable space."*

* Crombie's Natural Theology, Vol. II. p. 33. 1829.

For the purpose I have now had in view, I might have devoted pages to the names of English Writers, who have dwelt upon the mental powers, as indications of an Intelligent Creator—or have filled volumes with extracts from their works; but I preferred an intermediate plan of proceeding. Lord Brougham's strange misapprehensions, and consequent misrepresentations of the matter, required to be met by something more satisfactory than a bare assertion that His Lordship was in total error; and, I trust, the passages adduced, although few in comparison with the numbers that were at hand, will evince his error, beyond all possibility of doubt. Whoever, besides, will consider the charge brought against modern writers—which is, that they have neglected "the mind and its operations," from the want of a sufficiently firm belief of its immateriality—must be sensible how completely the importance of the subject will justify the circumstantial method, which has been adopted, of establishing the exact truth of the case. Many ill effects might be produced, by His Lordship's statement, upon the public at large; and thus—to prove that such statement has not the slightest foundation in fact—is to do something

more than justify the literary character of this country in the public estimation.

In reality—taking the series of English Writers who have touched on subjects connected with Natural Theology—they have much more frequently appealed to "the mind and its operations," as evidences of a Supreme Intelligence, than might previously be expected; and as will probably soon be seen, there are reasons for thinking that the argument has been placed by them in that precise point of view which renders it the most striking to ordinary understandings.

Lord Brougham not only condemns the neglect of psychological proofs by the moderns, but also contrasts their conduct with that of the ancients, in relation to such proofs. This will be manifest from the following extract:

"In these speculations of the ancient philosophers, we cannot find any process of strict inductive reasoning; and, accordingly, the facts are not turned to the best account for the purposes of the argument. But this defect appears, at the least, as much in the physical as in the psychological portion of the reasoning. Indeed, the latter comes more near to our own philosophy; and certainly we must admit that those old writers upon Natural Theology, in the place which they assigned to intellectual phenomena, pursued a more sound and consistent method of philosophising, than

the moderns have done when speculating upon the same subject." (p. 227, being part of a note to p. 52.)

Having produced several instances of modern psychological speculation, my plan, of enabling the reader to form his own judgment on every topic that may be discussed, now leads me to give, from Lord Brougham's note just referred to, the whole of the specimens there found of psychological speculation amongst the ancients. I shall present them as they occur in the note — the Greek passages translated into English, and the Latin in their original language.

"Nor has the Deity been satisfied with taking care of the body alone: he has implanted in man what is a far greater work to have made—a most excellent soul:—for what other animal possesses a mind that can perceive the existence of the Gods by whom all these vast and fair works have been formed? What other creature than man worships those Gods? What other intelligence is superior to man's in providing against hunger and thirst and cold and heat? or in curing diseases, or in exercising strength, or in cultivating learning, or in storing up the recollection of things heard and seen and learnt."*

"They [the Gods] have implanted reason in our nature, whereby we inquire touching external things; and, arguing and remembering, we learn the uses of each, and hit upon many contrivances for attaining good and avoiding evil.

* Xen. Memor. I. iv. 13.

Have they not also given us the gift of speech, by which we can communicate mutually all we have learnt, and thus instruct each other, and make laws, and regulate civil polity."*

"The constitution of the understanding, whereby it not only receives impressions through the senses, but also deals with the ideas thus received, and combines and composes something out of them, proceeding from things that are near to things that are quite remote, proves the exist ence of an Artificer; since things carrying such marks of contrivance could not exist spontaneously and without design."†

"Aliud a terrâ sumsimus, aliud ab humore, aliud ab igne, aliud ab aëre eo quem spiritû ducimus: illud autem quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem dico, et si placet, pluribus verbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam, ubi invenimus, unde sustulimus?"‡

"Jam vero animum ipsum, mentemque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non divinâ curâ perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere.... Ex quo scientia intelligitur quam vim habeat, qualis sit, quâ ne in Deo quidem res est ulla præstantior."§

"Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoriâ rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoscito."‖

Such were the psychological speculations of ancient times; and it is truly gratifying to find

* Xen. Memor. iv. iii. 11.
† Epict. Enchir. i. 9.
‡ Cicero de Nat. Deor. ii. 6.
§ Ibid. ii. 59.
‖ Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 28.

the most illustrious sages of Greece and Rome thus appealing to the faculties of the human mind, as proofs of Creative power and wisdom. But how was it possible for Lord Brougham to suppose that there was nothing parallel to such speculations, in the writings of the moderns? The means of deciding that point are now in the reader's hands; and even a slight comparison, of the extracts contained between the 134th and the 149th page of the present volume, with those just given, will show how much more effectually the same argument is urged by the authors there quoted, than by the philosophers of antiquity. Lord Brougham has taken the trouble (p. 222) to *account* for this supposed modern neglect of an old argument. The reasoning, although somewhat metaphysical and obscure, is ingenious; and if there had been a fact to account for, might perhaps have been considered as sufficient to account for it.

The manifest adaptations of things to each other prove the existence of an Intelligent Agent:—this is the principle upon which the Physical branch of Natural Theology depends. At least, the generality of treatises on the subject, intended to be popular, have been constructed on this principle;

which also forms the ground-work of the Physical department of the science, both in Lord Brougham's 'Discourse,' and in the present volume. Now, if the reader will once more refer to the various passages ancient as well as modern (pp. 134—153), connected with the Psychological branch, he will find the excellence of the mental faculties enlarged upon, and the important uses, to which they are subservient, described; — while the various adaptations of those faculties to each other are but slightly noticed. The conclusion seems to be, that the writers on such topics considered the modifications of material things, as affording much more striking evidences of a Deity, than their existence — and the existence and primary uses of the mental faculties, as of greater weight, in that respect, than their adaptations to each other. Can any satisfactory reason be given, for so remarkable a distinction? It may be worth while to consider the point.... In the first place, although plain men may be bewildered by subtleties, they will still believe that there is nothing of which they can be more certain than of the existence, and, in numberless instances, the mutual adaptations of material objects. Whatever difficulties they may feel — and

they do feel great difficulties — with regard to solid substances *beginning* to be, they know that things actually existing admit of modifications; and they are certain that such modifications for a determinate end can have originated only in intellectual power. Hence the propriety of avoiding, in professedly popular discourses, all discussions respecting the first existence of material things; and of expatiating upon the wonderful contrivances which abound throughout the visible world—as the most generally convincing evidences of a Supreme Being. In the second place, plain men are conscious of intellectual endowments; and although they may, as before, be bewildered by subtleties, they feel that the mind within them is something essentially different from matter—and that their own, as well as all other finite intelligence can have been in the first instance derived from nothing but that Intelligent Being, whose existence is attested on every side. Such persons, moreover, being enabled to apply their mental faculties to many valuable purposes, and observing the beneficial effects resulting from the mental faculties of others, can easily trace the intellectual adaptation of human beings to their external condition. Hence the propriety

of dwelling, in popular discourses, upon such particulars as mark the wisdom with which the internal frame of man has been adjusted to his temporal state. In the third place, when plain men, who are chiefly occupied by material objects, have their attention directed to the various powers of their own minds—the nice adaptations of those powers to each other, as well as the modes in which they respectively control or facilitate each other's operations—plain men, I say, having nothing *sensible* here to guide them, are speedily lost in the maze. Such persons understand the conformity of parts in the structure of the body, because there is something submitted to the sight and the touch; but having little inclination for abstract inquiries and having devoted scarcely any time to them, they listen to a discourse on the conformity of the parts of the mental system, as to a disquisition on words without ideas. They have some conception of the manner in which the different members of the corporeal frame, while to each is assigned its appropriate action, are combined so as to constitute one body; but they perceive not in what way the various mental faculties, each with its peculiar office, are formed into one

mind. Hence, I apprehend, the little notice which has been taken, in popular treatises on Natural Theology, of the adaptation of the intellectual powers to each other.

The reader will not infer, from the foregoing paragraph, that Lord Brougham is at all to be blamed for having employed a few pages in describing some of the adjustments which may be discovered amongst the faculties of the human mind. His Lordship was writing, not solely perhaps, but principally, for persons versed in philosophical speculation; and therefore was warranted in discussing psychological topics in the manner he has adopted. Although my own views, with regard to philosophical readers, are by no means so exalted as those of the Noble Author, I have followed the path which he has traced out; and it will be satisfactory to know that the reasoning from intellectual adaptations, as given in these pages (pp. 69—86) is thought to strengthen the cause of religion. My intention, however, has all along been to state, as I have now done, what I conceive to be the most striking arguments for the Divine power and wisdom, which can be drawn from psychological sources.

To review the main objects of the present section: The first purpose was to show that, in whatever light we consider the mental faculties—whether as simply existing; or as by their force and variety producing eminently great and beneficial effects; or as admirably adjusted to each other—we can neither fail to acknowledge the vast addition of strength they afford to the arguments, drawn from external things, for the being of God and his attributes of power and wisdom and goodness—nor to be struck with the complete accordance of the testimony, borne by the Intellectual and Material worlds, to the same momentous truths. Moreover, to supply an omission on the part of Lord Brougham, a few observations have been made, on the capacity, possessed by the human race, of distinguishing between right and wrong—and on the judicial character with which Conscience has been invested in the frame of man—as attesting the moral attributes of the Deity. Lastly, considerable pains have been taken to vindicate not only Ray, Derham, Clarke and Paley — but also modern writers in general—from Lord Brougham's reproach of having entirely neglected the evidences of the Divine Nature presented by "the mind and

its operations." . . . That, in discussing the statements of this part of the 'Discourse,' the Noble Author's meaning has always been fully apprehended, I can scarcely hope; but I have no scruple in declaring that it has never been intentionally misrepresented.

Towards the close of the section, Lord Brougham has introduced two or three pages of remarks, well deserving attention, on the *Instincts* of animals—as in some degree belonging to that portion of the inquiry. The same subject has been illustrated by the genius of Paley; whose reasonings upon it have received the highest commendation from Mr Dugald Stewart.* The subject, indeed, is extremely interesting; and there are few phenomena in which we find brighter manifestations of the Supreme power and wisdom and goodness, than in the instincts of animated nature.

* Dissertation on Metaphysical, &c. Philosophy, Part II. p. 202.

SECTION III.

ETHICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

(Discourse, Section V. pp. 98—137).

The Psychological and Ethical branches of Natural Theology are closely connected with each other. They are connected in various ways—in particular, by means of this principle, common to them both; namely, that the mind is something which exists, and yet is not material. In the last section, the mind, its manifold faculties, and their respective uses and relations, were adduced, as evidences for the being of a God—his power, his wisdom and his goodness. In the present section, the mind and its operations will be appealed to, as affording intimations of a future life; and thus we shall have in some measure disclosed to us the *moral* bearing of the whole subject.

According to Lord Brougham's statement in the portion of his 'Discourse' now to be treated

of, the Ethical branch of Natural Theology comprises "the probable designs of the Deity, with respect to the future destiny of his creatures:"—and the means of investigating those designs are derived, 1. "from the nature of the human mind," and 2. "from the attributes of the Creator." Each of these points, therefore, will require a distinct notice. In this, as well as in the Psychological branch, His Lordship has taken much more than a cursory glance at the objects presented to his consideration; his purpose having been to discuss the matter somewhat at large, with the design of supplying an alleged defect in professed works on Natural Theology. Lord Brougham, indeed, informs us that the doctrines of the Ethical department "have been much less cultivated, by scientific inquirers," than those even of the Psychological department*. In the foregoing section, I explained the Noble Author's views of the Psychological branch of the science; and also examined his statement—that arguments drawn from the nature of the human mind had hardly ever before found a place in the speculations of the Natural Theologian. Several of

* Discourse, p. 99.

the passages from works on Natural Theology, there laid before the reader, are so related to the subjects to which the present section is appropriated, that very serious misgivings must already be felt, as to Lord Brougham's representations of the neglect, by preceding writers, of the topics now to be dwelt upon. It is, undoubtedly, not a little singular that His Lordship should have put forth such a representation; for on adverting to the subject of a future existence, as indicated by the nature of the human mind, and the Divine attributes—we find that scarcely any other portion of Natural Theology has been more fully discussed, by writers of reputation and ability. But leaving the generalities which are almost inseparable from introductory observations, I proceed to the first of the two divisions, which have been marked out, for the more distinct survey of the Ethical department.

1. PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, OR EVIDENCE OF THE DEITY'S DESIGNS DRAWN FROM THE NATURE OF THE MIND.

Under this head, Lord Brougham, in the first place, resorts to experience, as deciding that no-

thing but what is material can arise from either the combination, or the modification, of matter. An acid and an alkali, when mixed, produce a third body, and nothing more. A block of marble, although chiselled into the form of the Apollo, is matter still. That *mind*, therefore, should originate in any combination, or modification, of matter, is contrary to experience. But His Lordship shall state the argument in his own language:

"We may first of all observe that if a particular combination of matter gives birth to what we call mind, this is an operation altogether peculiar and unexampled. We have no other instance of it; we know of no case in which the combination of certain elements produces something quite different, not only from each of the simple ingredients, but also different from the whole compound. We can, by mixing an acid and an alkali, form a third body, having the qualities of neither, and possessing qualities of its own different from the properties of each; but here the third body consists of the other two in combination. There are not two things—two different existences—the neutral salt composed of the acid and the alkali, and another thing different from the neutral salt, and engendered for the first time by that salt coming into existence. So when, by chiselling, 'the marble softened into life grows warm,' we have the marble new moulded, and endowed with the power of agreeably affecting our senses, our memory and our fancy; but it is all the while

the marble: there is the beautiful and expressive marble instead of the amorphous mass, and we have not, besides the marble, a new existence created by the form which has been given to that stone. But the materialists have to maintain that, by matter being arranged in a particular way, there is produced both the organized body, and something different from it, and having not one of its properties—neither dimensions, nor weight, nor colour, nor form ..... If, therefore, their theory is true, it must be admitted to rest upon nothing which experience has ever taught us: it supposes operations to be performed, and relations to exist, of which we see nothing that bears the least resemblance in any thing we know." (pp. 102—104.)

The extracts already given from Dr Barrow (p. 138.) and Dr Bentley (p. 142.) show that, in their estimation, the modifications of matter are quite insufficient to account for the powers of the human mind. I quote the following passage from Dr Clarke, because the manner of thinking bears considerable resemblance to that employed by Lord Brougham:

"It will easily appear that perception or intelligence is really a distinct quality or perfection, and not a mere effect or composition of unintelligent figure and motion: and that, for this plain reason—because intelligence is not figure, and consciousness is not motion. For whatever can arise from, or be compounded of any things, is still only those very things, of which it was compounded,

And if infinite compositions or divisions be made eternally, the things will still be eternally the same; and all their possible effects can never be anything but repetitions of the same*."

To persevere in quotations of this kind, for the purpose of proving how unadvisedly Lord Brougham has censured preceding writers, for neglect of such doctrines, would assuredly be superfluous. The materialism of Hobbes in the seventeenth century—and that of Collins and Priestley in the eighteenth—excited and kept up attention to the inquiry; and the names, in succession, of Archbishop Bramhall and Richard Baxter—Dr Clarke and Andrew Baxter—Dr Price, Mr Bryant, Dr Reid and Dr Beattie—not to mention many others of equal celebrity—show that the doctrine of the soul's immateriality has not been in want of defenders. But by whomsoever this doctrine may have been previously maintained, we cannot but rejoice that it has found a vindicator in Lord Brougham.

His Lordship's second argument, in support of the same opinion, is derived from the consciousness of possessing the power of thought, and from

* Clarke on the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. viii. See also his Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Prop. iv.

reflection upon the operations of our own minds. Although the subject—as treated by the Noble Author—has been glanced at (pp. 87—89.), it may be worth considering once more. External phenomena, as ascertained by means of our senses, assure us of the existence of something external to us, without which there would be no such phenomena; and certain internal acts of thinking, willing, &c., made known to us by our own consciousness, assure us of the existence of something within us, that performs those acts. Moreover, the external phenomena and the internal acts are so completely dissimilar, that we cannot suppose them to have the same origin. We are impressed with the conviction that they arise from causes essentially distinct from each other. And thus, external phenomena being attributed to something material, or body—the internal acts of thinking, &c. are attributed to something immaterial, or mind. Higher than this it is impossible to ascend, in our attempts to trace the sources of our knowledge. Our senses and our consciousness are the primary means of intelligence: our reason enables us to judge of the notices they present: and if at last we doubt the truth of the inform-

ation thus afforded, there remains for us nothing but hopeless scepticism. Such is the ground wisely taken by the disciples of Dr Reid; amongst whom, in the main, is to be numbered the highly-gifted Author of the 'Discourse of Natural Theology.' It is indeed to be lamented that, from a wish to strengthen what he deems his principal position, he should appear to weaken a station of scarcely less importance. To insinuate a doubt, as His Lordship does, respecting the evidence of the senses, by no means tends to inspire confidence in the evidence of consciousness. He who is taught to doubt the truth of testimony upon which he has been accustomed to rely—will have some hesitation in relying upon any other. Lord Brougham's previous reasoning on this subject—concerning which I ventured to express my opinion (p. 88.) in the foregoing section—is enforced on the present occasion with great zeal. The notices from without and the intimations from within are made the subjects of the following comparison — the import of which is diffused through a pretty long paragraph:

"We believe that matter exists, because it makes a certain impression upon our senses, that is because it pro-

duces a certain change or a certain effect; and we argue, and argue justly, that this effect must have a cause, though the proof is by no means so clear that the cause is something external to ourselves. But we know the existence of mind by our consciousness or reflection on what passes within us; and our own existence as sentient and thinking beings implies the existence of the mind which has sense and thought. To know, therefore, that we are, and that we think, implies a knowledge of the soul's existence. But this knowledge is altogether independent of matter, and the subject of it bears no resemblance whatever to matter, in any one of qualities, or habits, or modes of action. Nay, we only know the existence of matter through the operations of the mind; and were we to doubt of the existence of either, it would be far more reasonable to doubt that matter exists than that mind exists." (p. 105.)

No one will doubt Mr Dugald Stewart's anxiety that the principles of mental philosophy should appear in all their strength. Some observations of that excellent author, on the subject of the preceding paragraph, have already been offered (p. 88.); and I now present a short sentence from his pen, in relation to the same matter. "The belief," he writes, "with which Consciousness is attended has been considered as the most irresistible of any; insomuch that this species of evidence has never been questioned:

and yet it rests on the same foundation with every other kind of belief to which we are determined by the constitution of our nature."* By anything like exaggeration, we are put upon our guard, as by the representations of an advocate; but to a statement, like that of Mr Stewart, we listen, as to the decision of a judge.

From the last, however, as well as from the former arguments of Lord Brougham, we willingly admit the correctness of his inference, that the intellectual principle is immaterial; and the next consequence (p. 107.) is, that, although the body may be resolved into its elements, the mind cannot be so resolved—having no parts—being absolutely one and simple. This consequence is

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 18. Let me here adduce the remarkable, and apparently well-weighed, words of Locke: "Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us of the existence of such beings; and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse, the other by thought: this we cannot doubt of.... But beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire farther into their nature, causes and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easy as the other: and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should, by thought, set body into motion, than how a substance we know not should, by impulse, set body into motion." Essay on Understanding, B. II. c. xxiii. s. 28.

enlarged upon from page 108 to page 111; in a manner which, however well intended, really involves the subject in uncertainty. Whether His Lordship employed so much disquisition, from an impression that the argument had been neglected by preceding writers, I know not; but, in truth, the argument is common to nearly all who have touched upon the natural evidences of a future state. It will be sufficient to give the observations of Dr Clarke, on the subject:

"Since the powers and faculties of the soul are the most remote and distant from all the known properties of matter that can be imagined, it is at least a putting great violence upon our reason to imagine them superadded by Omnipotence to one and the same substance ..... It is highly unreasonable and absurd to suppose the soul made up of innumerable consciousnesses, as matter is necessarily made up of innumerable parts; and on the contrary, it is highly reasonable to believe the seat of thought to be a simple substance, such as cannot naturally be divided and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is subject to be ..... Consequently the Soul will not be liable to be dissolved at the dissolution of the body; and therefore it will naturally be immortal. All this seems to follow, at least with the highest degree of probability, from the single consideration of the Soul's being endued with sense, thought or consciousness."*

* Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Prop. iv.

For the purpose of illustrating the possibility of the existence and activity of the mind independently of matter, Lord Brougham has recourse in the next place to some experiments upon the corporeal frame, during sleep—when "the bodily functions," those at least which depend upon volition, are suspended. The experiments in question are effected by means of such external applications to the senses as can be ventured upon "without awakening the sleeper."... "The consequence," His Lordship observes, "of *the cessation which takes place of all communication of ideas through the senses*, is that the action of the mind, and above all, of those powers connected with the imagination, becomes much more vigorous and uninterrupted. This is shown in two ways—first, by the celerity with which *any impression upon the senses*, strong enough to be felt without awaking, is caught up and made the groundwork of a new train of ideas, the mind instantly accommodating itself to the suggestions of the impression, and making all its thoughts chime in with that; and secondly, by the prodigiously long succession of images that pass through the mind, with perfect distinctness

and liveliness, in an instant of time." Now, without even knowing the nature of the experiments to be tried, is there not something like a contradiction between the expressions which I have given in Italics? In other words, if there is "any impression upon the senses which is caught up," how can there be "a cessation of all communication of ideas through the senses?"

But to proceed to the experiments themselves:

"Every one knows the effect of a bottle of hot water applied during sleep to the soles of the feet: you instantly dream of walking over hot mould, or ashes, or a stream of lava, or having your feet burnt by coming too near the fire. But the effect of falling asleep in a stream of cold air, as in an open carriage varies this experiment in a very interesting, and, indeed, instructive manner. You will, instantly that the wind begins to blow, dream of being upon some exposed point, and anxious for shelter, but unable to reach it; then you are on the deck of a ship, suffering from the gale—you run behind a sail for shelter, and the wind changes, so that it still blows upon you—you are driven to the cabin, but the ladder is removed, or the door locked. Presently you are on shore, in a house with all the windows open, and endeavour to shut them in vain; or seeing a smith's forge, you are attracted by the fire, and suddenly a hundred bellows play upon it, and extinguish it in an instant, but fill the whole smithy with their blast, till you are as cold as on the road." (pp. 112, 113.)

Mr Dugald Stewart mentions some external applications of the same kind—not as experiments, but as remedies; and infers, from their effects, that "our dreams are frequently suggested to us by bodily sensations."...."I have," he observes, "been told by a friend, that having occasion, in consequence of indisposition, to apply a bottle of hot water to his feet when he went to bed, he dreamed that he was making a journey to the top of Mount Ætna, and that he found the heat of the ground almost insupportable. Another person, having a blister applied to his head, dreamed that he was scalped by a party of Indians." Such I take to be the origin of Lord Brougham's experiments. The bodily frame is out of order; and a blister is applied to the head, or a bottle of hot water to the feet. Whatever the effect may be, who shall decide how much is to be attributed to disorder, and how much to the bottle or the blister? When Mr Stewart adds—"I believe every one, who is in the habit of dreaming, will recollect instances, in his own case, of a similar nature"—we see the limitation introduced, namely, "one who is in the habit of dreaming;" and ought to consider the limitation

implied, namely, one who is suffering from bodily indisposition. From such premises there is no warrant to draw general conclusions.*

Supposing however, for the sake of argument, Lord Brougham's representations to be correct, their real tendency is only to show to what a perturbed state of existence, to what a perverted activity, some of the mental faculties are consigned, during sleep. Such representations prove the excitability and wildness of the Imagination, under the circumstances there detailed; and the importance of its being under the direction of the reasoning powers. Something indeed, of the kind above described, may have happened to an individual, once in his life-time, even when perfectly well—or, from peculiar temperament, may have happened to him more than once; but how great is the number of persons to whom nothing of the kind ever has happened, or ever will happen! In making experiments upon things material—after many trials producing an invariable result, we may safely rely upon the information derived from a process of induction so decisive; while the cases here dwelt upon serve but to con-

* Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I. p. 336.

vince us of our inability to subject the mind to direct experiment, and thus teach us the propriety of not drawing our conclusions, in mental philosophy, from such methods of investigation. This, at least, is the only opinion which a full consideration of the subject has enabled me to form. If I am in error, my mistake can do no harm—inasmuch as the reader has the means placed before him, of judging for himself.

For reasons similar to those just stated, I am unable to perceive how any doctrine, respecting the human mind, can be satisfactorily established on some other experiments subsequently mentioned by Lord Brougham. If we take the case of the man "who being extremely overpowered with drowsiness—as after sitting up all night, and sleeping none the next day—lies down, and begins to dictate:"—the first thing that strikes us is the strange condition and employment of the person, the operations of whose mind we are about to observe. "He will," as His Lordship truly predicates, "find himself falling asleep after uttering a few words." The next part of the business is not so self-evident. "He will be awakened by the person who writes repeating

the last word, to show he has written the whole; not above five or six seconds may elapse, and the sleeper will find it at first quite impossible to believe that he has not been asleep for hours, and will chide the amanuensis for having fallen asleep over his work—so great apparently will be the length of the dream he has dreamt, extending through half a lifetime." (p. 114.) And this intercourse between the dozing dogmatist and the unhappy scribe is supposed to continue for some time. To estimate the matter arithmetically, His Lordship supposes the amanuensis to write two words in a second, and four words to be dictated at once. There are, then, two seconds between each act of dictation; and if half that interval be consumed in falling asleep, the dream, which "seems to last for years," is in reality but for one second. With such rapidity do the images of things pass through the human mind!..... Now, in the first place, the circumstances here detailed, if intended to furnish general conclusions, ought to be general in their occurrence; whereas there are very few, I suspect, by whose experience they have ever been confirmed. In the second place, the mere wanderings of the

imagination, during so feverish a state of the body, can afford no criterion of the healthy and unobstructed operations of the intellectual powers. .... In fine, I would compress my opinion of all these, and all similar experiments, into one question—How is it possible—by means of such mechanical kinds of operations of the senses—to ascertain any thing, respecting the nature and properties of the mind, when the whole system of the bodily functions shall be no more?

In addition to such experiments and reasonings, the Noble Author has given several instances of remarkable dreams, occasioned by corporeal pain or excitement of mind; the inferences from which are all liable to the various objections just adduced. If, however, the reader is curious about the subject, he will refer to the 'Discourse,' (pp. 115—118.) and determine what weight is really due to the statements there presented.

On leaving the topics above mentioned, Lord Brougham occupies much the same ground with that previously taken by Bishop Butler, in the first chapter of his Analogy—*On a future state.* Did the limits, which I have assigned to myself,

allow me, I should gladly discuss this part of the argument; but having dwelt so long on the preceding subjects, I will only recommend that His Lordship's observations (pp. 118—126.) should be perused in connection with the disquisitions of that great prelate.

Before I pass on, to the second head, it occurs to me to mention an argument, for the immateriality of the soul, which Lord Brougham might, perhaps not improperly, have introduced into this part of his 'Discourse.' The argument derives its force from the inertness—the inability to move of itself—which is proved by all observation and experiment to be a property of matter—contrasted with the power of originating motion indisputably possessed by the human mind. This distinction between mind and matter deserves the most attentive consideration. Bishop Butler has availed himself of it, in the chapter just referred to; and Mr Andrew Baxter has enlarged upon it, with great effect, in his *Inquiry into the nature of the Human Soul.*"*.

"A power of beginning motion," says Mr

* The first edition of the work was published without date, the second in 1737.

Dugald Stewart, "is an attribute of mind, no less than sensation and thought; and wherever motion commences, we have evidence that mind has operated."*

II. MORAL ARGUMENT, OR EVIDENCE OF THE DEITY'S DESIGNS, DRAWN FROM HIS ATTRIBUTES IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONDITION OF THE SPECIES.

The study of the works of creation, as daily exhibited to our view, has ever been deemed, by thinking men, one of the most certain means of acquiring valuable knowledge; and of the world within us it may with truth be said, that its wonders, if duly contemplated, cannot fail to afford increase of wisdom. The soul of man, in its very nature, bears tokens of a divine origin, as well as a destination to eternal life; and although, while carefully examining the texture (so to speak) of the human mind, we sometimes find it enwrought with mysterious characters—those very characters impress us strongly with the idea of their having been inscribed by the finger of God. But amidst much that is obscure in the

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 165.

intellectual frame, we there discover unquestionable intimations of a future state of existence; and the time is now come to inquire how far those intimations are confirmed by the information, which we have been able to obtain, respecting the attributes of the Deity.... There is, indeed, a certain temper and disposition, which is peculiarly suited to investigations of this nature; and on no occasion could Lord Brougham have more properly enforced the necessity of a "humble and submissive spirit," than that on which he has done so—namely, when he was about to consider the attributes and designs of the Deity, as affecting the destiny of the human race.

The first argument employed by Lord Brougham, in proof of a future state of existence, is drawn from the goodness of God, conjointly with the desire of immortality common to all men. The benevolence of the Deity is manifested by His providential arrangements for the temporal well-being of our species. Not only does the mind appear by its very nature destined for immortality—but even the certain knowledge of the inevitable dissolution of the body cannot abate the expectation of endless life. If, then, that

life be a reality, how clearly do we see the complete accordance between the goodness of God, and the hopes of future existence which he has implanted in the mind. In short, suppose that we are intended for endless life—and the intimations of it which have been afforded, and the longings after it which form part of ourselves, correspond exactly with other manifestations of the Creator's superintending care:—suppose the contrary—and we involve that portion of the Divine dispensations, which is of the deepest moment to the whole human race, in perplexity not to be disentangled. Under such circumstances, our understandings will not permit us to hesitate about drawing our conclusions.... The Noble Author has treated the subject in other and better language—which I recommend to the reader's attention.

In connexion with the longing after immortality, may be mentioned the improvement of which the mental powers are susceptible, as life advances—their more extended range through the material and intellectual worlds—their growing anticipations of higher and better modes of existence than experience has afforded, or even imagination suggested. This capacity of the mind,

for greater attainments, in whatever constitutes the excellence of our rational nature, seems to assure us, in the most agreeable and convincing manner, that the present state of existence is but introductory to another—in which our faculties will be directed to objects still more brightly reflecting the Divine Perfections.

Lord Brougham next adverts to the affections of our nature, as combining, with our sense of the Divine goodness, to assure us of a future existence. No doubt, the importance of those affections, during the present life, is abundantly manifest; and did they cease with the apparent termination of the relations which called them forth, no farther account of them could be required. But when we consider them as, in numberless instances, continuing unimpaired by the separation caused by death—the fact seems to afford grounds of hope that the separation will be but temporary; and that, in another state, our best sympathies will still exist, and under happier auspices. Lord Brougham has touched the subject with great feeling; and when his reflections on this occasion are compared with a remarkable passage at the close of his Dedica-

tion to Earl Spencer, we have convincing evidence of that kindliness of disposition which is attributed to the Noble Author, by those to whom he is intimately known. In truth, I can easily imagine him to have frequently derived far greater satisfaction from the recurrence of such sentiments, than he has ever derived from the recollection of all the triumphs of his eloquence, and all the various achievements of his extraordinary powers .... There may occasionally be discovered in the following extract—as in much of His Lordship's writing—an attempt to add strength to the argument by giving force to the expression—an attempt which scarcely ever succeeds, by whomsoever it may be made:—in other respects, the extract will be read with pleasure by every one.

"The tender affections so strongly and so universally operating in our nature afford another argument of a like kind. No doubt the purpose to which they are subservient in this life is much more distinctly perceivable; yet still it is inconsistent with the provisions of a benevolent Power to suppose that we should be made susceptible of such vehement feelings, and be suffered to indulge in them, so as to make our happiness chiefly consist in their gratification, and that then we should

suddenly be made to undergo the bitter pangs of separation, while, by our surviving, those pains are lengthened out without any useful effect resulting from our sufferings. That such separations should be eternal appears irreconcilable with the strength of the affections wounded, and with the goodness so generally perceived in the order of the universe. The supposition of a re-union hereafter overcomes the difficulty, and reconciles the apparent inconsistency." (p. 129.)

Amongst the most remarkable indications of a future life, Lord Brougham justly numbers those feelings of our nature which attest their existence, by religious observances of one kind or other, in whatever region of the earth human beings are to be found. Every age has witnessed the universal prevalence of such observances; which, originating in apprehensions, inseparable from the mind itself, of an unseen world, will unquestionably continue, through all succeeding ages, to indicate the hopes and fears which will still agitate the human breast. Now, it is not easy to believe that such apprehensions can be permitted so to occupy the mind, unless they are intended to forewarn men of that state of existence which assuredly shall be hereafter. Those apprehensions, indeed, are of the utmost

importance during the present life—as encouragements to good, and restraints from evil. If, on this account, an objector should allege that the apprehensions are of the same importance, even supposing there is no future state corresponding to them—nothing, it may be replied, can be imagined more directly opposed to all that we have observed of the Divine proceedings, than the notion that, in a matter of such consequence, the conduct of rational creatures is providentially influenced by hopes which must inevitably be disappointed, and fears of that which shall never come to pass. In this case therefore, as in the instances before adduced, the supposition, that the present life comprises the whole of our existence, involves our earthly condition in utter perplexity—while the assurance of another life accounts for some of the most striking properties of our mental constitution, and eminently displays the wisdom of the appointments of the Deity with regard to us.

But the great argument of all, in proof of a future existence—I am sorry to record the fact—is despatched by Lord Brougham in the following paragraph:

"The unequal distribution of rewards and punishments in this world, that is, the misery in which virtue often exists, and the prosperity not seldom attendant upon vice, can in no way be so well accounted for, consistently with the scheme of a benevolent Providence, as by the supposition of a future state." (p. 130.)

When we contrast the strong language employed by Lord Brougham, in enforcing *other* arguments for a future state, with the slight and almost hesitating manner in which the argument, *from the unequal distribution of rewards and punishments in this world*, is noticed — we can scarcely avoid feeling some uneasiness of mind; and our uneasiness gains strength, when we recollect the previous omission (pointed out p. 84.) of all reference to the moral constitution of man, as leading the thoughts to A MORAL GOVERNOR OF THE WORLD. That a state of final retribution is "consistent with the scheme of a benevolent Providence" there can be no doubt — and it is clear that the act of retribution *implies* the Divine attribute of justice; but why is the moral character of the Deity thus veiled from the sight? Had the power of *conscience* been duly insisted upon, in the Psychological branch of the science, with a view of indicating the Moral Attributes

of God—here would have been the place to point out its operation in other respects. The judicial authority which conscience bears — the right of acquittal and condemnation which it is commissioned to exercise—the premonitions which it fails not to afford, that its decisions will be ratified hereafter—might on this occasion have been introduced with great advantage. To that topic would naturally have succeeded the various intimations that men are, during the present life, in a state of probation; so that on their conduct while on this earth will depend their future welfare. And finally, His Lordship might have availed himself of the considerations which, notwithstanding the moral disorders abounding in the world, lead us to infer that God is no indifferent spectator of virtue and of vice; that the marks of his righteous dispensations are even now perceptible; and that such inferences, combined with the evidences of the Divine attributes derived from other sources, fully warrant our belief in an ultimate adjudication of every one's lot, in strict accordance with his real character.... Discussions like these would have well become the *Ethical* department of Natural Theo-

logy; and the omission of them cannot fail to excite the most serious regret.

Lord Brougham closes his review of the Ethical department of Natural Theology, by comparing the weights of the arguments respectively resulting from the first and the second divisions of this branch of the subject. "The most satisfactory proofs," he observes, "of the soul's immortality are those of the first, or psychological class, derived from studying the nature of mind; those of the second class which we have been surveying, derived from the condition of man in connexion with the attributes of the Deity, are less distinct and cogent." If His Lordship intends to maintain, as I conclude he does, that the entire evidence with regard to a future state, afforded by the nature of the human mind, is more "distinct and cogent" than the evidence afforded by the condition of man in connexion with the attributes of the Deity— I cannot but think that he has formed a very erroneous estimate of the matter. Suppose the mind to be by its very nature secure of existence after the bodily frame shall have been resolved into its component particles — who can

tell, from that consideration alone, whether the mind's future being may not consist in mere consciousness—or in restless activity—without happiness and without hope? The truth is, that, after reflection on the immaterial nature of the human mind has given probability to the opinion that it will survive the body, we must have recourse to all the other intimations of a future state which we can discover—all the aspirations, the capabilities, the sympathies, the moral and religious apprehensions of our intellectual nature—all the indications that we are now in a state of trial—all the manifestations of the power and wisdom and goodness and justice of God—before we can indulge in any thing like rational hopes of reward for those who take heed to that which is right. Mr Dugald Stewart appears to have somewhat understated the value of the argument derived from "the nature of mind;" but his view of its bearing upon the whole question is assuredly more correct than that of Lord Brougham. "In collecting," says Mr Stewart, "the various evidences which the light of nature affords for a future state, too much stress has commonly been laid upon the soul's Immateriality.

The proper use of that doctrine is not to demonstrate that the soul is physically and necessarily immortal; but to refute the objections which have been urged against the possibility of its existing in a separate state from the body. Although our knowledge of the nature of Mind may not be sufficient to afford us any positive argument on the subject; yet, if it can be shown that the dissolution of the body does not necessarily infer the extinction of the soul; and still more, if it can be shown that the presumption is in favour of the contrary supposition; the moral proofs of a future retribution will meet with a more easy reception, when the doctrine is freed from the metaphysical difficulties which it has been apprehended to involve."*

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 209. So also, in his Dissertation on the progress of Metaphysical Philosophy, "Where is the sober Metaphysician to be found, who now speaks of the immortality of the soul as a logical consequence of its immateriality; instead of considering it as depending on the will of that Being by whom it was at first called into existence? And, on the other hand, is it not universally admitted by the best philosophers, that whatever hopes the light of nature encourages beyond the present scene, rest solely (like all other anticipations of future events) on the general tenor and analogy of the laws by which we perceive the universe to be governed?" (Part I. p. 88.) It may here be observed that Lord Brougham's division of the Ethical part of Natural Theology seems to have been derived from this work of Mr Dugald Stewart; who

The mind—even if, by the nature with which it has been endowed, immortal—is still dependent for existence on the Supreme Being. What has been created may be annihilated—may be disposed of, according to the pleasure of the Creator. The case of the human soul is not a case of simple existence—apart from all other considerations. There are moral considerations which may seriously affect its destiny. In our anxiety, therefore, for information respecting our future condition, we must have recourse, not so much to the nature of the mind, as to the various intimations of the Divine Will, which have been vouchsafed to us on the subject.

On looking over the *Ethical* Branch of Natural Theology, as treated by Lord Brougham, it presents so little which can properly be *called* Ethical, that some curiosity is excited, to revert to the Introduction to the 'Discourse'; for the pur-

who treats—1. *Of the argument for a Future State, derived from the nature of mind*—and 2. *Of the Evidences for a Future State, arising from the Human Constitution, and from the circumstances in which man is placed.* (pp. 209, 217.) Let me farther state, that the general arrangement of the 'Discourse' very closely resembles that adopted by Dr Crombie, in his excellent work on Natural Theology, already referred to.

pose of ascertaining how far the original plan has been carried into effect. Lord Brougham, then, in his introductory remarks, seems to consider Natural Theology as having two objects:—1. "the discovery of the existence and attributes of a Creator, by investigating the evidences of design, in the works of the creation, material as well as spiritual"—which was intended for the Physical and Psychological branches;—and 2. "the discovery of his will and probable intentions with regard to his creatures, their conduct and their duty"—which was reserved for the Ethical branch. When however, as the reader will find stated in page 161, we arrive at the section appropriated to the Ethical branch, we are simply told that it comprises "the probable designs of the Deity with regard to the future destiny of his creatures;"—and thus, all that relates to "their conduct and their duty"—from which, in fact, the Ethical branch derives its name—is dropped by the way. The conduct and the duty of men are not touched upon in the course of the section; nor do I recollect that they are brought forward in any other part of the 'Discourse.' If it be said that the Will

of God, with regard to the conduct and duty of men, forms the subject of Moral Philosophy, and therefore could not properly be introduced into a 'Discourse of Natural Theology'—the reply is easy—that the plan of the work, as described in the Introduction was most undoubtedly the result of very different views of the matter. But to state every thing fairly, had the subject of Morals been discussed, the Noble Author must have extended the limits which he had probably assigned to himself; unless, indeed, there had been—what I think there might have been, without any disadvantage—considerable omissions and abbreviations, in various parts of the work. At the same time, if the neglect, here observed upon, be in any way connected with the neglect, previously pointed out, of certain moral bearings of the subjects under consideration—the proceeding cannot be too strongly condemned. However the case may be, the omitting to place, distinctly before the reader's mind, the Moral attributes of God—the Moral nature of man—and the Moral conduct of man—will be deemed, by thinking persons, most detrimental to the credit of the 'Discourse.'

THE subject of Morals is too weighty and extensive, to admit of discussion at the end of a Section—more especially, in a work like the present. In what consists the difference between that which is right and that which is wrong, in human conduct—how we become sensible of the distinction—on what principles, and from what motives, we choose the right—are questions which, for more than a century and a half, have exercised the talents of some of the ablest authors whom this country has produced. Although those of my readers, who are acquainted with the literary history of that period, need not the information, it may be advisable to state that I particularly refer to the labours of Cudworth, Cumberland, Clarke, Butler, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Paley, Dugald Stewart and Brown. In

the writings of these eminent men, the subject is presented in a great variety of views — which cannot fail to enlarge the student's mind. The systems adopted by them, even when different, are seldom contradictory; and the very fact — that there are so many considerations which separately point out *the same conduct*, as that which men ought to pursue — manifests in the most striking manner the futility and danger of all attempts to withdraw themselves from the power of moral obligation.

SECTION IV.

ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

(Discourse, Part II. pp. 175—213.)

Lord Brougham has discoursed, on the advantages arising from the study of Natural Theology, with so much eloquence and ability—and indeed they are of themselves so manifest—that my remarks on the subject may with great propriety be but few and brief. The study is considered, by his Lordship, as affording, first, the pleasures which attend scientific pursuits in general—secondly, the pleasures and advantages peculiar to itself—and thirdly, aid to the cause of Revelation. It is the last of these topics which will require the greatest attention; but let each of them be taken in its order.

I. That the pleasures attendant on scientific pursuits belong to the study of Natural Theology will not be disputed, when it is borne in mind that the study is founded on the knowledge of

nature—on science in general. He who reads the book of nature for himself proceeds from fact to fact: observes things, connected with each other by resemblances with shades of difference—and separated by diversity with marks of resemblance: is struck with instances followed by instances of affinities and dependencies and adjustments and co-operations. He who, for the purpose of enlarging his views, has recourse to the labours of others—whether affording information, or presenting artificial means of improving the power of observation—finds his knowledge of the processes of nature, and the mutual relations they involve, greatly increased. He who, in addition to such methods of inquiry, avails himself of the light of mathematical science, to assist him in his researches into physical phenomena, is amply repaid by the new and surprising lustre shed upon facts previously known, as well as by the discovery of numberless other facts, which only that science can enable him to comprehend. Whatever, besides, can be ascertained respecting the moral and intellectual faculties of the human race—and the moral tendencies of the system of which we form a part—is of the ut-

most importance to him who has the leisure and the capacity to collect and examine the various indications, which are presented, of the truth of the doctrines of Natural Theology. A science, so connected with the physical, the intellectual and the moral world, cannot fail to abound in interesting objects of contemplation. So long, therefore, as accessions of knowledge, derived from the most extensive range of observation, of experiment and of reasoning, can gratify the human mind, the student of Natural Theology may be secure of finding, in his investigations, that satisfaction which is peculiar to mental exertions in the pursuit of truth. We are, indeed, so formed as to be delighted even with truth in the abstract, without regard to its "gross and material utility;" with a mathematical theorem, for instance, a physical fact, a law of nature — independently of its application to practical purposes. We love to generalize; to trace resemblances and analogies; to compare the quantities of things. We are fond of resolving what is complex into its simplest elements, and verifying our results by the reverse operation. We feel an elevation of mind in accompanying the great Masters of

Science in their discoveries, and beholding the mysteries of nature laid open before us.... But although the satisfaction arising from our inquiries into the constitution of nature is amply sufficient to incite us to perseverance—yet, on reflection, we cannot but feel some anxiety respecting the purposes to which the knowledge we have obtained may be applied. And here, the subject takes two directions:—the one leading to the uses of our knowledge with regard to the present life—the other, to its uses in a Theological point of view. After a very few remarks upon the former of these topics, I shall discuss the latter in the second division of the section.

By observing the processes throughout the system of the Universe—by studying the mechanism (so to speak) of the material world, with the various compensations and adjustments which every where abound—men learn various modes of applying the powers of nature. In a limited sphere, they acquire a dominion over the elements, which they may almost be said to wield at pleasure. They are thus enabled to make their knowledge of external things conduce to the well-being and embellishment of private life;

facilitate the intercourse of communities; and essentially contribute to the prosperity of empires.

It is to the relations of things—their mutual adaptations—and the purposes to which they are subservient—that, as has been stated again and again, the attention is especially directed by Natural Theology; and in no other points of view are the objects of our contemplation capable of filling the mind with finer feelings of delight and admiration. There is, moreover, such a tendency to similarity in those ends and adjustments, that the student is speedily led by them to compare results—to form classes—to establish systems. Long-continued observation at last warrants probable conjecture. The careful interpreter of nature becomes the sagacious prophet. One age has announced to it the anticipations of the philosopher—another witnesses their fulfilment.

Lord Brougham, following the footsteps of Mr Dugald Stewart, has very properly made some remarks, with a view of showing how important, to the extension of physical knowledge, is the consideration of the *purposes* of things, required by Natural Theology. From the dili-

gent study of natural phenomena, a conviction arises, that all things are useful in one way or another; so that, whenever the student finds an object, of the tendency of which he can give no account, he at once attributes his embarrassment to his own ignorance. His curiosity is excited; and in his subsequent endeavours to resolve the difficulty, he probably lights upon some unexpected manifestation of the wonderful economy of nature. It was by considering the reason that could be assigned for the valves of the veins, that Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood.... The anecdote, as related by Mr Boyle, is given by Lord Brougham, in the 185th page of his 'Discourse;' and by Mr Stewart, in the 185th page of his 'Outlines of Natural Philosophy.' In this part of his Lordship's work, there are many observations well deserving attention. I must now pass on to the second head.

II. What has already been advanced leads us to conclude that the study of Natural Theology has its peculiar pleasures and advantages. In the first place, indisputable relations, dependencies, adjustments, ends, purposes—or whatever term

may be employed—indicate contrivance—understanding—foreknowledge. We feel, indeed, that it was not by some slow and cautious process of reasoning, that the Supreme Intelligence produced the results we witness—however astonishing the mode in which they are connected with each other; but we feel also that, by a careful and modest application of the faculties, with which we have been endowed, to the Divine productions, we may become wiser, and yet more sensible of our ignorance, as we contemplate "the manifold wisdom of God."* The tracing of design in the works of the creation furnishes a wholesome exercise to the intellectual powers. It calls forth ingenuity—sharpens the reason—and delights the imagination. Moreover, by constantly referring every thing to a Creating and Superintending Mind, it preserves a solemn impression of responsibility, in the conduct of our inquiries; and calls upon us to recollect that WE ARE IN THE PRESENCE OF GOD.... In the second place, the study now treated of is not one which can be pursued only in our libraries—

* Eph. iii. 10. ἡ πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ, is the beautiful expression of the original.

amidst books of science, and various kinds of experimental apparatus: — not one which is confined to some favoured region of the earth, abounding in the materials adapted to such inquiries: — every climate furnishes ample means for the purpose — and, like the air that is breathed, without expense. The appearances of nature are obvious to all; and though superior talents and learning, in these as well as other pursuits, secure important advantages to the philosophical inquirer — yet the art of observing the arrangements and processes of the material world, so as greatly to inform and gratify the mind, is under the ordinary circumstances of life by no means of difficult attainment.... In the last place, the study of Natural Theology traces every thing that exists, from that which by its minuteness eludes the unaided senses, to that which overwhelms the imagination by its magnitude — every law that is observed to prevail throughout the vast extent of the visible creation — to the will of God; and thus, the peculiar kind of contemplation which is required constantly tends, by its very nature, to exalt our conceptions of the power and wisdom and good providence of the Creator.

This habitual ascent of the thoughts, from things material to the Supreme Being, can scarcely fail to have a permanently beneficial effect upon the minds and characters of men; and when we consider the intimations, in various ways presented to us, of a future existence, the condition of which as to happiness will depend upon our moral improvement in this life, we cannot but feel that such views of the economy of the world are of the deepest interest to us, as creatures designed for immortality.... It is, then, not merely for the confutation of those who believe not in the being of a wise and righteous Governor of the universe, that the study of Natural Theology is to be undertaken. When arguments for that purpose have been familiarized to the mind — when we have traced the consequent indications that the present state is appointed for probation, the next for retribution — and satisfied ourselves as to the Divine will, with regard to the dispositions and conduct required of us — the study may still be pursued with pleasure and advantage. New conceptions of the attributes of God will be formed within us; new reasons be suggested, for acquiescing in the dispensations of his pro-

vidence; and new incitements afforded, for adoration of his greatness and obedience to his laws.... On these topics, my limits will not allow me to expatiate; and therefore, content to have thrown out a few imperfect hints respecting them, I refer those readers who would wish to see considerations of that kind eloquently enforced—to the pages of Lord Brougham.

III. We have now to ascertain the aid, rendered by the study of Natural Theology, to the cause of Revelation; or, in other words, the connexion between Natural and Revealed Religion. Such an inquiry seems to be right in itself; and indeed becomes quite indispensable, under the circumstances stated by Lord Brougham, in the following terms:

"An objection [against Natural Theology] has sometimes proceeded, unexpectedly, from the friends of Revelation—who have been known, without due reflection, to contend, that by the light of unassisted reason we can know absolutely nothing of God and a Future State. They appear to be alarmed lest the progress of Natural Religion should prove dangerous to the acceptance of Revealed; lest the former should, as it were, be taken as a substitute for the latter. They argue as if the two systems were rivals, and whatever credit the one gained were so much lost to the other. They seem to think

that if any discovery of a First Cause and another world were made by natural reason, it would no longer be true that *life and immortality were brought to light by the Gospel.*" (pp. 199, 200.)

The preceding paragraph is so general in its views of the subject to which it relates, as to leave the mind in great uncertainty with regard to the extent to which the opinions there recorded have prevailed; and therefore, without attempting — what yet would be neither uninteresting nor unimportant — a regular history of those opinions — I will endeavour to present a few distinct notices of their rise and progress, since the time of the Reformation.

So far as I can at present recollect, SOCINUS — Faustus Socinus — first maintained the opinions mentioned by Lord Brougham. In the life of Socinus, by one of his modern followers and admirers, the following statement occurs:

"With respect to the power of man to discover, by the light of nature, the being of God, and the truths of what is called Natural Religion, Socinus thought that these principles were above his natural powers; and that the first notices of a Divine Being were derived from Revelation, or immediate communications from God."*

* Toulmin's Memoirs of Faustus Socinus, 1777. p. 216.

St Paul's declaration—that *the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead*—stood in the way of the opinion, "that it cannot be proved from the creature that there is a God;" and so was to be set aside by some means or other. Bishop Pearson, in one of his learned notes, has well disposed of what he calls the "pitiful criticisms" of Socinus, for that purpose.—Such then, on these points, were the sentiments of the individual, who is generally accounted the father of the Unitarianism of the present day.*

During the seventeenth century, the opinions of Socinus did not flourish in this country. The seed was sown, but the ground was not quite prepared for it; nor were there, till after the middle of the eighteenth century, any great signs of vegetation. And the fact is remarkable, that, with the increase of Unitarian doctrines—while they were avowedly maintained by some, and regarded with complacency by others—there undoubtedly was a tendency to a revival

* Rom. i. 20. See Pearson on the Creed, Art. *I believe in God.*

of the opinions of Socinus, touching Natural Religion. Indications of the existence of such a tendency may be traced even in our own times. I do not quote the late Bishop Watson, as a person symbolizing with the Unitarians, but as one who appears to have felt no dissatisfaction at the progress of their tenets; and we find him thus expressing his sentiments, respecting a future state, in a letter to Mr Gibbon: "I have no hope of a future existence except that which is grounded on the truth of Christianity." The reason subsequently given to THE KING, for such a declaration, is certainly a good one, supposing the doctrine involved to be well founded; but it leaves that point untouched. "I had," he says, "frequently met with respectable men, who cherished an expectation of a future state, though they rejected Christianity as an imposture, and I thought my publicly declaring that I was of a contrary opinion might perhaps induce Mr Gibbon, and other *such* men, to make a deeper investigation into the truth of religion than they had hitherto done."* The late Mr Gilbert Wakefield's Unitarian principles are well known; and

* Bishop Watson's Anecdotes of his own Life, Vol. I. p. 107. 8vo.

in the course of his writings, he frequently presents the following views: "The reason why I never took any pleasure in *moral ethics*, and would not give one penny for all the morality in the world, is because there is no foundation for virtue and immortality, but in Revelation: and therefore I could never see any advantage from moral writings."*.... I do not affirm, nor do I suppose, that such opinions are universally held by Unitarians — although well according with their peculiar views. Unitarians have this difficulty to contend with: — Christianity, as explained by them, differs but little from the Religion of Nature. Is this credible, with regard to a Dispensation promulgated in so wonderful a manner? Now if Natural Religion be an imaginary thing, the difficulty is apparently lessened. May not such considerations have had some effect in forming their opinions on the subject now discussed? My purpose, however, is to state facts; and I would only farther observe, that there seems to be this difference between Socinus and the Modern Unitarians alluded to — Socinus denied that the being of God, as well

* Wakefield's Memoirs of his own Life, Vol. I. p. 512.

as all its important consequences, could be deduced by the power of reason — the Unitarians rather restrict their denial, to the consequences of that great fact.... But to proceed to a class of Theologians, very remote, in their sentiments, from Socinus and his modern disciples.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century —to counteract the mischievous tendency and ill effects, in a practical point of view, of the indiscreet mode in which certain high doctrines had been preached—there were divines of great eminence, who made it their business to impress upon the conscience a serious sense of moral obligation. They dwelt much upon the duties of life. Some of them, unfortunately, called Christianity a Republication of the Law of Nature:— not intending, most assuredly, that Christianity is a *mere* republication, but designing to hold it forth as a Religion abounding in new motives to the observance of all that is required of men in their present state of being. The Adversaries of the Gospel affected to understand what was said, of the "republication of the law of nature," in its strictly literal sense; and availed themselves of the opportunity to show, that Christianity is, on

that principle, "as old as the creation." Controversies arose: in the midst of which appeared certain zealous, but not very prudent, friends of Revelation, whose aim was to prove that there is no such thing as Natural Religion at all. Before the disputes alluded to were closed, a Lay Divine and Religious Philosopher presented to the world some lucubrations which attracted a good deal of notice. "A very curious and inquisitive person (as Mr Whiston justly calls him) Mr HUTCHINSON, thought that, by the light which revelation afforded him, compared with his own observations, he saw farther into the constitution of the universe, and the operations carried on in it, than Sir ISAAC [NEWTON] had done."* Such is the account, given by Bishop Horne, of the philosophy of Hutchinson; who deriving the principles of "the constitution of the universe and the operations carried on in it" from Scripture, could scarcely allow that any thing appertaining to *Religion* could be collected from other sources. Accordingly, we are informed that "he looked

* Bishop Horne's Works, Vol. I. p. 445. It may be observed, by the way, that Hutchinson has asserted that he was the principal collector of the Fossils bequeathed by Dr Woodward to the University of Cambridge. What the fact may have been I know not.

upon Natural Religion as Deism in disguise; an engine of the devil, in these latter days, for the overthrow of the Gospel; and therefore boldly called it *the Religion of Satan or Antichrist.*"* In such opinions, philosophical and religious, Hutchinson had several followers of great respectability, as the names of Horne, Parkhurst and Jones (not to mention others) will testify; but the Hutchinsonian philosophy was not formed to endure the scrutiny of the eighteenth century — and the inferences from it, as to religion, would have entirely disappeared, had there not been some attempts to evince their correctness by other considerations. By maintaining the senses to be the only natural inlets to knowledge — that is, by discarding reflection, on the operations of the mind, as another source of information — Dr Ellis, the author of a Treatise entitled, *The Knowledge of Divine things from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature*, undertook to prove that neither the being of a God, nor any other principle of religion, could possibly be deduced from the study of the phenomena of the Universe. To give some

* Preface to the second edition of Jones's Life of Bishop Horne, p. xx. See the first Volume of Horne's Works.

notion of the purport of the book, I extract the following passage:

"A mind that has no knowledge but of sensibles, sees and hears no other objects, can abstract no ideas from matter, but what are material; and had he mountains of them, his attempt would be as fruitless, as the giants invading Jupiter. Heap matter upon matter, it will never amount to immateriality, nor open to his view the new scene of insensibles and invisibles. Without an instructor to open his eyes, it would not be possible to conceive an angelic being, because it can have no resemblance, no idea of a substance purely spiritual; yet vastly remoter from matter is an omnipotent Being, comprehending in itself all the possibilities of things."*

The volume now cited—and a collection of tracts, with the title of *The Scholar armed against the Errors of the Time* (3rd ed. in 1812) zealously enforcing the same principles—undoubtedly had, for a season, some effect upon the opinions of people, with regard to Natural Re-

* Knowledge of Divine things, &c. p. 460. 3rd ed. The first edition of the work was published in 1743; the second in 1771; and the third in 1811. Dr Ellis appears to have been educated at Oxford and established in Dublin. The reader who would see a strange interpretation of Rom. i. 20. is referred to pp. 266, &c. of the Volume here quoted. This may perhaps be a proper place to observe that the late Archbishop Magee was a follower of Dr Ellis, in his sentiments respecting Natural Religion.

ligion; but those principles do not appear to have taken any firm or permanent hold of the public mind. I am not aware that, during the last thirty years, there has been, in the University of Cambridge, more than *one learned man*, who avowedly professed the leading doctrines of Dr Ellis's Treatise. It has, indeed, occasionally happened to me to hear a surmise that that numerous class of Churchmen who have long looked up to the late Dr Milner, and his brother the Rev. Joseph Milner, with respect, in matters of religion, have generally adopted the peculiar views of Dr Ellis. This I believe to be very far from the truth; although amongst them, as amongst other persons, such views are now and then to be found. Of Dr Milner I can state that, during the latter part of his life, I had several conversations with him on the subject of Dr Ellis's book; in the course of which, he condemned, in the strongest terms, the scheme of rejecting the operations of the human mind, as one of the primary sources of knowledge. He seemed to think of the book altogether with great dissatisfaction; and mentioned it as a production, of which "the more he read, the less he could understand."... His

brother has left his own opinions, on the subject of Natural Religion, on record. From his Answer to Gibbon, I present the following extracts; which, I believe, will be new to most of my readers—and, I trust, acceptable to them all:

"Thus, St. Paul being judge, *God has not left himself without witness*, even in the natural world. The works of creation speak to us from *without;* and the moral nature, which he has given us, speaks to us from *within*. In conjunction they declare his Being and Sovereign authority, his power, wisdom, and goodness, his equitable government, and the accountableness of the human race for all their moral conduct before him. And this is the utmost stretch of natural religion, an intuitive feeling rather than the result of any laborious investigation. Strong and deep in its nature, though confused and indeterminate in its degree, it lays, however, all mankind under a formal obligation of obedience, because all mankind feel its force, and of necessity acquiesce in its authority, while they strive in vain to reason away its validity." Again, "Let any man coolly attend to what passes within himself, and ask what account can be given of that principle within him which we call *Conscience*. However it has been derided, it is not derided out of the world; and any person may, if he pleases, convince himself of its power, by attending to the energy of its rebukes, in spite of the most subtile reasonings which he may have made use of to drown its voice. Still it speaks, and speaks not like other principles and instincts of human

nature; but with an authority steady and strong, yet ever upright and equitable, commanding the whole man, and commanding no less the esteem than the fear of the whole human race. All render themselves more or less obnoxious to its rebukes; but to bribe it into silence, or rather to stupify and intoxicate it, would ask a long and enormous course of confirmed flagitiousness; and if it be ever effected at all, it leaves a man in a state too monstrous and unnatural, to excite any other ideas than those of horror and detestation. If any man might be conceived to have conquered in himself this awful principle, so as to have lost all idea of its influence, one is tempted to think it was Mr Hume: yet hear how elegantly as well as emphatically, he describes it. Speaking of Somerset, the murderous favourite of James I. he says, 'The favourite had hitherto escaped the enquiry of justice; but he had not escaped that still voice which can make itself be heard amidst all the hurry and flattery of a court, and astonishes the criminal with a just representation of his most secret enormities.' And a little after, 'the grace of his youth gradually disappeared; the gaiety of his manners was obscured; his politeness and obliging behaviour were changed into sullenness and silence.'"*

Such were the sentiments of that learned and pious man, with regard to Natural Religion. Something, I may remark by the way, of the same turn of thought, would have given, to

* Gibbon's Account of Christianity considered. By Joseph Milner, M.A. pp. 198, 202—204. 1781.

Lord Brougham's 'Discourse,' a moral dignity—an influence over the human mind, which neither acuteness nor eloquence can command. But to bring the whole matter into a small space—Socinus long ago, and various Unitarians of modern times—certain Trinitarians also, for more than a century past—have taken credit to themselves for their opposition to Natural Religion, as an invention of man—at once unwarrantable and mischievous. Lord Brougham considers such "reasoners" as "neither the most famous advocates of revelation, nor the most enlightened;" and yet, as his Lordship observes, "we may do well to show the groundlessness of the alarms which they would excite."

The Noble Author truly states that the most eminent writers on Natural Theology have been sincere and zealous Christians; who were therefore most unlikely to support a cause that could place any thing, appertaining to Christianity, in danger. Ample scope was afforded, for the defence of Natural, as well as Revealed Religion, by the Lecture founded by Mr Boyle; at which Lecture, accordingly, were delivered, by Christian Preachers, some of the ablest vindications of

Natural Religion, that have ever been presented to the world. From the time of Hooker, in short, to our own, the great Divines, by whose labours our literature has been so wonderfully enriched, never seem to have thought it possible that Natural and Revealed Religion, if properly understood, could be in a state of hostility with each other. On the contrary, they believed that they were contributing to the advancement of divine truth, when they considered Natural and Revealed Religion as appointed by the Almighty, to "work together for good" to the human race. In such sentiments, moreover, they were sustained by the most illustrious philosophers that ever appeared to develope the laws by which material things are governed—by Bacon and Boyle and Newton.... But not to rest solely upon the authority of names, however venerated—it may be useful to point out some of the bearings of Natural Religion upon that which is Revealed.

Let us, then, suppose that an individual lays claim to be a messenger sent from God; and that, in proof of his claim, he appears to work miracles. Now, on the one hand, this person may be, as he represents, a messenger from God

—or a clever enthusiast—or an artful impostor—or half enthusiast and half impostor:—on the other, however important it may be to admit his claims in the first case, it is equally important to reject them in the other cases. To decide the point at issue, those opponents of Natural Religion, who are consistent with themselves, hold that the evidence for the reality of the miracles is the only test of the divine mission. In other words, they disregard the internal evidence, resulting from the moral character of the communication—and depend upon the external evidence, arising from the manifestation of supernatural power. "They," says a learned writer of this class, "who insist upon proving the truth of Revelation by its internal evidence, or by a demonstration of its fitness and expediency, treat it as if it were of *human*, not of *Divine* origin. For man, indeed, has no right to expect assent from his fellow-creatures to the truth of any system he proposes, unless he can show that it is, in itself, wise and good. But God commands with authority. His word is sufficient evidence, or sufficient *surety* at least, that whatever he proposes to us must be true and good."....Those,

on the contrary, who conceive that "the world and all that it inhabit" bear witness to the existence and attributes of the Deity, are persuaded that a Revelation, from the same Being, will come recommended to men, by its accordance with the conclusions of their reason and their moral perceptions—and not merely overawe them by "the signs and wonders" by which it appeals to their senses. Their study, indeed, of the natural world has taught them that, in the ways of God, there are "many things hard to be understood"—many things far beyond the reach of their intellectual powers; and thus, in a divine revelation, they are prepared to expect mysteries still farther removed from human comprehension. In this manner, they conceive that men will be addressed as what they are, rational creatures of finite capacity. So likewise they conclude that a real revelation from God will exhibit indubitable marks of its divine origin, in its entire adaptation to the nature and condition of man, as a moral agent. This internal evidence, moreover, is felt to be of so much importance, that we find some authors—whether unawares or not, I am unable to say—deserting

their own principles, and zealously availing themselves of its assistance, in proof of the Christian Religion. As an example, I will mention Mr Gilbert Wakefield—already shown (p. 210.) to have been a determined opponent of all morality, except that derived from Revelation. This gentleman wrote a book, of about 230 pages, in defence of Christianity; and the volume is almost entirely confined to the internal evidences and moral excellence of the system. It is not unpleasant to observe the natural feelings of people thus completely overthrowing their theoretical positions.*

"Natural Religion," Dr Hey observes, "is presupposed in Revealed."† A person, claiming to have been sent from God, appeals to miracles wrought by himself, as proofs of his mission;—and our antecedent notions of the divine power warrant the belief, that miracles may have been wrought in attestation of such a fact. The communication made by that individual indicates the highest degree of mercy and goodness, on the part of the Deity, towards the human race;—and the intimations of the divine benevolence,

* Wakefield's Evidences of Christianity, 2nd ed. 1793.

† Lectures in Divinity, Vol. I. p. 14.

presented by the world around us, allow us to trust that the Creator and Preserver of mankind may vouchsafe expressly to reveal to them his purposes on their behalf. The character of the same person, and his instructions respecting the dispositions and conduct which become men in their present state, transcend our best conceptions of what is morally excellent; — and the moral nature, with which we have been endowed, affords the strongest assurance that God would affix that seal to a dispensation coming immediately from Himself. On such foundations we may safely build our faith. An individual, so furnished with evidences of his divine appointment, has a right to demand that the fullest credit should be given to his declarations regarding the future destinies of the human race. Whatever he may unfold—concerning the nature of God, and his dealings with men both here and hereafter—is to be received with the utmost humility of mind; for the little that can be previously known on these subjects is only sufficient to show how much must remain unknown, unless it should please the Almighty to remove the obscurity in which they are involved.

The moral and intellectual faculties may be weakened and perverted. Hence the distorted and discordant views, of the Deity and a future state and human duty, which are found in the writings and opinions of the ancient philosophers. Hence the degrading representations of the Christian Religion, in the systems of various Christian sects. As the differences and contentions, amongst these Christian sects, throw no doubt upon the reality of a Revelation, common to them all—so neither ought the scarcely more discreditable disputes, amongst the philosophers, to bring into question the reality of Natural Religion.

With regard to the opinion which has been held—that Natural Religion tends to supersede Revelation—I will only say, that it is perfectly incomprehensible to me, how such a notion can even be hinted at by any person who has taken the trouble to compare the intimations of the one with the decisions of the other, on many important points—and the profound silence of the one with the authoritative declarations of the other, in matters of still greater moment. When the utmost has been made of Natural Religion, it can give no information on subjects on which

Revelation is the most copious—the various dispensations of God towards man—our redemption from the effects of transgression—and in the language of the Creed—"the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting."

I have seen Lord Brougham's account of the connexion between Natural and Revealed Religion (pp. 204—209.) quoted with approbation. Although it contains a few expressions which I do not quite like, and is at the same time rather vague and indefinite, I recommend it to the reader's attention.... The next service mentioned by His Lordship (pp. 209—211.), as rendered by Natural Religion to Revelation, is of a very ambiguous character. Without transcribing the whole paragraph in which this service is pointed out, I will extract a few sentences, which will assuredly be sufficient to convey the writer's meaning:

"Were our whole knowledge of the Deity drawn from Revelation, its foundation must become weaker and weaker, as the distance in point of time increases from the actual interposition.... Upon testimony all Revelation must rest. Every age but the one in which the miracles were

wrought, and every country but the one that witnessed them — indeed, all the people of that country itself save those actually present — must receive the proofs which they afford of Divine interposition upon the testimony of eye-witnesses, and of those to whom eye-witnesses told it.... We are by no means affirming that Revelation would lose its sanction by lapse of time, as long as it had the perpetually new and living evidence of Natural Religion to support it. We are only showing the use of that evidence to Revelation, by examining the inevitable consequences of its entire removal, and seeing how ill supported the truths of Revelation would be, if the prop were withdrawn which they borrow from Natural Theology; for then they would rest upon tradition alone." (pp. 209—211.)

Lord Brougham's representation seems to be to this effect: — The evidences of Revelation, being founded on human testimony, are continually growing weaker, from the lapse of time; whereas the evidences of Natural Religion are constantly gaining strength: and thus, as ages pass away, Natural Religion acts to greater and greater advantage in support of Revelation — which, it seems, would otherwise "lose its sanction." On this subject, my remarks shall be brief. About the beginning of the last century, a Scotch Mathematician made the validity of the

argument, arising from human testimony, the subject of calculation—subsequently applying his principles to determine the year of our Lord, after which it would be unbecoming a philosopher to give credence to the miracles, on which our Religion is held to have been founded; and I have been informed that, not many years ago, some learned Germans were busily employed in the same investigation.* In spite of calculation, however, the world has gone on believing; and there are, as yet, no indications of a belief regulated by mathematical theorems. The credit indeed given to matters of well-authenticated history is but little affected by the lapse of time. We are as well assured of the events of the reign of Henry VIII. as of those of the reign of Charles I. or of George I. The acts of Julius Cæsar are no less certain to us than those of Oliver Cromwell. Now the miracles, which introduced the Christian Religion, are facts — his-

* This writer's name was Craig. His work—a 4to pamphlet of 36 pages, entitled 'Theologiæ Christianæ principia mathematica'—was published in 1699. The mathematician was quite willing that Christianity should be received, on its present evidence, till A. D. 3153. Such are the speculations of men who are rather learned than wise. I am not aware that Craig meant to injure the cause of Revealed Religion.

torical facts — facts recorded by the friends of that Religion, and allowed by its enemies. Whoever now believes in those miracles — and who, after all, will venture to say that he does not believe in them? — believes, with as firm a faith, as he who lived at an interval of one hundred years from the period at which they were wrought. Moreover, the continual progress of the Gospel in the world — new instances of the accomplishment of prophecy — and various unexpected illustrations of circumstances connected with external and internal evidence — may greatly overbalance all that the original testimony can be imagined to lose, by transmission through a long series of ages. Till, therefore, we know from experience something more of the effect of time, in impairing the credibility of facts so well attested, we will postpone all consideration of the mode by which the waning evidence of Christianity — if such it should then be deemed — may be aided with subsidiary light. To say the truth, there is, in Lord Brougham's notion, something which too much resembles a falling back upon Natural Religion, when the direct defence of Revelation can be no longer maintained. But is not such a view

of the matter altogether at variance with those Scriptures, by which, when we have acknowledged their authority, we cannot, without inconsistency, refuse to abide? When our Lord predicted the perpetuity of the Church which he was about to found, who can imagine that he referred to the means of protection afforded by Natural Religion? Those, who doubt not the fulfilment of that prediction, believe that the Church of Christ is founded upon a rock, and is in itself secure alike from external violence, and the silent, insidious encroachments of time.

After alluding to "the recourse had by the inspired penmen, to the views which are derived from the contemplation of nature, when they would exalt the Deity by a description of his attributes, or inculcate sentiments of devotion towards him"—a subject which would admit of much interesting discussion—Lord Brougham remarks (p. 213.) upon the "little that is to be found, of particularity and precision, in any thing that has been revealed to us respecting the nature of the Godhead"—"the mystery in which almost all the divine attributes, beyond what natural reason teaches, are wisely veiled;"—con-

cluding that "those attributes are nearly the same in the volume of nature and in that of his revealed word." With reference to observations of this kind, we shall do well to consider that Revelation is effected through the medium of language; from the imperfections of which, it may be impossible to make known, in any degree, the essential nature of the Deity: — we shall do well to consider how unequal the human mind must be, in the present state, to comprehend the mode of existence of "The High and Lofty One, that inhabiteth eternity." Moreover, the knowledge of the Supreme Being, afforded by the Revelation vouchsafed to us, is undoubtedly of that kind, with which we are the most concerned. It was evidently not intended to gratify curiosity, but to "make wise unto salvation." In this respect, the views presented to us are so momentous, that there is great difficulty in conceiving how any one can suppose that the intimations, of the attributes of the Deity, collected from the study of nature, can bear a moment's comparison with those glorious manifestations of the Divine Perfections which illuminate the pages of Holy Writ.

I have now followed Lord Brougham through those departments of Natural Theology which are most usually the objects of attention—offering, as I proceeded, such remarks, whether in the way of explanation, of approbation or of caution, as the matters successively brought under consideration appeared to demand. A work like the present can scarcely be mistaken for a complete system, or even a complete outline, of the science of Natural Theology. Many points, of great importance, have been left untouched; but the reflections, suggested by the 'Discourse', may, as I am willing to hope, render some service to the cause of Religion. Had I been engaged in writing a regular treatise on the subject discussed, I should have aimed at greater precision of language, than will be found in the present volume. My wish has been to write clearly, without that painful attention to accuracy of composition which is sometimes attributed to Academical persons:—an attention equally forbidden, in my own case, by the want of time and the want of inclination. If, in executing what I conscientiously believed

to be my duty, I shall be thought to have shed additional light upon any portion of Natural Theology—or if I shall have interested even a few readers, in inquiries of unquestionable importance, I shall feel myself to be amply rewarded for my labour.

The remainder of the volume will be devoted to matters variously related to what has preceded; and may possibly be not unacceptable to those who are fond of abstruse and learned speculations. There are, indeed, several subjects, examined with great acuteness in Lord Brougham's Notes, which yet appear susceptible of farther elucidation; but circumstances compel me to restrict myself to three topics—to each of which a section will be appropriated. The topics are—The argument *à priori*, as it is called—The sentiments of the Ancient Philosophers—and The opinions of Bishop Warburton.

SECTION V.

ARGUMENT *A PRIORI.*

(Discourse, Section IV. pp. 81—97).

I NOW proceed to review Lord Brougham's account of what is called the argument *à priori*, in proof of the being and attributes of God—an abstract mode of reasoning, the nature of which will be better understood from the present section, than from any formal definition. Thus much, however, it will be needful to state in the outset—that the proof heretofore enforced mainly rests upon the marks of design and contrivance abounding in the world; whereas the proof yet to be considered, through the medium of the Noble Author's representations, is *primarily* independent of those marks. So far, the argument *à priori* is, to adopt His Lordship's language, "without reference to facts." Lord Brougham, however, taking the ground that the argument *à priori* is absolutely and entirely "with-

out reference to facts," draws out a long array of objections to which the deductions from it are in consequence liable. He then shows that the argument is, in reality, *not* "without reference to facts." Now, under such circumstances, unless there is some evidence—and none appears—that the advocates of the argument maintain that it *is* "without reference to facts," to what purpose are the objections brought forward? But not to dwell on this point, the objections shall be extracted without abridgement:

"The first thing that strikes us on this subject is the consequence which must inevitably follow from admitting the possibility of discerning the existence of the Deity and his attributes *à priori*, or wholly independent of facts. It would follow that this is a necessary, not a contingent truth; and that it is not only as impossible for the Deity not to exist, as for the whole to be greater than the sum of its parts, but that it is equally impossible for his attributes to be other than the argument is supposed to prove they are. Thus the reasoners in question show, by the argument *à priori*, that he is a being of perfect wisdom and perfect benevolence. Dr Clarke is as clear of this as he is clear that his existence is proved by the same argument. Now, first, it is impossible that any such truths can be necessary; for their contraries are not things wholly inconceivable, inasmuch as there is nothing at all inconceivable in the Maker of the uni-

verse existing as a being of limited power and of mixed goodness, nay of malevolence. We never, before all experience, could pronounce it mathematically impossible that such a being should exist, and should have created the universe. But next, the facts, when we came to examine them, *might* disprove the conclusions drawn *à priori*. The universe *might* by possibility be so constructed that every contrivance might fail to produce the desired effect:—the eye might be chromatic and give indistinct images—the joints might be so unhinged as to impede motion—every smell, as Paley has it, might be a stink, and every touch a sting.* Indeed we know that, perfect as the frame of things actually is, a few apparent exceptions to the general beauty of the system, have made many disbelieve the perfect power and perfect goodness of the Deity, and invent Manichean theories to account for the existence of evil. Nothing can more clearly show the absurdity of those arguments by which it is attempted to demonstrate the truths of this science as mathematical or necessary, and cognizable *à priori*." (pp. 81—83.)

Being very far from giving credit to the possibility of proving the being of a God, in a manner similar to the demonstration of a geometrical theorem—and not being aware of any one who conceives the possibility—I have no motive to

* I am happy to say that this is not exactly "as Paley has it." Paley's words are these: "He [the Deity] might have made every thing we tasted bitter; every thing we see loathsome; every thing we touched a sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord." Moral Philosophy, B. II. c. 5.

vindicate the propriety of the word "necessary," when applied to the Deity, on the principles laid down by Lord Brougham. There is, however, something from which the mind recoils, in the idea of making the Divine existence "a contingent truth." "Contingent," Johnson informs us, has the signification of "falling out by chance; accidental; not determinable by any certain rule." How far such expressions belong to such a subject, I will leave to the reader's judgement:—observing only that the being of God is a fact which differs from every other fact;—that every other fact depends upon *Will*, and so is contingent; that is, contingent to *us*, not to Him who possesses all power and all knowledge.

With regard to the method of proving the goodness of the Deity—to which Lord Brougham adverts in the subsequent part of the extract, when referring to Dr Clarke—I shall shortly have occasion to show, that His Lordship's statement involves as great a mistake as can well be imagined. When the subject is resumed, it will be under circumstances which will enable us to render the discussion more complete than we can hope to do at the present moment.

Towards the close of the paragraph, the Noble Author seems to attribute the invention of Manichean theories to the disbelief of the perfect power and perfect goodness of the Deity. The fact is — we have good evidence that it was for the purpose of *reconciling* the existence of evil with the Divine power and goodness that the Manichean theories were invented. There is scarcely any writer whom Lord Brougham respects more highly — and scarcely any more worthy of his respect — than Dr Cudworth; and we find that great Christian philosopher adopting the following language:

"Now as for that fore-mentioned *Ditheism* or opinion of two Gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident that its original sprung from nothing else, but first a firm persuasion of the *Essential Goodness* of the Deity; together with a conceit that the evil that is in the world was altogether inconsistent and irreconcileable to the same; and that therefore, for the solving of this phenomenon, it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish principle self-existent, or an Evil God."*

It may be worth while to add that the opinions of M. Beausobre, Dr Lardner and Dr Hey, coincide with those of Dr Cudworth, respecting

* Intellectual System, p. 213.

the origin of Manichean theories.... But to resume the main subject—From the preceding observations, the reader will justly infer that I hold, with Lord Brougham, the absurdity of all attempts "to demonstrate the truths of this science as mathematical or necessary, and cognizable *à priori*." I only lament that His Lordship should have censured Dr Clarke, in particular, for employing a demonstration of that kind—when he was on the point of making it his business to show that Dr Clarke had really used an argument of a very different kind. Moreover, the Noble Author is, in my judgment, perfectly right, in assigning a different character to Dr Clarke's reasoning. If then, as Lord Brougham contends and as I admit, Dr Clarke's reasoning is *not* the argument *à priori*, already treated of—the question naturally occurs—How came it to pass that the term *à priori* was ever applied to that reasoning? Now, although a tolerable answer may be given to this question, there is, I confess, cause to lament that the term has ever been so applied. The misapplication indeed, for it is such, has occasioned great ambiguity—many involuntary mistakes—and probably some not un-

designed misrepresentations. The case, however, appears to have been as follows: Philosophers had, for many ages, turned their thoughts to the discovery of a proof of the being of a God, altogether independent of facts. A proof, if so constructed, must wholly consist of purely abstract reasoning; and supposing the possibility of the thing, would be properly called the argument *à priori*. On the other hand, the common proof of the being of a God, being founded on the innumerable facts and marks of design and contrivance prevailing throughout the world, was contradistinguished by the title of the argument *à posteriori*. At length, however, a proof, of an intermediate kind—bearing some affinity to each of those just described—was ventured upon. The proof alluded to proceeded from this one simple *fact*—that *something* does actually exist;—in other respects disregarding the numberless phenomena of the material world. This mode of proof was, from its nature of a very abstract character; and being made, in some of its parts, to depend upon reasoning which may be fairly called *à priori*—and not because the reasoning was *à priori* from first to last—was termed the argument

à priori. The statement now offered, if well considered, will, I think, be sufficient to account for the name given to the reasoning adopted by Dr Clarke, and other learned men; but will not completely justify the correctness of the appellation. Law, in one of the notes to his translation of King's 'Origin of Evil,' has expressed, in few words, the sense in which the phrase *à priori* is to be understood, when applied to Dr Clarke's method of reasoning—*prior to the examination of particular phenomena**—and so, not prior to the conviction that there is something which exists. In confirmation of my view of the matter, I will adduce two passages—one from Lord Brougham's favourite author, Dr Cudworth—another from a writer more recent than Dr Clarke, whose adherent he was, in the main. To the first of the passages, although long, I request the reader's especial attention; for it throws great light upon the present subject of inquiry.

"True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have themselves affirmed that there could be no *demonstration* of a God; which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore

* King's Origin of Evil, p. 58. 4th ed. 1758.

no certainty at all to be had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, that the existence of a God could not be demonstrated *à priori*, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth *Alexander Aphrodisius*, in his *Physical Doubts and Solutions*, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to the Aristotelick principles, from motion, declare himself: ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, οὐ γὰρ οἷόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν—*that this argument or proof of his was in the way of analysis only: it being not possible that there should be a demonstration of the first principle of all. Wherefore we must here fetch our beginning from things that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature which was before them.* And to the same purpose *Clemens Alexandrinus*, having first affirmed, ὡς δυσμεταχειριστότατος ὁ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυτεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένους εἶναι, *that God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of; because since the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, which was the cause to all other things, of their being made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared of*

manifested: he afterwards subjoins, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει. *but neither can God be apprehended by any demonstrative science. For such science is from things before, in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing exists before that which is altogether unmade.* And certain it is that it implies a contradiction, that God or a Perfect Being should be thus demonstrated, by any thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless, it doth not therefore follow that there can be no *certainty* at all had of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a *certain* knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated *à priori*, or from antecedent necessary causes: As for example, that there was something eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictious to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless, upon supposition only, that *something doth exist*, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of irrefragable reason, that there never was nothing, but something or other did always exist from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the existence of a God or Perfect Being cannot be demonstrated *à priori*, yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose existence we cannot doubt of) and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his ex-

istence. And whensoever anything is thus necessarily inferred, from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonstration—though not of the διότι, yet of the ὅτι of it: that the thing *is*, though not *why* it is."*

The foregoing valuable passage, from Dr Cudworth's work dated 1678, shows how clearly the distinction, between the veritable argument *à priori* and the argument now so called, was perceived, at that time. It shows us, moreover, not only that the writer agreed, with one of the most acute of Aristotle's commentators and one of the most learned of the Fathers, in thinking that the pure argument *à priori* was altogether inapplicable—but also that he admitted the validity of the kind of argument so fully afterwards drawn out by Dr Clarke. Let me also remark that, notwithstanding the fondness of the Schoolmen for metaphysical speculation on this very subject, they appear to have placed no reliance upon the argument *à priori*, as originally understood.† I now present the opinion of a more recent author, respecting the modern argument *à priori;* concerning which he thus writes:

* Intellectual System, pp. 715, 716.

† Thus, for example, writes Thomas Aquinas: "Deum esse, quamvis non à priori, à posteriori tamen demonstrari potest."

"Here then lies the groundwork of the argument we are entering upon: something now exists, or has a real being; therefore something has always existed, or had a real being. This is the only method in which we can prove the *existence* of the first cause, by beginning *à posteriori;* for the argument *à priori* does not, nor indeed can prove, that there is a first cause, but supposes it already proved."*

The distinction between the old imaginary argument *à priori*, and that at present known by the name, has, I trust, become perfectly manifest; and I will proceed to show, by one remarkable instance, the importance of keeping the distinction in mind.... Mr Hume devotes the ninth part (or section) of his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion to the argument *à priori.—Demea* thus introduces the topic: — "If so many difficulties attend the argument *à posteriori*, had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument *à priori*, which, by offering to us infallible demonstration cuts off at once all doubt and

* Knight, On the Being and Attributes of God, p. 10. 1747.... I have the materials for an Historical and Critical Account of the modern (so called) Argument *à priori*, with remarks upon its proper use; but considering that there are probably not above half a score persons in the kingdom who would care to peruse a work of that kind, the propriety of devoting to the composition so much time, as it would unavoidably require, is very questionable.

difficulty?" Now the argument so described is unquestionably the imaginary *à priori* reasoning of the ancients. But to attend to the dialogue: *Cleanthes* interposes, and requests an explanation of the argument; of which *Demea* gives the following account: "The argument, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself, or be the cause of its existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, &c."..... an indifferent representation of the *modern* argument *à priori*. To all this *Cleanthes* rejoins—"I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by arguments *à priori*. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction." And so he goes on; attacking *Demea's* actual argument "from effects to causes," as if it were the ancient abstract argument first mentioned. Now it is only by duly apprehending and recollecting the distinction between the ancient and the modern argument of the same name, that the reader of Mr Hume can be aware of the substitution

of one thing for another, which is constantly taking place in the course of the discussion. In fact, we are here presented with an exquisite specimen of that intellectual juggling, which is so often played off, in the philosophical writings of this great master of the dialectic art. Did he know the distinction, or was he deceived by his own dexterity? I am unwilling to suppose that he intended to mislead his readers.

We are led by the distinction which has been drawn between the ancient and the modern argument *à priori*, together with Lord Brougham's strictures on Dr Clarke's reasoning, to the inquiry, whether Dr Clarke considered that he was, from the very outset, using the pure argument *à priori*. It is clear that he had no such notion. To a correspondent, who had objected to "arguing at all *à priori*," he replied, that "the argument *à posteriori* is by far the most generally useful, and ought always to be distinctly insisted upon;" but that, "forasmuch as Atheistical writers have sometimes opposed the being and attributes of God, by such metaphysical reasonings, as can no otherwise be obviated, than by arguing *à priori*, therefore this manner of arguing

also is useful and necessary *in its proper place*."* In allusion moreover to the first proposition of his argument, he informs another correspondent that "when once a thing is known, by reasoning *à posteriori*, to be certain, it unavoidably follows that there is in nature a reason *à priori* (whether we can discover it or not) of the existence of that which we know cannot but exist."† Besides these, there are many indications that Lord Brougham has not pointed out what was unknown to Dr Clarke. But it is now time to attend to His Lordship's remarks, upon Dr Clarke's argument, which are thus offered:

"Dr Clarke is the chief patron of this kind of demonstration, as he terms it; and though his book contains it more at large, the statement of his fundamental argument is perhaps to be found most distinctly given in the letters subjoined to that celebrated work. The fundamental propositions in the discourse itself are, That something must have existed from all eternity, and That this something must have been a being independent and self-existent. In the letters he condenses, perhaps explains, certainly illustrates, these propositions (see Answers to Letters 3, 4 and 5) by arguing that the existence of space

* Answer to a seventh letter, at the end of his work On the Being and Attributes of God.

† Answer to a sixth letter, as before.

and time (or, as he terms it, duration) proves the existence of something whereof these are qualities, for they are not themselves substances; he cites the celebrated *Scholium Generale* of the *Principia;* and he concludes that the Deity must be the infinite being of whom they are qualities." (pp. 83, 84.)

The Noble Author, then, has stated, in print, his conception that, in the answers to letters 3, 4 and 5, the two propositions, which he has enunciated, are condensed, perhaps explained, certainly illustrated. This is extraordinary; for the unquestionable fact is that those propositions form the first, second and third propositions of Dr Clarke's Discourse — while the subject discussed in the letters is the *sixth* proposition of the Discourse. In other words, we find in the Discourse, 1. That something has existed from eternity; 2. That that something is an immutable and independent Being; 3. That that Being is self-existent: — we find in the letters, Prop. 6. That that Being is infinite and omnipresent. So that it is assumed, in the letters, that there *is* an eternal, immutable, self-existent Being; and new principles — namely, the existence of space and time — are introduced, to prove the infinity and

omnipresence of the same Being. So far are the letters from presenting a restatement of the fundamental argument. His Lordship, however, may have the satisfaction of thinking that Mr Dugald Stewart has taken the same erroneous view of the matter. It was, indeed, as I strongly suspect, that learned metaphysician who led His Lordship into the mistake. Thus writes Mr Stewart:

"Proceeding on these principles, Dr Clarke argued, that, as immensity and eternity are not *substances* but *attributes*, the immense and eternal Being, whose attributes they are, must exist of necessity also. The existence of God therefore, according to Clarke, is a truth that follows with demonstrative evidence, from those conceptions of space and time which are inseparable from the human mind."*

How any person, who had ever read Dr Clarke's sixth proposition, could arrive at such a conclusion as this—is to me quite inexplicable. Instead of the immensity being taken, to prove the existence, as Mr Stewart and Lord Brougham suppose—the existence is assumed as certain, to prove the immensity. I know not whether any

* Dissertation on Metaphysical Science, Part II. p. 67.

one has before noticed this remarkable misapprehension of Dr Clarke's meaning.*

The Noble Author next advances some specific objections to Dr Clarke's argument; but I think it no illegitimate inference, from his Lordship's mistake respecting the scope of the argument, to say that there may very possibly be far more in the substance of the argument, than he has discovered. This, indeed, is not the place to discuss the merits of an abstruse method of reasoning; nor am I concerned to defend the validity of the reasoning adopted by Dr Clarke. On Lord Brougham's objections, therefore, I shall trouble the reader with but few observations.

Dr Clarke's argument depends upon the *reality* of space and time. Lord Brougham denies that reality. "What is time," he asks, "but the succession of ideas, and the consciousness and the recollection which we have of that succession?" From this may be collected his Lordship's notion of space. In these opinions he follows certain

* Butler, in his correspondence with Dr Clarke, understood the matter. "In your Demonstration, Prop. vi." (he writes) "you propose to prove the *infinity* or *omnipresence* of the self-existent Being." It may be worth notice that Butler appears to have been satisfied with the argument as far as Prop. vi.

continental philosophers. Thus Leibnitz—"Space is nothing but the order of things co-existing, and time nothing but the order of things successive:"—so also D'Alembert, but with less decision: *S'il n'y avoit point de corps et de succession, l'espace et le temps seroient possible, mais ils n'existeroient pas.* For my own part, I am content to follow Locke and Newton, in believing the reality of space and of time. I cannot persuade myself that the co-existence of things *constitutes* space, or that their succession *constitutes* time; but I can well understand that the co-existence of things enables us to *measure* space, and their succession to *estimate* time. Mr Dugald Stewart declares that he "cannot even form a conception of the proposition contended for by Leibnitz;" acknowledges that space must always appear something real to him, "while the frame of his understanding remains unaltered;" and asks, "Of what *data* is human reason possessed, from which it is entitled to argue in opposition to truths, the contrary of which it is impossible not only to prove, but to express in terms comprehensible by our faculties?"†

† See Dissertation on Metaphysical Science, Part II. p. 69.

In considering Dr Clarke's sixth proposition, the real difficulty is to satisfy the mind respecting the notion that space and time are attributes of the self-existent Being; on which point no one who has not studied, with the closest attention, the correspondence between Butler and Clarke, can be capable of forming any judgement. To that correspondence, therefore, I refer the reader, who has any curiosity on the subject. To one objection however, much enlarged upon by Lord Brougham, I will just advert.

"If space be deemed a quality, and if infinite space be the quality of an infinite being, finite space must also be a quality, and must, by parity of reason, be the quality of a finite being. Of what being? Here is a cube of one foot within an exhausted receiver, or a cylinder of half an inch diameter and three inches high in the Torricellian vacuum. What is the being of whom that square and that cylindrical space are to be deemed as qualities?" (p. 85.)

To this it may be replied, that Omnipresence is not locality; and that, to the Being who exists everywhere, space must *appertain* in a manner altogether different from that in which it belongs to whatever may be (as every thing finite may be) successively in different parts of

space. The modes of existence with relation to space are entirely dissimilar; and there is no "parity of reason" which is applicable to the cases under consideration. All that I mean to assert is, that, whether Dr Clarke's view of the matter be right or wrong, Lord Brougham's argument is inconclusive.

Lord Brougham's next object is to give a kind of general view of Dr Clarke's Demonstration, from beginning to end; which he does in the following terms:

"It is truly astonishing to find so profound a thinker, and, generally speaking, so accurate a reasoner [as Dr Clarke] actually supposing that he can deduce from the proposition, That a self-existent Being must have existed from all time, this other proposition, that therefore this Being must be infinitely wise (Prop. XI.) and that 'he must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice and truth, and all other moral perfections such as would become the *governor* and *judge* of the world.' (Prop. XII.) With the general texture of this argument we have at present nothing to do, further than to show how little it can by possibility deserve the name either of an argument *à priori*, or be regarded as the demonstration of a necessary truth. For surely, prior to all experience, no one could ever know that there were such things as either judges or governors; and without the previous idea of a finite or worldly ruler and judge, we could never gain

any idea of an eternal and infinitely just ruler and judge; and equally certain it is that this demonstration, if it proves the existence of an infinite and eternal ruler and judge to be a necessary and not a contingent truth (which is Dr Clarke's whole argument), would just as strictly prove the existence of finite rulers and judges to be a necessary and not a contingent truth; or, in other words, it would follow, that the existence of governors and judges in the world is a necessary truth, like the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles; and that it would be a contradiction in terms, and so an impossibility, to conceive the world existing without governors and judges." (pp. 88, 89.)

Every one who has read the preceding paragraph will, of course, conclude that Dr Clarke must have immediately inferred that the self-existent Being is of necessity infinitely wise. Let us, then, trace Dr Clarke's argument in its progress. The sixth proposition, as we have seen, is intended to prove that the Self-existent Being is omnipresent; the seventh, that the same Being is but *One;* and the eighth, that the Self-existent Being, *and original cause of all things*, must be an intelligent Being. Here, as I have already (p. 107.) had occasion to remark, is discussed "the main question between us and the atheists;" and here we see the Self-existent Being described

as the Creator of "the things that do appear." Dr Clarke, moreover, distinctly declares that, to establish the *Intelligence* of the Self-existent Being, we must have recourse to the phenomena of the world; with which view he occupies nearly twelve closely-printed octavo pages in pointing out the indications of intelligence with which the world abounds. The ninth proposition is to prove that the Self-existent and original Cause of all things is a Being endued with liberty and choice; which is proved both from what has gone before, and also by an appeal to the disposition of things in the world—from final causes—and from the nature of created beings. The proof of the tenth proposition—That the Self-existent Being, the Supreme Cause of all things, must have infinite power—mainly depends upon the actual constitution of things, as ascertained by perception and consciousness. After this apparatus, comes the eleventh proposition—adduced by Lord Brougham—That the Supreme Cause and Author of all things must of necessity be infinitely wise. And here, after availing himself of the information afforded by the foregoing propositions—proved as well by reference to the phenomena of the

universe, as by abstract reasoning — Dr Clarke again dwells upon "the wisdom and perfection of the works of God, evidenced more illustriously in the late discoveries in Astronomy and Natural Philosophy"—at the same time recommending the writings of Galen and Cicero, among the ancients — and Boyle, Ray and Derham, among the moderns, in confirmation of his views. It would be an ill compliment to the reader's penetration to suppose that anything more can be wanted, to enable him to estimate the correctness of Lord Brougham's representation — that "from the proposition — that a self-existent being has existed from all time"—Dr Clarke has deduced, "that *therefore* this being must be infinitely wise".... But, according to the Noble Author, Dr Clarke has, from the same premises, also deduced "the infinite goodness, justice and truth" of the same being, together with "all other moral perfections, such as become the Supreme Governor and Judge of the world:" the point which remains finally to be considered. Our attention, indeed, is now called to Dr Clarke's closing proposition. It was shown, in the propositions immediately preceding — not solely, the

reader will recollect, by abstract reasoning, but also by the evidence of the world around us—that the Supreme Being possesses infinite knowledge and the perfection of wisdom—and is absolutely independent and omnipotent. Now, "all evil," Dr Clarkes argues, "and all imperfections whatsoever, arise either from shortness of understanding, defect of power, or faultiness of will; from all which, it being manifest that the Supreme Cause and Author of all things cannot but be infinitely removed—it follows undeniably that he must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice and truth, and all other moral perfections." The importance of some reasoning on the divine benevolence and moral attributes, previous to the examination of such appearances of good or evil as may be found in the world, was strongly felt by Mr Dugald Stewart. "It is difficult," he observes, "to conceive what other motive [than that of benevolence] could have induced a Being completely and independently happy, to have called his creatures into existence.—In this manner, without any examination of the fact, we have a strong presumption for the goodness of the Deity; and

it is only after establishing this presumption *à priori*, that we can proceed to examine the fact with safety."* Here is a sentence, weighty with truth, and momentous in its bearings. In this manner, we are *prepared* to contemplate, to the best purpose, the providential arrangements and moral tendencies of the system of things presented to our view. More, than what has now been adduced, cannot be required to vindicate the reasoning here adopted by Dr Clarke. At all events, with regard to the statement—that there is, as it were, but one step, between the supposition of a Self-existent Being and the proof of a Being of infinite goodness, justice and truth—we now see how many important propositions are interposed, and consequently how little the statement is borne out by fact. Indeed, I can scarcely conceive how any one, intent on sketching an object placed before him, could possibly have produced a picture more unlike the reality, than Lord Brougham's description is, in all its parts, to Dr Clarke's original.... I have now redeemed the pledge which was given in the 236th page.... The Noble Author's observations, respecting "the

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 190.

existence of governors and judges in the world being a necessary truth, like the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles," can have arisen solely from a total misapprehension of Dr Clarke's method of reasoning. There are, however, other reasons, which induce me to lament that the latter part of the paragraph should ever have been published.... Why His Lordship should have taken so much trouble, with regard to Dr Clarke's labours, does not appear; but, in addition to all the objections alleged against the substance and validity of the general argument, we find some strictures, on its originality, which cannot be allowed to pass without examination.

Lord Brougham's language tends to leave, upon the reader's mind, an impression that Clarke's argument was derived from Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. His Lordship gives the preference to Locke's argument. I have no wish to arbitrate between Locke and Clarke; although several matters are alleged, which are well entitled to consideration. It is, however, beyond doubt that the primary position of Locke "does not materially differ" from that of Clarke; and in fact, this primary position had been taken ad-

vantage of, long before the time either of Clarke or of Locke*. But as to any appropriation, of any part of Locke's Essay, I can state that, in the Preface to the Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Clarke had occasion to notice some abusive remarks (by a Cartesian) upon his work, On the Being and Attributes of God; on which occasion he thus wrote: "The rest of the book is all either an indecent and unreasonable reviling of the learned Mr Locke: from whom I neither cited any passage, nor (that I know of) borrowed any argument from him: and therefore is altogether impertinent." Believing that, on this point, Dr Clarke's word ought to go farther than any other person's surmise, I proceed to the next charge of plagiarism which has been advanced.

Mr Dugald Stewart's mistake—in supposing that Dr Clarke intended, from the nature of space and time, to prove the existence of God, when he really was proving the omnipresence—has been pointed out. While discussing that subject, Mr Stewart made use of the following language—"An argument, substantially the same

* See the quotation from Cudworth, pp. 241—243.

with this, for the existence of God, is hinted at very distinctly by Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, Chap. V. Sect. 3, 4."* From this suggestion, I believe—for it is not expressly so stated—Lord Brougham concluded that Dr Clarke probably took his own argument from Dr Cudworth. The Noble Author thus writes:

"Dr Cudworth, in the fifth chapter of his great work, has, in answering the Democritic arguments, so plainly anticipated Dr Clarke, that it is hardly possible to conceive how the latter should have avoided referring to it. 'If space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, *as they pretend*, then will it undeniably follow, from this very principle of theirs, that there must be incorporeal space [substance] and (this space being supposed by them to be infinite) an infinite incorporeal Deity.'" (p. 92.)

It is clear from the structure of the sentence from Cudworth, more especially from the words in Italics, which Lord Brougham by some accident omitted in transcribing—as well as from other parts of the Intellectual System—that the argument was intended for a confutation of the followers of Democritus, on their own principles. There is no reason to conclude that Cudworth

* Dissertation on Metaphysical Philosophy, Part II. p. 67. n.

would have stood by the argument, in any other point of view. His Lordship, however, has quoted another passage; and so much of it as may throw light upon the present question, I will extract:

"We conclude, therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritic and Epicurean atheists, that space is of a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably that there must be some incorporeal substance whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; *just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted.*" (p. 93, or Cudworth, p. 769.)

The concluding words, here printed in Italics —which also Lord Brougham accidentally omitted in transcribing—show that such notions of space were at that time well known to "learned Theists and Incorporealists;" with whose writings Dr Clarke, as well as Dr Cudworth, may have been acquainted*.... The truth is that, prior to the time of Dr Clarke, there had been much abstract

* Since the preceding remarks on the passages from Cudworth were written, I find that Mosheim, in his Latin Translation of the Intellectual System agrees with me in my view of the argument. "*Ad hominem*, ut in scholis loqui solent, hic disputat vir longe doctissimus, et ex ipsis eorum, qui cum Democrito et Epicuro faciunt, de natura spatii decretis argumentum eorum adversus Deum corpore vacantem evertit." p. 1007. ed. 1733.

speculation, on the proof of the being and attributes of God; and he had read, I have no doubt, every thing of the kind, that was worth reading. But when he sat down to write, it was no crude information that he had to communicate. Every thing bore the impression of his own mind. By continued meditation, his knowledge had acquired the form and coherence of system.... In former days, he seems to have been more justly estimated. Bentley and Clarke appear to have been associated in the mind of Johnson. The great moralist, when asked whether some one studied hard, replied, "No, Sir. I do not believe he studied hard. I never knew a man who studied hard. I conclude, indeed, from the effects, that some men have studied hard, as Bentley and Clarke." On another occasion, "Snatches of reading," he said, "will not make a Bentley or a Clarke."*.... These are not the men to be placed on their trial for literary larceny.

There is, indeed, another author, besides Cudworth, from whom Lord Brougham supposes Dr Clarke's abstract argument to have been derived;

* Boswell's Life of Johnson, Vol. I. p. 47, and Vol. IV. p. 20. ed. 1807.

namely, Sir Isaac Newton. In page 90, His Lordship adverts to the *Scholium Generale*, at the end of the *Principia*, which, he says, "is thought to have suggested it;" and again in page 150, to that "celebrated *Scholium*, upon which Dr Clarke's argument *à priori* for the existence of a Deity is built." Here, likewise, I take it for granted that Lord Brougham directs his course, as Mr Dugald Stewart points the way. This latter gentleman, in his Dissertation so frequently quoted, mentions Newton's *Scholium* as "the germ" of Clarke's "celebrated argument *à priori*;" gives an anecdote of Clarke, from which it appears that, even while yet a boy, he had a clear conviction of the absolute and independent existence of space; and then goes on—"With this early and deep impression on his mind, it is easy to conceive how Newton's *Scholium* should have encouraged him to resume the musings of his *boyish days*, concerning the necessary existence of space; and to trace, as far as he could, its connexion with the principles of Natural Theology."*.... This is so delightful a vision, that one is almost afraid to move or breathe, lest it should vanish into

* Dissertation, p. 69.

air; but the dull reality is, that Dr Clarke's work came out in 1704 — and "the celebrated *Scholium*" first made its appearance in 1713, when the *second* edition of the Principia was published! Such is the value of refined speculation, in matters of this kind. Mr Stewart's mistake is the more remarkable, because he has himself recorded that "the *Scholium* first appeared at the end of the second edition of the Principia, printed at Cambridge in 1713; the former edition, published at London in 1687, having no Scholium annexed to it."... Having mentioned this inaccuracy, I may, without in the least detracting from the merits of Mr Stewart as a philosophical writer, observe—that his literary notices are by no means to be depended upon. From several instances which might be adduced, I will select one; and as it has no relation to the subject now discussed, the reader will find it given in a note, at the end of the present section .... After all, Mr Stewart may, in this instance, have been misled by the circumstance that, in Clarke's fifth letter to Butler (at the end of the Demonstration), the *Scholium* is quoted in the margin. The letter, however, bears date April 8, 1714, and therefore

was *written* after the publication of the second edition of the *Principia*. It appears also that Dr Clarke was in the habit of adding marginal notes, in the successive editions of his work, on the Being and Attributes of God.

There is, to my mind, something unaccountable in these modern attempts to lower the character of Dr Clarke. He opposed not the usual mode of proof: on the contrary, a reference to the 109th page of this volume will show how highly he estimated the indications, of the Divine being and perfections, presented by the material, the moral and the intellectual worlds. With Dr Cudworth, he seems "neither to have had any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments *pro Deo*, nor yet to be thought to lay stress upon anything which is not every way solid and substantial."* Mr Whiston has given an anecdote, respecting Dr Clarke and his Discourses at Boyle's Lecture, which I trust will be interesting to every reader:

"After this, A. D. 1704, and 1705, Mr. Clarke preached, and soon after published his sixteen Sermons at Mr Boyle's Lecture, in two Volumes; containing 'Discourses concern-

* Intellectual System, p. 721.

ing the Being and Attributes of God; the Obligations of Natural Religion; and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation.' And I have been informed, that Dr Smalridge said, of one or both of those volumes, 'It was the best book on those subjects that had been written in any language.' When Mr Clarke brought me his book — it was the first volume, I suppose — I was in my garden over against St Peter's College in Cambridge, where I then lived. Now I perceived that in these Sermons he had dealt a great deal in abstract and metaphysic reasonings. I therefore asked him how he ventured into such subtilties, which I never durst meddle with? And showing him a nettle, or the like contemptible weed in my garden, I told him, 'That weed contained better arguments for the Being and Attributes of God than all his Metaphysics.' Mr Clarke confessed it to be so; but alleged for himself, 'That since such Philosophers as Hobbes and Spinoza had made use of those kind of subtilties *against*, he thought proper to shew that the like way of reasoning might be made better use of *on the side* of Religion.' Which reason or excuse I allowed not to be inconsiderable."*

My inference, from all this, is—that whatever objections, are brought against the writings of Dr Clarke, ought to bear the marks of deliberate inquiry, and indicate respect for the character of a great man; and I am the more confirmed in my conclusion, on finding Lord Brougham at last

* Whiston's Memoirs of Dr Clarke, pp. 7, 8.

adopting a considerable portion of the following sentiments from the pen of Mr Dugald Stewart:

"Although the argument, as stated by Dr Clarke, does not carry complete satisfaction to my mind, I think it must be granted that there is something peculiarly wonderful and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own existence. Nay, further, I think that these conceptions are intimately connected with the fundamental principles of Natural Religion. For when once we have established, from the evidences of design everywhere manifested around us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful *cause*, we are unavoidably led to apply to this *cause* our conceptions of *immensity* and *eternity*, and to conceive Him as filling the infinite extent of both with his presence and with his power. Hence we associate with the idea of God those awful impressions which are naturally produced by the idea of infinite space and perhaps still more by the idea of infinite duration. Nor is this all. It is from the immensity of space that the notion of infinity is originally derived; and it is hence that we transfer the expression, by a sort of metaphor, to other subjects. When we speak, therefore, of *infinite* power, wisdom and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from space, are at least greatly aided by this analogy; so that the conceptions of Immensity and Eternity, if they do not of themselves *demonstrate* the existence of God, yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature and attributes."*

* Dissertation, &c. p. 67.

Something of the misapprehension already pointed out, respecting the object of Dr Clarke's sixth proposition, pervades the whole of the preceding extract. Had Mr Stewart perceived the real import of the proposition, he would have more distinctly seen how greatly it may assist the mind, in forming those sublime conceptions of the Deity, on which he has expatiated with so much eloquence. Of that eloquence I would not weaken the effect. I despair, indeed of closing the section more happily, than by means of a sentence which I have just met with. It suits the present train of thought; and Lord Brougham will agree with me, in not liking it the less, because it was written by a learned non-conformist. "The consideration of the infinite distance between God and the creature, which strongly appears upon reading such a book as Dr Clarke's, directly tends to promote humility, perfect resignation, and all those other dispositions, which ought to be constantly prevalent in our bosoms, towards our Great Creator, *in whom we live and move and have our being*."

Note referred to p. 265.

THERE are, in the Letters of Junius, some verses, cited by Mr Horne, as the words of his "ancient monitor." The same verses also are thus cited by Mr Dugald Stewart: "In the following rude lines of *Churchill*, which Mr [Horne] Tooke's Letter to Junius has made familiar to every ear, the feelings which give to the *stone arch* its peculiar character of grandeur are painted with equal justness and spirit:

> —— 'Tis the last key-stone
> That makes the arch; the rest that there were put
> Are nothing till that comes to bind and shut.
> Then stands it a triumphant mark: then men
> Observe the strength, the height, the why and when
> It was erected; and still, walking under,
> Meet some new matter to look up and wonder." *

Now the difficulty here is, to imagine how any one could have failed to perceive that these lines must have been written at least a century prior to the time of Churchill. In fact, they are Ben Jonson's; and form part of *An Epistle to Sir Edward Sackville, Earl of Dorset*, to be found in the *Underwoods*. Horne's Letter, of which the preceding verses form the conclusion, is the 51st of the series; and we find a quotation from the same poem in the 53d letter.

* Stewart's Philosophical Essays, p. 412. ed. 2, 1816.

SECTION VI.

THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS.

(Discourse, Notes, pp. 263—280.)

THIS subject is introduced by Lord Brougham, primarily in confirmation of his views of Natural Theology; and in the next place, on account of its bearing upon the doctrines of Bishop Warburton, yet to be discussed. The opinions in question relate, 1. to *mind;* 2. to *The Deity and matter;* and 3. to *the immortality of the soul.* On each of these I shall offer my remarks with all possible brevity.

1. *Ancient opinions respecting mind.* Notwithstanding much discrepancy of sentiment on topics of this nature, there was a very general belief of the immateriality of the soul. Lord Brougham quotes Plato and Aristotle, as holding nearly the same language on the subject. "Plato," he observes, "speaks of the ουσια ασωματος και νοητης [it ought to be οὐσία ἀσώματος καὶ νοητή.]—*a bodi-*

less and intelligent being."... Now, νοητὴ is not *intelligent*, but *intelligible;* that is, *perceivable, or conceivable, by the understanding.* If *intelligent* had been the meaning, intended to be conveyed, νοητικὴ would have been the word. Cudworth observes that Plato "uses the expression οὐσία νοητὴ *intelligible substance*, in opposition to the other, which he calls οὐσία αἰσθητὴ *sensible*," or perceptible by the senses.* And this correction is the more important, because there is some reason to think the οὐσία νοητὴ refers to Plato's notion of *ideas*, or the *forms* of things; to which also the passage next quoted by Lord Brougham—and, as it happens, the next, by Cudworth—may equally relate: τὰ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα,

* See Cudworth's Intellectual System, Chap. i. Sect. 19. Mosheim, in his translation, has completely misunderstood the passage; as the following version will convince the learned reader: "οὐσίαν νοητὴν, substantiam *intelligentem* [appellat] ut discrimen earum ab altero illo rerum ordine indicaret, quas οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς, *substantiæ sentientis nomine significat.*" These are strange mistakes for Mosheim to have made—extending not only to Plato's Greek but to Cudworth's English. A history of mistakes, in any department of literature, would be a curious document. Olympiodorus, an old Greek commentator, wished to give νοητὴ an active signification, although against the rule, as he observed. But Proclus, better acquainted with the Platonic philosophy, assigned to the word its ordinary meaning.

λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ, σαφῶς δείκνυται—*things incorporeal, being the most excellent and greatest of all, are made manifest, or discovered, by reason alone, and no otherwise.* Lord Brougham goes on to cite a passage from Plato, for the purpose of representing the body as the prison of the soul; but it is given so incorrectly—εικονα δεσμωτηριου ειναι ουν της ψυχης αυτο εως ην τα οφειλομενα το σωμα—as to be divested of all meaning. In the *Cratylus* (s. 38.) we find the following: τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥς περ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδὲ γράμμα: intimating that, as a punishment till its debts are paid, or faults expiated, the soul is imprisoned within the body; which, on account of thus keeping the soul in custody, is called σῶμα.....His Lordship then quotes an expression of Aristotle—οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν—to show that philosopher's belief in *a substance separable and separated from things perceivable by the senses.* It is employed by Cudworth (p. 19,

as before) with the same view .... The two subsequent passages, also from Aristotle — adduced with the design of proving that philosopher's opinion to be, that the soul (thereby meaning the highest intellectual power) is always connected with matter of some kind or other — are entirely misunderstood. We have first a passage from the treatise *de generatione animalium* (ii. 4.), which will be sufficiently intelligible to the learned reader: ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐκ τοῦ θήλεος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἄρρενος· ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ οὐσία σώματός τινός ἐστιν. Lord Brougham gives only the latter part of the sentence. The whole would have shown that Aristotle was probably writing, as he really was, not of the *animus* peculiar to man, but of the *anima* which is common to men and animals..... The next passage, from the treatise *de anima* (ii. 2), is very imperfectly transcribed; and, as in the preceding case, does not refer to the νοῦς. Aristotle is here discussing the ψυχὴ, the perishable *anima*, belonging to plants and animals, in general. His words are these: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά

τι ἡ ψυχή· σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι: in Lord Brougham's version—*Those therefore rightly hold who think that the soul cannot exist without the body, and yet that it is not body; it is not the body, but somewhat of the body.* To what senses the word ψυχὴ was to be considered as extending, is sufficiently clear from the whole tenor of the discussion; but to prevent mistakes, Aristotle, not many lines before, had positively stated that he did not include the *understanding*—that being capable of separation from the body—the eternal from the corruptible: περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεορητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερὸν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. These quotations from Aristotle, therefore, have no connexion with the subject which they were designed to illustrate.... A passage from Plato (*de legg.* x. 12) here adduced—ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι, τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ, *since the soul is always annexed to a body, sometimes to one and sometimes to another*—is more to the purpose; for although

it does not indicate any impossibility of the existence of the soul apart from the body, yet, by referring to the transmigration of the soul, it involves the *distinction* between the soul and the body.... The next appeal to antiquity will require more attention. I give the paragraph as I find it:

"This corporeal connexion is stated by Plutarch, in the *Quæst. Platon.*, still more plainly to have been the Platonic doctrine—ψυχην πρεσβυτεραν του σωματος, αιτιαν τε της εκεινου γενεσεως και αρχην· ουκ α γενεσθαι ψυχην ανευ σωματος ουδε νουν ανευ ψυχης, αλλα ψυχην μεν εν σωματι, νουν δε εν τῃ ψυχῃ. *The soul is older than the body, and the cause and origin of its existence; not that the soul exists without the body, or the understanding without the soul; but that the soul is in the body, and the understanding in the soul.*" (p. 265.)

I am surprised that the Noble Author was not here aware that the stream of thought did not exactly "run smooth." For, not to mention other points, What is the meaning of the soul being "the cause and origin" of the body's existence? The fact is—Plutarch is writing on a totally different subject; namely, the formation of the world; as the passage, when fairly laid

before the reader, will abundantly testify: "*τί δή ποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεὶ πρεσβυτέραν ἀποφαίνων τοῦ σώματος, αἰτίαν δὲ τῆς ἐκείνου γενέσεως καὶ ἀρχήν, πάλιν φησὶν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι ψυχὴν ἄνευ σώματος, οὐδὲ νοῦν ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν μὲν ἐν σώματι, νοῦν δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ;* —*δόξει γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, συνυπάρχον ἅμα τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ γενῳμένον ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς. ἢ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα συνυπῆρχον ἀλλήλοις ἀεί, καὶ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἔσχεν οὐδὲ ἀρχήν· ἐπεὶ δε ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ μετέλαβε καὶ ἁρμονίας, καὶ γενομένη διὰ συνφωνίας ἔμφρων, μεταβολῆς αἰτία γέγονε τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ κρατήσασα ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσι τὰς ἐκείνης ἐπεσπάσατο καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν, οὕτω τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου γενέσιν ἔσχεν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς.* Plutarch here notices an apparent discrepancy in the language of Plato; in writing, as he does, on soul being older than body, and the cause and origin of its existence, and yet that neither does soul exist without body, nor understanding without soul; but soul in

body, and understanding in soul;—so that body appears to be and not to be at the same time—to exist along with soul, and yet to be formed by it. He solves the difficulty by supposing that soul without understanding, and body without form, always co-existed—without cause or origin; but that when soul acquired understanding and harmony, and thus became wise, it produced a change in matter, and by the potency of its own operations, controuled and directed the motions of matter. And so the body of the world had its origin in mind.*.... Enough has now been given, to show the Noble Author's misapprehension on the subject.... From the extracts from Plato and Plutarch, His Lordship draws the following inferences; which, whether true or not, are certainly not established by evidence: "According to these representations and quotations taken together, Plato held the soul to be an immaterial substance, separable from any given body, but incapable of existing without some body or other; and the mind or understanding to be a part of the soul."

* Plut. Op. Xyland, Vol. II. p. 1002.

After a quotation from Plato, indicating that the soul is a self-moving substance, we find a well-known declaration of Epictetus, stating that the human soul is actually a part of the divine substance; and then another extract from Plutarch, also *appearing* to affirm that the soul is a portion severed from the substance of the Deity. This last passage has been adduced by various learned persons, besides Lord Brougham —Warburton is in the number—under the impression that it relates to the human soul; whereas it is as far from being connected with that subject as I have shown the preceding passage from Plutarch to be. In the incomplete shape, indeed, in which it is presented by His Lordship, there is nothing about it tending to excite any suspicion of mistake: "ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος· οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν—*the soul is not only his work, but a part of himself; it was not created by him, but from him, and out of him.*"

The real passage however, with a little of the context, will evince the error of supposing that this sentence affirms anything with regard to the

human soul: *τούτων δὲ μάλιστα τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀπτομένων δόξης, ἐπίστησον εἰ κἀκεῖνα λεχθήσεται πιθανῶς, ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκε, σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐγέννησε θεὸς, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὕλης παρασχομένης, ἐμόρφωσε καὶ συνήρμοσε, πέρασιν οἰκείοις καὶ σχήμασι δήσας καὶ ὁρίσας τὸ ἄπειρον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ [νοῦ μετασχοῦσα καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας] οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος· οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν.** From this, it appears that Plutarch wished the reader to consider the correctness of some opinions connected with those of Plato: namely, that there were two things, body and soul, from which God composed the world: the former [body] God did not create, but taking the boundless, shapeless matter that was presented, gave it form and symmetry; while the latter, the soul before mentioned, *partaking of understanding and reason and harmony*, was not only the work of God—but part of himself—from himself and out of himself.... The long continued mistake, of believing that any doctrine respecting the human

* Plutarch, p. 1001.

soul was laid down in this passage of Plutarch, is now sufficiently exposed. This passage, and the preceding one from the same writer, throw light upon each other; and I will only observe farther upon it, that if, in quoting the latter part of the sentence, the words which I have enclosed within brackets had not been omitted, an inquirer, anxious to know the truth of things, would have been led by them to examine the original, and judge for himself.

Having now gone through Lord Brougham's quotations and observations under the first head, I may observe, in conclusion, that but little has really been made out. At the same time, it is but right to state that I have no wish to gainsay the inferences which His Lordship would draw from the whole. My notion is, that some slight intimations have been afforded, of what might be distinctly shown by a copious induction of particulars; namely, that, in the schools of ancient philosophy, an opinion very generally prevailed that the human soul was originally a portion severed from the divine substance, and therefore by nature immortal—and that it was destined—after a series of migrations from one body to another—according to Plato, for moral

purposes, as punishment, reward and purification —to constitute, once more, a part of the divine substance—the individual existence being lost in the existence of the Deity.

2. *Ancient opinions respecting the Deity and matter.* Lord Brougham appears to think more highly, of the ancient opinions respecting the Deity, than he is warranted in doing by the evidence adduced on the subject. The note now to be considered opens thus:

"The notions of the Supreme Being entertained by the ancient philosophers were more simple and consistent than their theory of the soul; and but for the belief, which they never shook off, in the eternity of matter, would very nearly have coincided with our own. They give him the very same names, and clothe him apparently in the like attributes. He is not only αθανατος, αφθαρτος, ανωλεθρος, —*immortal, incorruptible, indestructible*—but αγινητος, αυτογενης, αυτοφυης, ανθυποστατος—*uncreated, self-made, self-originating, self-existing.* Ζωον πασαν εχον μακαριοτητα μετ' αφθαρσιας, says Epicurus—*A being having all happiness, with an incorruptible nature.* Again, he is παντοκρατωρ, παγκρατης—*omnipotent, all-powerful;* δυναται γαρ απαντα, says Homer (Odyss. ξ)—*He has power over all things.* The creative power is also in words at least ascribed to him.—κοσμοποιητης, δημιουργος—*the maker of the world, the great artificer.*" (pp. 266, 267.)

The preceding paragraph was, I have no doubt, suggested by a passage in Cudworth's *Intellectual System;* the remarks, however, of that learned writer show the necessity of caution in drawing inferences, of the kind intended by Lord Brougham, from many of the expressions enumerated by His Lordship. I cannot but think the matter of sufficient consequence to warrant my requesting that the sentiments of Cudworth may be compared with those of the Noble Author.

"Even the Atheists readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there must be something ἀγένητον, *something which was never made* or *produced*, and which therefore is the cause of those other things that are made; something αὐτόφυες and αὐθυπόστατον, that was *self-originated* and *self-existing;* and which is as well ἀνώλεθρον and ἄφθαρτον as ἀγένητον, *incorruptible* and *undestroyable* as *ingenerable;* whose existence therefore must needs be *necessary*, because if it were supposed to have happened by chance to have existed from eternity, then it might as well happen again to cease to be. Wherefore all the question now is, what is this ἀγένητον and ἀνώλεθρον, αὐτόφυες and αὐθυπόστατον, or, this *ingenerable* and *incorruptible, self-originated* and *self-existent* thing, which is the cause of all other things that are made?"*

* Intellectual System, C. iv. Sec. 3. p. 194.

The fact thus recorded by Cudworth—that the Atheists had no hesitation in applying, to the Cause of all things, the epithets *ἀγένητον*, *ἄφθαρτον*, and so on—shows how little can be deduced, from Lord Brougham's premises, in favour of the ancient creed on this important point. On a matter so evident, it would be a waste of time to dwell; and therefore I proceed to His Lordship's quotation from Epicurus—whose disposition to allow a Deity in name, provided that he removed the reality, has been long ago celebrated by Cicero. Epicurus then, according to the Noble Author, describes the First Cause, as *ζῶον πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας* —*a being having all happiness with an incorruptible nature.* Now when I consider that this expression of Epicurus occurs in Cudworth, within a few pages of the preceding extract, I cannot but suppose that it was derived from that source; on which supposition, it is to be lamented that the *dictum* of the old philosopher, if extracted at all, should have been given without some of Cudworth's remarks. Let me therefore supply the omission.

"Now, of all those, whosoever they were, who thus maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, we may pronounce universally that they were neither better nor worse than a kind of imperfect Theists. They had a certain notion, or idea, of God, such as it was; which seems to be the very same with that expressed in *Aristotle*, *ζῶον ἄριστον ἀΐδιον*, *an animal, the best, eternal;* and represented also by Epicurus in this manner, *ζῶον πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας*, *an animal that hath all happiness with incorruptibility.* Wherein it was acknowledged by them that, besides *senseless matter*, there was an *animalish*, and *conscious* or *perceptive* nature, self-existent from eternity."*

We can now understand the kind of Theism indicated by the expression of Epicurus; a Theism which we find in great abundance amongst the philosophers of ancient times. Asserting, as they did, the eternity of matter, they had no scruple in allowing the eternity and incorruptibility of a sentient principle, distinct from matter. This they endowed, in their imaginations, with the most excellent qualities which they supposed it capable of possessing; calling it *ἄριστον καὶ μακαριώτατον*, *the best and most happy.* Beyond this, many of the philosophers did not go; while others exalted their minds to the idea of a Su-

* Intellectual System, C. iv. Sec. 7. p. 198.

preme Intelligence or Understanding, not *creating* matter, which *they* also believed to be eternal—but moulding it into all its varied forms, and giving order and stability to the universal fabrick:—hence the names δημιουργὸς, παντοκράτωρ, indicating the boundless power of the Deity, as the maker and governor of the world. Plutarch has recorded his approbation of Plato's doctrine, on this subject, in a passage quoted by Cudworth and Lord Brougham. After stating the opinions of Heraclitus, Plutarch prefers those of Plato in the following terms: "Βέλτιον οὖν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτιῶν· τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὐτῆς, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν, ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν παρασχεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος. *It is therefore better for us to follow Plato,* (than Heraclitus) *and loudly to declare that the world was made by God. For as the world is the best of*

all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless the substance or matter, out of which the world was made, was not itself made; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer to be ordered and disposed by him. For the making of the world was not the production of it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state, like the making of an house, garment or statue."*

Several passages from Aristotle, which Lord Brougham has quoted with great propriety, indicate a similar opinion on the part of that most acute philosopher. The doctrine moreover, that no substance could be created or destroyed, was applied to the soul as well as to matter; and the philosophical writings of those ages abound in speculations on the subject. On the pre-existence of the soul, implied in its derivation from the divine essence — its natural immortality — and its ultimate restoration to its primary source — a few observations were offered under the preceding head. This very prevalent doctrine of ancient times is, as the Noble Author has stated, "most unsatis-

* Intellectual System, C. iv. Sec. 6. p. 197. I have given Cudworth's translation.

factory;" and has, in a moral point of view, some important consequences which will by and by require consideration.... Under the present head, I need only farther observe, that Lord Brougham has fairly stated the difference of sentiment amongst the philosophers, respecting a divine providence; exemplifying his remarks by referring to the Epicureans on the one hand, and Plato on the other:—for while the Epicureans held that the Gods were altogether indifferent to the affairs of men — Plato opposed the tenet, in the strongest language of condemnation.

3. *Ancient opinions respecting the immortality of the soul.* Much of what has been advanced under the two preceding heads, if not equally applicable to the present topic, undoubtedly bears upon it with great force. Aristotle, as Cudworth has truly remarked, asserts that "the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, *that anything should be made out of nothing pre-existent.*" Hence their derivation of the rational soul from the substance of the Deity. The soul, moreover, thus being, in their estimation a part of the Deity, was by its very nature immortal. They therefore held it to be,

like the Divinity himself, ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, *something incorruptible and indestructible.* To that effect writes Plato, as cited by Lord Brougham: ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλό τι ψυχὴ, ἦ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη; arguing, from the general principle, that whatever is immortal must be incorruptible, that the soul, being immortal, must also be indestructible. Their belief, then, was, that the soul did not *begin* to be, along with the individual body which it informed. It pre-existed. So firm, indeed, and so widely spread were their sentiments on this subject, that there is reason to doubt whether any one of the ancients, before Christianity, ever believed the soul to survive after death, who did not also believe that it had pre-existed.* This pre-existence, moreover, of itself led them to the notion of post-existence. Such is the view of the matter taken by Plato, in a passage adduced by the Noble Lord: ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῶδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι, *Our soul was*

* See Intellectual System, C. i. Sec. 31. p. 38.

*somewhere, before it began to exist in this present human form; and so on that account the soul also appears to be something immortal**... With regard to the manner of existence, we have seen, under the first head of the present section, that, according to the same philosopher, the soul was always connected with some *body*, or other; its final destination, after the allotted number of migrations, being—a re-union with the Deity. Such,

* Lord Brougham gives an indistinct reference to the *Timæus* of Plato. Nearly the same words occur in the *Phædo*, c. 18. His Lordship has quoted the passage in p. 271, and again in p. 274; giving a somewhat different version in each instance. The latter clause, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ, κ.τ.ἐ. is, in the first instance, rendered—*as also it seems to be immortal afterwards;* and, in the second, *so it seems to be immortal also.* The illative import of the word ταύτῃ being in each case neglected. In the next page another passage is quoted from Plato (*Phædo* 47.); which, being of no great consequence to the subject discussed, I notice in this place, merely to correct an oversight:—ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίην ἑκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν πολλὰ ἔτη βιῷ: which Lord Brougham thus translates—*But I should rather say that each of our souls wears out many bodies, though these should live many years.* Here are two mistakes: βιῷ refers to ἑκάστη τῶν ψυχῶν, or rather to ψυχῇ, and not to σώματα—and ἄλλως τε καὶ means *especially* and not *though*, as His Lordship has imagined. Plato writes of the soul living many years, in the sense in which every one would acknowledge it to be living, *I should say that the soul wears out many bodies, especially if it should live many years;* and he farther explains his meaning by the mention of the constant change and repeated renovation to which the body is subject.

in brief, was the leading philosophical doctrine of ancient times.

There are some circumstances, which ought now to be considered, with reference to the preceding account. Every reader will be aware that, during the time when those abstruse speculations, respecting the Deity and mind and matter, were in progress, there existed a popular creed—which required the acknowledgement of many Gods, and impressed the imagination with notions of rewards and punishments in a future life. Now, it is clear that the conclusions of the philosophers were inconsistent with what may be called the established religion of their country. If the philosophers believed in One God, they could not easily be polytheists: if they held the already-described doctrine of the soul, they must have rejected the vulgar apprehensions of retributive justice in the realms below. What, then, shall be said of Plato, for example, who in his various works usually writes of *The Gods*—and, what is more, on some occasions seems to maintain the doctrine of a separate existence of the soul after death, and a future state of rewards and punishments? Lord Brougham, indeed, men-

tions no difficulty in the case. He thus notices the fact:

"It must be admitted that the belief of the ancients was more firm and more sound than their reasons were cogent. The whole tenor of the doctrine in the *Phædo* refers to the renewal or continuation of the soul as a separate and individual existence, after the dissolution of the body, and with a complete consciousness of personal identity—in short, to a continuance of the same rational being's existence after death. The liberation from the body is treated as the beginning of a new and more perfect life—τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος· πρότερον δ' οὔ." (p. 276).

After this, we have from the *Phædo*—which, as His Lordship justly observes, presents "a somewhat fanciful picture of the next world"—two or three short extracts, in proof of the belief of a future state; and a passage, from the twelfth book *Of Laws*, the purport of which is worth notice. Plato, after stating that every one (to adopt Lord Brougham's version) *shall go to other Gods* (*or Gods in another world*) *to render an account* (παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον) immediately adds, *as the laws of the state declare* (καθάπερ ὁ νόμος ὁ πάτριος λέγει). Now without meaning to infer from this passage, that

Plato held "the laws of the state" to be the sole ground for the notion of a future account, there is something in the phrase, which, when connected with his philosophical opinions, may warrant a request that the turn of thought may be borne in mind—when the subject is more fully discussed in the next section.

In farther illustration of the strenuous belief of the ancients, Lord Brougham adduces a passage from Xenophon's Cyropædia (VIII. 7.), containing part of Cyrus's address to his children, when on his death-bed; and subjoins Cicero's beautiful translation of the same passage.* We there find the superiority of the intellectual to the corporeal nature of man pleasingly described, and the liberation of the soul from the body mentioned as a happy event. His Lordship, however, would have done greater justice to his subject, if he had gone on with his quotation.... Cyrus, after pointing out the similarity between death and sleep, and observing that in sleep the

* "Mihi quidem nunquam persuaderi potuit, animos, dum in corporibus essent mortalibus, vivere; quum exissent ex iis, emori; nec verò tum animum esse insipientem, quum ex animo insipienti evasisset; sed quum omni admixtione corporis liberatus, purus et integer esse cœpisset, tum esse sapientem." Cic. *de Senect.* c. 22.

soul especially manifests its own divinity, thus proceeds — "Wherefore, if these things be so, reverence me as a God; but if the mind perish with the body, yet will you, fearing the Gods who preserve and govern the world, preserve my memory inviolate."* Here we may *first* remark the extreme uncertainty of the speaker—instead of that firm belief, which Lord Brougham supposes this address to indicate; *secondly*, the notion which was entertained of the soul, supposing it to survive—namely, that it was a portion of the divine substance, and so to be considered as a deity; and *thirdly*, that the sentiments, attributed to Cyrus, appear to be adopted by Cicero. In the *Somnium Scipionis*, indeed, the same conception of the soul may be noticed—"Deum te igitur scito esse;" and, in this very treatise *de Senectute* already quoted, death is represented as an event to be disregarded, if it extinguish the soul—to be wished, if the soul is eternal: *no third state could be devised*†. So imperfect were

* "Quare, si hæc ita sunt, sic me colitote ut deum: sin una est interiturus animus cum corpore, vos tamen deos verentes, qui hanc omnem pulchritudinem tuentur et regunt, memoriam nostri pie inviolateque servabitis."

† "Deum te igitur scito esse: siquidem Deus est, qui viget, qui

the notions even of Cicero, respecting a future state of retribution. Undoubtedly, the works of this great philosopher present several very striking representations of heroes and lawgivers and other great benefactors of mankind, associated in the enjoyment of supreme felicity in another world; and Lord Brougham has very properly made use of such representations, in his disquisition on ancient opinions. His Lordship, however, seems not to have taken the trouble to trace the connexion between those lofty speculations, and the avowed doctrines respecting the origin and destination of the human soul. Had this connexion been carefully considered, and the expressions of doubt—perhaps more than doubt—which are found in the productions of those early ages, been duly taken into account, His Lordship's decisions would have been invested with much more of the judicial character than they can at present be allowed to exhibit.

qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur, et movet id corpus, cui præpositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps Deus: et ut mundum ex quâdam parte mortalem ipse Deus æternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet." *Somnium Scipionis.*

"Mors aut plane negligenda est, si omnino extinguit animum, aut etiam optanda, si aliquo eum deducit, ubi sit futurus æternus. *Atqui tertium certe nihil inveniri potest.*" *de Senect.* c. 19.

To express my view of the matter in few words. There is an apparent contradiction between the philosophy and the religion of those ancient times. It ought, then, to be shown either that the apparent, is not a real contradiction; or that the sages in question fairly abandoned their philosophy, and adhered to their religion. Something at least of this kind ought to be done, before any one can justly infer the "firm and sound belief," of those old philosophers, in a future state.

SECTION VII.

WARBURTON.

(Discourse, Notes, pp. 281—296).

About this time Warburton began to make his appearance in the first ranks of learning. He was a man of vigorous faculties, a mind fervid and vehement, supplied, by incessant and unlimited inquiry, with wonderful extent and variety of knowledge; which yet had not oppressed his imagination, nor clouded his perspicacity. To every work he brought a memory full fraught, together with a fancy fertile of original combinations; and at once exerted the powers of the scholar, the reasoner, and the wit.— JOHNSON.

THE first impression of the character of Warburton, upon the mind of Johnson, is here presented, for the purpose of fixing the reader's attention, at the opening of the section, upon the intellectual qualities of the individual, some of whose opinions are about to be considered. An interest in the subject may thus be excited and sustained; for, to confess the truth, it would not be easy to infer, from the tenor of Lord Brougham's observations, that the author of *The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated* had ever drawn forth such language, from the great biographer.

Should any one, on the opening of the volume, be attracted to the present section by the name of Warburton, it may be useful to observe that the subjects here considered are dependent upon those discussed in the preceding section; which therefore is, in the first instance, recommended to the reader's perusal. The sentiments of the ancient philosophers, there detailed, will form an excellent introduction to the following paragraph from the pen of Lord Brougham:

"To any one who had read the extracts in the last note, but still more to one who was familiar with the ancient writers from whose works they are taken, it might appear quite impossible that a question should ever be raised upon the general belief of antiquity in a future state, and the belief of some of the most eminent of the philosophers, at least, in a state of rewards and punishments. Nevertheless as there is nothing so plain to which the influence of a preconceived opinion and the desire of furthering a favourite hypothesis will not blind men, and as their blindness in such cases bears even a proportion to their learning and ingenuity, it has thus fared with the point in question; and Bishop Warburton has denied that any of the ancients except Socrates really believed in a future state of the soul individually, and subject to reward or punishment. He took up this argument because it seemed to strengthen his extraordinary reasoning upon the Legation of Moses." (p. 281.)

On the contrary, the difficulty seems to be, to reconcile such a belief, of a future state, as His Lordship attributes to those old philosophers, with those very extracts which he had himself previously given from their works. As to Warburton, the real question is, whether—when he employed the argument alluded to, in aid of his reasoning upon the Legation of Moses—he had grounds for so doing, which would justify an honest and learned inquirer. Language is pliable; and even with reference to the opinion—that the ancient philosophers *did* believe in a future state of retribution—an adversary might allege that Lord Brougham "took up the argument because it seemed to strengthen his own notions of Natural Religion." Remarks of this kind I should decidedly condemn in His Lordship's case; and I am equally adverse to them in the case of Warburton. We have little or nothing to do with the question, why Warburton "took up the argument:" the great object ought to be, to ascertain whether or not the argument is valid. The Noble Author, indeed, has proceeded to show, in the first place, how Warburton's estimate of the creed of the philosophers bears upon the reasoning of his great work.

"His reasoning is this. The inculcating of a future state of retribution is necessary to the well being of society. All men, and especially all the wisest nations of antiquity, have agreed in holding such a doctrine necessary to be inculcated. But there is nothing of the kind to be found in the Mosaic dispensation. And here he pauses to observe that these propositions seem too clear to require any proof. Nevertheless his whole work is consumed in proving them; and the conclusion from the whole, that therefore the Mosaic law is of Divine original, is left for another work which never appeared; and yet this is the very position which all, or almost all who may read the book, and even yield their assent to it, are the most inclined to reject. Indeed it may well be doubted if this work, learned and acute as it is, and showing the author to be both well read and well fitted for controversy, ever satisfied any one except perhaps Bishop Hurd, or ever can demonstrate anything so well, as it proves the preposterous and perverted ingenuity of an able and industrious man." (p. 282.)

The propositions—respecting the necessity of a belief in a future state to the well being of society, the agreement amongst the wisest nations of antiquity in inculcating such a belief, and the want of such a doctrine in the Mosaic Law—although plain to Warburton, had yet been frequently placed in so different a light from that in which he viewed them, that, as he soon found, their "full elucidation" required "a severe search

into the civil policy, religion, and philosophy of ancient times"—as well as "a detailed account of the nature and genius of the Jewish dispensation." Warburton gives us this information at the beginning of his work; and I know not that there is anything in the information to call either for censure or defence. Lord Brougham's objection—that the proof that "the Mosaic Law is of Divine original, was left for a further work, which never appeared"—may perhaps be not improperly met by the following statement. The first volume of the Divine Legation, as originally published, contained the first three Books; in which were discussed the necessity that exists, and the necessity that was in ancient times felt to exist, for the belief of a future state, to the well-being of society. The second volume, comprising Books IV. V. and VI, was intended to show that the doctrine of a future state was not inculcated in the Mosaic Law. These were the premises to be established; and from these premises, together with all their bearings, Warburton believed that the conclusion followed of course—namely, that the Law of Moses is of Divine original. Why, then, was another volume promised? Warburton

has answered the question. "It was promised—*to remove all conceivable objections against the conclusion, and to throw in additional light upon the premises.*" In fact, the seventh book was intended to unfold the progress of religious opinions amongst the Jews, from the time of the earlier Prophets to the time of the Maccabees, when the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments became national; the eighth book, to pourtray the character of Moses as a Law-giver; and the ninth, that is, the last book, to explain the nature and genius of the Christian Dispensation*... Amongst Warburton's numerous assailants during his life-time, was no less a personage than that most acute, eloquent, philosophical, inaccurate and versatile Nobleman, Lord Bolingbroke; and although he does not appear to have joined in the censure, respecting an unfinished undertaking, then expressed by some, and now advanced in the 'Discourse of Natural Theology', yet the following remarks, by the author of the Divine Legation, cannot be duly estimated, without recollecting the part taken in the controversy by that eccentric statesman.

* Divine Legation, vi. 6. near the end.

"This is the plain and simple argument of the Divine Legation; which the first and the second volumes of that work are employed to explain and illustrate. And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it. This praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others have understood so little of the argument, as to imagine that the two first volumes had left it unfinished; and that the third was to complete the syllogism; though the author had told us, more than once, that the purpose of the last volume was only to enforce the various parts of the foregoing argument, by many new considerations."*

The reader is now sufficiently aware of the objects of that "further work," of Warburton, "which never appeared."... Lord Brougham, moreover, intimates a doubt whether any one, except perhaps Bishop Hurd, was ever satisfied with the Divine Legation. Now, whatever I may be endeavouring to elucidate, it is not my plan to produce names, without at the same time producing the opinions or statements for which they are intended to vouch; and therefore conceiving myself to be, on this occasion, restricted to the mention of but few individuals,

* View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy, Letter IV. near the beginning: or Warburton's Works, Vol. XII. p. 244.

the first shall be neither a Bishop nor even a Churchman—but a Non-conformist, whose learning and judgement entitle him to attention. Thus, then, writes Dr Doddridge in the notes to his Family Expositor:

Luke xvi. 31. "It is true, Moses no where expressly mentions a future state of rewards and punishments; yet the facts recorded by him strongly enforce the natural arguments in proof of it."....Again, 2 Tim. i. 10. "*Life and immortality* is put by a usual Hebraism for *immortal life*, as Archbishop Tillotson well observes in his discourse on these words, in which he has shown how uncertain the heathens were as to the doctrines of a future state of retribution; and the comparative obscurity of that light in which it was placed in the Old Testament. But what Mr Warburton has written upon this subject in his Divine Legation, and what is said upon it in the last edition of the Critical Inquiry into the opinions of the ancient philosophers, has done abundantly more than anything else to vindicate the propriety of this expression."....Finally, Rom. i. 21. "I think what Paul charges upon the philosophers is, that though they actually knew there was one Supreme God, they neglected him, to conform (for low and base considerations) to the established idolatry, which was really the case, to their aggravated guilt and condemnation, as appears from most of the passages in which the Pagan writers bear testimony to *the doctrine of the Unity*."

There is only another individual whose sentiments I shall here record. He is, indeed, a

Churchman; but at the same time a Churchman as unlikely to be misled by the *name* of Warburton, as can possibly be imagined. Having already produced this person's opinion in favour of Natural Religion, I shall now be enabled to show how compatible are such opinions with the belief that those ancient sages, after they had abandoned the road to religion, were speedily lost amidst the mazes of a heartless philosophy.

"The learned reader will soon satisfy himself, from Cicero *de senectute* and his Tusculan Disputations, that this proud atheistic system was really the creed of the philosophers. We are easily dazzled by the glare of some luminous sentences, considered in a detached point of view, to suppose them to have been much nearer Christian truth than the Pagan vulgar. But their notions, reduced to a whole, do really appear to have been still more remote from the Gospel. Bishop Warburton has, I think, amply proved the point before us. It is worth any man's while to peruse him, in order to gain a clear insight into that text, *the world by wisdom knew not God.*"*

The approbation therefore, of the Divine Legation, was confined neither to Bishop Hurd, nor yet to the Church to which he belonged .... I was glad to transcribe the closing sentence of Lord

* Milner's Answer to Gibbon, p. 113. The author, of course, refers to the third book of the Divine Legation.

Brougham's observations, last presented, on account of the praise of Warburton which it involves:—not that I think the idea of "an able and industrious man, well read and well fitted for controversy," bears any striking resemblance to JOHNSON's Warburton!.... After a paragraph, (pp. 282—283) on which I deem it needless to offer any remarks, the Noble Author indulges in the following strain of animadversion:

"The two things which the author always overlooked were the possibility of a human lawgiver making an imperfect system, and of sceptics holding the want of the sanction in question to be no argument for the divine origin of the Mosaic law, but rather a proof of its flowing from a human and fallible source. As these 'mere possibilities' are wholly independent of the admission that every word in the book is correct, and all the positions are demonstrated, and as nothing whatever is said to exclude such suppositions, it is manifest that a more useless and absurd argument never was maintained upon any grave and important subject." (p. 283.)

This, I rather think, is strong language; to which I shall, as usual, endeavour to reply, by detailing, with all possible plainness, the circumstances of the case.... Much that has been written, respecting the argument of the Divine Legation, from the time of its publication to the present,

naturally leads to this conclusion—that the author, fancying that he had discovered for himself that the retribution of a future state had not been enforced in the Law of Moses, had, from the mere love of paradox, employed the supposed fact, as an argument for the truth of the Jewish Dispensation. Lord Brougham's remarks upon the subject, in the beginning of the foregoing paragraph, appear to confirm that notion. Now although the current of thought—perhaps from want of an especial consideration of the subject—had flowed in a contrary direction, yet there were persons, and those too of great name, who had maintained the opinion adopted by Warburton. Grotius, Episcopius and Bishop Bull may be mentioned in this point of view. Their sentiments on the matter will be found in the note*. Moreover, immediately prior

* Grotius: "Moses in Religionis Judaicæ Institutione, si diserta Legis respicimus, nihil promisit supra hujus vitæ bona, terram uberem, penum copiosum, victoriam de hostibus, longam et valentem senectutem, posteros cum bona spe superstites. Nam, si quid est ultra, in umbris obtegitur, aut sapienti ac difficili ratiocinatione colligendum est."....Episcopius: "In tota Lege Mosaica nullum vitæ æternæ præmium, ac ne æterni quidem præmii indicium vel vestigium extat."....Bull: "Lex enim promissa habuit terrena et terrena tantum."

to the time when Warburton fixed his attention on Theological inquiries, Deistical writers had strongly urged the omission of the sanction of a future state in the Law of Moses, as a proof that the Jewish economy could not be of divine origin. Is it, then, likely that Warburton, in the immensity of his reading, should be ignorant of all these circumstances? But not to dwell upon the probabilities of things, we have his own evidence to appeal to. At the end of the fourth section of the sixth book, he has quoted at length, the passages of Grotius, Episcopius and Bull, from which I have given extracts; for the purpose of showing that the doctrine he held was not of his own invention. Nay, the very title-page of the work, which called forth the kind of criticism now under notice, might have shown the authors of such criticism how wide it was of the mark. In the title-page we read as follows: *The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated* ON THE PRINCIPLES OF A RELIGIOUS DEIST, *from the omission of the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment, in the Jewish Dispensation.* So far, indeed, was Warburton from having "always overlooked the possibility

of sceptics holding the want of the sanction in question to be no argument for the divine origin of the Mosaic Law, but rather a proof of its flowing from a human and fallible source"—that his work bears upon its front an indelible mark that it was written in designed opposition to such sceptical conclusions. Again, in the first section of the first book, we find this declaration from the pen of Warburton: "Why I choose this medium, namely, *the omission of a future state in the Jewish Dispensation*, to prove its divine original, is, *first*, for the sake of the DEISTS: being enabled hereby to show them, That this very circumstance of omission, *which they pretend to be such an imperfection as makes the dispensation unworthy the Author to whom we ascribe it*, is, in truth, a demonstration that God only could give it."....And finally, not to mention many other instances in which Warburton has opposed the sceptical inferences from *the omission*, and vindicated his own — to the fifth book he has added an Appendix, consisting of more than forty closely printed pages, in which Lord Bolingbroke's arguments on the subject, as the most important he could dis-

cover, are formally taken into consideration. On the whole, so copious is the evidence of Warburton's attention to the objections that were advanced against his system, that when Lord Brougham alludes to such objections, as having been overlooked, I am at a loss to imagine in what manner he can have read the Divine Legation. The indications indeed, of a thorough acquaintance with the purport and execution of the work, are hitherto so faint, that there will be, to most people, an appearance of something premature in His Lordship's judgement—"that a more useless and absurd argument was never maintained upon any grave and important subject." When the Deists had once pressed the omission of a future state as fatal to the belief of the divine origin of the Jewish Polity—there were but two courses for the advocates of Revelation to pursue:—either to show that there was no such omission, or to trace out the consequences of the omission, supposing it to be granted. The former was considered as the safe course; but it evinced rather the good intentions than the success of those who adopted it. Warburton took the latter; and by com-

bining the omission of a future state with the Theocratic government under which the Israelites were placed—the retributive providence to which they were subjected in this life—and the singular character and condition of the people themselves—he framed an argument, for the divine origin of the dispensation, which it was easy to censure as paradoxical, and difficult to prove to be unsound. The presumption of Warburton, however, in taking what was deemed the *wrong* course, was an offence not to be forgiven. He was, therefore, assailed with a violence of invective, which, as he said, could scarcely have been susceptible of increase, if he had attempted to demonstrate the Divine Legation of Mahomet. What was the consequence? Disdaining to soften that malignity which he did not dread, he employed the language of contempt. I lament that he did so, but I do not wonder at it. The provocation was great; and I have seen the language of contempt employed, in cases in which I could discover no provocation whatsoever. It may, I think, be observed that what has been clamorously censured or unreasonably applauded has for the most part afterwards experienced an

interval of unmerited neglect. Something of this kind appears to have befallen the Divine Legation; and although I have ventured to offer a few remarks on the subject, I am fully aware that the time is not yet come for duly estimating the labours of—WARBURTON.

My object, in placing the following sentiments of Lord Brougham before the reader, is not so much to state any objections to them—as to have an opportunity of mentioning a circumstance in the highest degree honourable to the personal character of the Historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

"The merit of the Divine Legation lies in its learning and in its collateral argument; indeed nearly the whole is collateral, and unconnected with the purpose of the reasoning. But much even of that collateral matter is fanciful and unsound. The fancy that the descent of Æneas to hell in the sixth book of the Æneid is a veiled account of the Eleusinian Mysteries, has probably made as few proselytes as the main body of the 'Demonstration'; and if any one has lent his ear to the theory that the ancients had no belief in a future state of retribution, it can only be from being led away by confident assertion from the examination of facts." (p. 283.)

To employ the language of Mr Gibbon, "the descent of Æneas and the Sybil to the infernal

regions, to the world of spirits, expands an awful and boundless prospect, from the nocturnal gloom of the Cumæan grot, to the meridian brightness of the Elysian fields; from the dreams of simple nature, to the dreams of Egyptian theology and the philosophy of the Greeks. But the final dismission of the hero through the *ivory gate*, whence

Falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes,

seems to dissolve the whole enchantment, and leaves the reader in a state of cold and anxious scepticism." The circumstance indeed, just mentioned, had perplexed the commentators, and mortified the admirers of Virgil. It had been accounted an oversight in a work not completely revised, or a proof of the author's Epicurean disbelief of a future state. Warburton's interpretation, mentioned by Lord Brougham, tended at least to lessen the difficulty, if not entirely to remove it. "The hypothesis," as Mr Gibbon informs us, "had been admitted by many as true; it was praised by all as ingenious; nor had it been exposed, in a space of thirty years, to a fair and critical discussion." And thus, the future historian, being "ambitious of breaking a lance against the giant's shield," published ano-

nymously (1770) his 'Critical Observations on the design of the sixth book of the Æneid;' in which "he aimed his strokes against the person and the hypothesis of Bishop Warburton." Heyne, the editor of Virgil, praised the learning displayed in the 'Observations', but condemned the severity. Mr Hayley, whom I need not describe, was disposed to justify even the acrimony of the style. But Mr Gibbon, when reviewing the events of his life, saw the matter in a different light. "I cannot," he writes, "forgive myself the contemptuous treatment of a man who, with all his faults, was entitled to my esteem; and I can less forgive, in a personal attack, the cowardly concealment of my name and character." There is indescribable satisfaction in pointing attention to an acknowledgement of error, so creditable to the "name and character" of Mr Gibbon; and I am inclined to hope that the statements contained in this paragraph may have the effect of showing that Warburton's speculations are not quite so visionary, as Lord Brougham's expressions would lead his readers to suppose*.

* See Gibbon's Memoirs of his Life and Writings, pp. 208—212. 8vo. ed. 1814.

After all, Warburton's position—that the ancient philosophers had no belief in a future state of retribution—was, as the Noble Author observes, not necessary to the proof of his general theory; which, however, would certainly be strengthened, if it should appear that, from a conviction of the absolute necessity of the belief of a future state to the well being of society, the very same persons enforced in public what they rejected in private. Of the fact, indeed, of doctrines *exoteric*, distinct from doctrines *esoteric*, in that respect, having been held by those old philosophers, Lord Brougham has no doubt. According to His Lordship, the first notions of religion, having originated in fear and ignorance, were first embellished and recommended by the fancy of poets, and then sanctioned and enforced by the power and authority of Rulers. Hence philosophers themselves, having neither the inclination nor the liberty, "to expose the errors of the popular faith"—"taught one doctrine in private, while in public they conformed to the prevailing creed."*. So far, then, there appears to be no essential difference of opinion between

* Discourse, p. 284.

Warburton and Lord Brougham. His Lordship's complaint, immediately afterwards, is that Warburton makes "the tenor of the doctrine the criterion of *esoteric* or *exoteric*;" and he thus enlarges upon the mode of proceeding:

"It seems hardly credible that so acute and practised a controversialist should so conduct an argument, but it is quite true. As often as anything occurs in favour of a future state, he says it was said *exoterically;* and whenever he can find anything on the opposite side, or leaning towards it (which is really hardly at all in the Platonic or Ciceronian writings) he sets this down for the *esoteric* sentiments of the writer. But surely, if there be any meaning at all in the double doctrine, whatever may have been its origin, the occasion is every thing; and there can be no difficulty in telling whether any given opinion was maintained *exoterically* or not, by the circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, it was propounded." (p. 285.)

Now, to myself, I confess, it does not appear so easy, as to His Lordship, to distinguish between writings *exoteric* and writings *esoteric;* but that is, on either side, a mere opinion, from which it would not be safe to draw any conclusion.... With regard to the assertion, that Warburton made the mention of a future life, or the omission, the immediate reason for desig-

nating a treatise as *exoteric* or *esoteric* — I must refer the reader to some circumstances, which yet remain to be developed, in the present section.... On a similar account, I must also request a suspense of judgement, in relation to Plato and Cicero, as mentioned by His Lordship.... Furthermore, I observe that Lord Brougham is of opinion, as well as Warburton, that a double doctrine was held by the philosophers. If, then, Warburton is pressed by a difficulty, when a future state appears to be admitted, in writings which may not unreasonably be thought *esoteric* —is not Lord Brougham equally pressed by a difficulty, when a future state is denied in writings which may as reasonably be thought *exoteric?* Suppose a book were published in England—one part of it denying a future state, or arguing against it, or ridiculing the notion, and another part admitting the popular creed, what should we consider the author to be—an infidel or a believer?.... But enough of generals: we now proceed to particulars; to which we are introduced by the Noble Author in the following manner:

"The argument, on which Warburton dwells most, is drawn from the allusion made by Cæsar in the dis-

cussion upon the punishment of the conspirators, as related by Sallust: 'Ultra (mortem) neque curæ neque gaudio locum esse:' and from the way in which Cato and Cicero evade, he says, rather than answer him, appealing to the traditions of antiquity, and the authority of their ancestors, instead of arguing the point. (*Div. Leg.* III. 2. 5.) Can any thing be more inconclusive than this? Granting that Sallust, in making speeches for Cæsar and Cato (whom, by the way, he makes speak in the selfsame style, that is, in his own Sallustian style) adhered to the sentiments each delivered; and further, that Cæsar used this strange topic, not as a mere rhetorical figure, but as a serious reason against capital punishment, and as showing that there is mercy and not severity in such inflictions (a very strong supposition to make respecting so practised and practical a reasoner as Caius Cæsar); surely so bold a position as practical atheism brought forward in the Roman Senate was far more likely to be met, whether by the decorum of Cato or the skill of Cicero, with a general appeal to the prevalence of the contrary belief, and its resting on ancient tradition, than with a metaphysical or theological discourse, singularly out of season in such a debate. To make the case our own: let us suppose some member of Parliament, or of the Chamber of Deputies, so ill-judged as to denounce in short but plain terms the religion of the country, would any person advert further to so extravagant a speech, than to blame it, and in general expressions signify the indignation it had excited? Would not an answer out of Lardner, or Paley, or Pascal be deemed almost as ill-timed as the attack?

To be sure, neither Cato nor Cæsar are represented as testifying any great disgust at the language of Cæsar; but this, as well indeed as the topic being introduced at all by the latter, only shows that the doctrine of a future state was not one of the tenets much diffused among the people, or held peculiarly sacred by them."—(pp. 285—287.)

Near the beginning of the foregoing paragraph, Lord Brougham seems rather to have admitted for the sake of argument, than to have acknowledged as an historical fact—that Cæsar opposed the capital punishment of the conspirators, on the ground that death would at once put an end to sufferings, the continuance of which was demanded by the enormity of their crimes. When, indeed, His Lordship observed upon "the selfsame Sallustian style," in which Cato and Cæsar are made to speak—and still more, when he denominated the notion of such a reason against capital punishment being seriously employed by "so practised and practical a reasoner as Caius Cæsar"—"a strong supposition"—he certainly must have intended to throw some portion of doubt upon the whole matter. Now, in the first place, if we had received the account on the sole authority of

Sallust, it would be difficult to assign a cause for misrepresentation on the part of the historian, or incredulity on our own part. But in the second place, we have an independent testimony, to the accuracy of the statement, in the writings of an illustrious individual, who was actively engaged in the proceedings on that occasion. In short, we have in our possession Cicero's fourth oration against Catiline, which was drawn forth by the very subject under consideration. I will state, as briefly as possible, the circumstances of the case....The question proposed to the Senate was—What should be done, with regard to those of the agents in Catiline's conspiracy, who were in custody?* Julius Silanus, as Consul Elect, spoke first, and was of opinion that they should be put to death. Cæsar, who, it will be recollected, was an Epicurean, dwelt upon their deeds, as crimes to which no sufferings that could be devised would be adequate; represented death as, in cases of grief and wretchedness, the termination of sorrows, not the exacerbation—all the ills of

* Quid de his fieri placeat, qui in custodiam traditi erant. Sallust. Bell. Cat. c. 50.

life being dissipated by that event, beyond which there was neither trouble nor joy;* and recommended the severest punishment that was consistent with the continuance of life. Cato, a Stoic—in a speech also given by Sallust—mentioned, with commendation of the manner and no dislike of the matter, Cæsar's dissertation on life and death; slightly observing that he supposed Cæsar to consider as false the things that were reported of the infernal regions; namely, the separation of the good from the bad, who were consigned to places abounding in every thing disagreeable and horrible.† So far we have depended upon the authority of Sallust; and notwithstanding the "Sallustian style," in which he has reported the speeches of Cæsar and of Cato, there is ample reason to believe that he has accurately given the substance of

* Equidem ego sic existumo, Patres Conscripti, omnis cruciatus minores quam facinora illorum esse.... De pœna possumus equidem dicere id quod res habet: in luctu atque miseriis mortem ærumnarum requiem non cruciatum esse: eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere: ultra neque curæ neque gaudii locum esse.—Bell. Cat. c. 51.

† Bene et composite C. Cæsar paullo ante in hoc ordine de vita et morte disseruit; falso, credo, existumans, quæ de inferis memorantur: diverso itinere malos a bonis loca tetra, inculta, fæda atque formidolosa habere. c. 52.

what was spoken. Let us now turn to the orations of Cicero; and see what information can be gathered, from that great master of the Academic school, in his own style. In the course of his address, he mentions the two opinions which had been delivered: the one enforcing death—the other the severest punishment in this life: the former, as demanded by the danger to which the Roman people had been exposed—the latter, as being more efficacious than death, which was not ordained for punishment at all. He goes on to describe Cæsar's plan, as subjecting those miscreants to chains and imprisonment and poverty and despair; as leaving them nothing but life—which being taken away, they would be freed from the punishment of their wickedness. So that, by way of terror to the evil, the ancients were of opinion that some punishments should be assigned to the impious in the infernal regions, conceiving that, without such punishments, death would not be an object of dread.*

* Video duas adhuc esse sententias: unam D. Silani, qui censet, eos, qui hæc delere conati sunt, morte esse multandos: alteram C. Cæsaris, qui mortis pœnam removet, cæterorum suppliciorum omnes acerbitates amplectitur. Uterque et pro sua dignitate et pro rerum magnitudine in summa severitate versatur. Alter eos, qui

.....We see, then, how completely Sallust's account of the debate is confirmed by Cicero's oration, as preserved in his own works; and in consequence, how needless is Lord Brougham's hesitating language, respecting the accuracy of the historian. We see, also, with what indifference the avowal, of Cæsar's Epicurean disbelief of a future retribution, was treated in the Roman Senate. Considered simply as a matter of Religion, it seems not to have been deemed worthy of a remark. There certainly was no "metaphysical or theological discourse" on the subject; and as to the "appeal to the prevalence of the

qui nos omnes, qui populum Romanum vita privare conati sunt, qui delere imperium, qui populi Romani nomen extinguere, punctum temporis frui vita et hoc communi spiritu non putat oportere....alter intelligit mortem a diis immortalibus non esse supplicii causa constitutam; sed aut necessitatem naturæ, aut laborum ac miseriarum quietem esse.....Adjungit gravem pœnam municipibus, si quis eorum vincula ruperit: horribiles custodias circumdat, et digna scelere hominum perditorum sancit—ne quis eorum pœnam, quos condemnat, aut per senatum aut per populum levare possit. eripit etiam spem, quæ sola hominibus in miseriis consolari solet. bona præterea publica publicari jubet: vitam solam relinquit nefariis hominibus: quam si eripuisset, multas uno dolore animi atque corporis, et omnes scelerum pœnas ademisset. Itaque ut aliqua in vita formido improbis esset posita, apud inferos ejusmodi quædam illi antiqui supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt, quod videlicet intelligebant, his remotis non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam. In Catal. IV. 4, 5.

contrary belief and its resting on ancient tradition," we are now aware how little the most eloquent man that Rome ever produced was disposed to avail himself of the topic.... The fair conclusion seems to be that Warburton was completely warranted in arguing from so remarkable a manifestation of the sentiments of philosophers, on that most important article of religious faith. ....While looking through Cicero's fourth oration against Catiline, in the edition of Grævius, my eye caught a note of Muretus, in which he states his opinion—and no man was more capable of forming a just opinion—of the ancient notions, respecting a future state. He is, of course, writing of the philosophers; of whose disbelief, he seems to have no doubt—as will be clear from the following extract:

"Plerique veterum in ea sententia fuerunt, ut crederent ea quæ de inferis dicerentur nihil esse aliud quam fabulas ad territandos imperitorum animos confictas; ipsumque ita sensisse Ciceronem demonstravimus in annotationibus Horatianis."

Lord Brougham's parallel, between the English Parliament and the Roman Senate, appears to fail; for it is supposed by His Lordship that,

in the English Parliament, a disavowal of the Religion of the Country would be met with expressions of blame and indignation—whereas there were in the Roman Senate no expressions of the kind. Allowing, moreover, that an answer out of Lardner or Paley would be ill timed, where would be the impropriety of reminding a Member, who should in that manner shock the feelings of those around him, of the many, far greater men than himself, who had sat in that house, and reverenced the Religion of which *he* had ventured to speak in terms of contempt? In short, every new light thrown upon the subject has the effect of showing more distinctly the sceptical opinions of the Roman philosophers. From the fact, however—that sceptical opinions were divulged in the Roman Senate—the Noble Author infers "that the doctrine of retribution was rather more *esoteric* than *exoteric* among the ancients." There is something in this notion—if I have not undesignedly mis-stated it—which I do not comprehend; and therefore as it appears, from what follows, to be connected with Warburton's view of the Eleusinian Mysteries, I will first present His Lordship's subsequent observations, and then consider them:

"The elaborate dissertation of Bishop Warburton upon the Mysteries proves this effectually, and clearly refutes his whole argument. For to prove that the doctrine of future retribution was used at all as an engine of state, he is forced to allege that it was the secret disclosed to the initiated in the Sacred Mysteries; which, according to Cicero, were not to be viewed by the imprudent eye. (Ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas est. *De Legg.* II. 14.) Surely this would rather indicate that such doctrines were not inculcated indiscriminately, and that at all events, when a philosopher gives them a place in his works, it cannot be in pursuance of a plan for deceiving the multitude into a belief different from his own." (p. 287.)

From the mode of expression adopted in the preceding extract, it seems probable that Lord Brougham does not object to Warburton's account of the purposes of the Mysteries. At all events, His Lordship reasons *from* that account; which therefore must here be distinctly explained. First, then, with regard to the lesser Mysteries, which were by no means difficult of access: "To support the doctrine of a PROVIDENCE," says Warburton, "which, they taught, governed the world, they *enforced* the belief of A FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments, by every sort of contrivance."* And here, let Warburton's

* Divine Legation, B. II. s. 4.

words be duly noticed. He does not affirm that the Mysteries *revealed the doctrine*, but that they *enforced the belief*, of a future state. The initiated in the lesser Mysteries had their previous belief recommended to them by interesting representations and impressed by solemn sanctions. This is Warburton's real position, which he maintains with every variety of argument. How different is this, from the Noble Author's account of Warburton's hypothesis, where he says—in the extract just given—that "to prove that the doctrine of future retribution was used at all as an engine of state, Warburton is forced to allege that it was *the secret disclosed* to the initiated!' In fact, two accounts of the same thing cannot possibly be imagined more directly opposed to each other than those of Warburton and Lord Brougham. When Warburton goes on, to unfold the purpose of the greater Mysteries, he observes—"the secret in the *lesser* Mysteries was principally contained in some hidden *rites and shows* to be kept from the open view of the people, only to invite their curiosity; and the secret in the *greater*, some hidden *doctrines* to be kept from the people's knowledge, from

the very contrary purpose:"—and afterwards, when declaring what the *doctrines* of the greater Mysteries were *not*, he says—"they were not the common doctrines of a Providence and future state; for ancient testimony is express that these doctrines were taught promiscuously to all the initiated, and were of the very essence of these Rites—These doctrines were not capable of being hid and secreted, because they were of universal credit amongst the civilized part of mankind—There was no need to hide them, because the common knowledge of them was so far from being detrimental to society, that, as we have shown, society could not even subsist without their being generally known and believed."—Warburton finally makes out *the secret* of the *greater* Mysteries to have been—that the Gods of the vulgar creed were only *dead mortals;* and that there was, in reality, but ONE GOD, the creator of the universe; and gives reasons why this doctrine was reserved for the greater Mysteries. So much for Warburton's explanation of the Mysteries of ancient times. To say the truth, Lord Brougham is here in a dilemma, from which he can never be extricated, either by learning or by

talent*.... On the assumption, however, of what is quite contrary to the truth, that Warburton held the notion of the doctrine of a future state being *revealed* in the Mysteries, as something new—and not *enforced* as something well known—the Noble Author indulges in what looks very like an invective against that learned person—if I do not mistake the character of the following remarks:

"Among the many notable inadvertencies of his argument, concealed from himself by an exuberant learning and a dogmatism hardly to be paralleled, is the neglecting to observe how difficultly the appearance of the doctrine in the places where we find it is reconciled with the notion of its having formed the subject of the Mysteries. What part in those Mysteries did Cicero's and Plato's and Seneca's and Xenophon's writings bear? There we have the doctrine plainly stated; possibly to the world at large—possibly, far more probably, to the learned reader only—but assuredly not by the Hierophant or the Mystagogue to the initiated. This is wholly inconsistent with the notion of its being reserved for these alone." (p. 288.)

* I will observe, in a note, that Lord Brougham seems to have mistaken the import of the expression—"Ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas est." The meaning will be understood from the context: "Quid autem mihi displiceat *in nocturnis*, poetæ indicant Comici. Qua licentia Romæ data, quidnam egisset ILLE, qui in sacrificium cogitatam libidinem intulit, quo ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas est."

Such is the commencement of a long paragraph; the consistency of which is maintained to the end. As the paragraph has nothing whatever to rest upon except His Lordship's strange misrepresentation of Warburton's opinion, I will only observe that, in my own judgement, it did not present the happiest opportunity for denouncing "the dogmatism hardly to be paralleled" of the man, or "the many notable inadvertencies" of his argument.

The next paragraph (pp. 289—291) relates to the circumstance of opinions *exoteric* and *esoteric*—or in other words, some passages favourable to the doctrine of a future state, and others adverse to it —being found in the same treatise—of Plato, for instance, or Cicero. Now, I cannot discover the great absurdity into which Warburton is supposed to be driven, when Lord Brougham describes him as maintaining "that Plato and Cicero pretend to believe a future state in order to deceive the multitude, by stating it in the same writings in which they betrayed their real sentiments to be the very reverse." They might in this manner consult their own safety. Some concessions, they might imagine, were due from them, as

citizens, to the popular feeling—so long as they could at the same time convey, *to the intelligent*, their opinions as philosophers. Are there not, in the writings of Mr Hume, traces of a similar proceeding? But not to persevere in these general speculations, which can seldom lead to any satisfactory conclusion, I will now take, in their order, the particular cases, which Lord Brougham has proposed for consideration.

"1. There can be no doubt that both the Greek and Roman philosophers disbelieved part of the popular doctrine as to future retribution; those punishments, to wit, which are of a gross and corporeal nature; and accordingly what Timæus the Locrian and others have said of the τιμωρίαι ξέναι proves nothing; for it applies to those only. Strabo plainly speaks of these only in the passage where he observes that women and the vulgar are not to be kept pious and virtuous by the lessons of philosophy, but by superstition, which cannot be maintained without mythology (fable-making) and prodigies (δὶα δεισιδαιμονίας· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιΐας καὶ τερατείας), for he gives as examples of these, Jupiter's thunder, the snakes of the Furies, &c." (p. 291.)

Warburton, in the first section of his third book, adduces some "testimonies of ancient sages and philosophers, concerning the necessity of the doctrine of a future state, to civil society." The

first is that of Timæus the Locrian, a very early Pythagorean; who having mentioned the use of philosophy, in promoting the virtue and happiness of well-disposed minds, enforces the necessity of religious terrors, and the apprehension of punishments after this life, to restrain the perverse and evil. The next is that of Polybius, much to the same effect. The third is that of Strabo, referred to by Lord Brougham; and the last that of Pliny the elder, who, although an Epicurean, held the importance of the fear of the Gods to the interests of society. In the second section, Warburton mentions the quotations, before adduced from Timæus, Polybius and Strabo, as conducive to the proof of his next proposition—that while the aforesaid sages and philosophers, with a view to the public good, enforced the necessity of a general belief of a future retribution, such retribution did not form a part of their own creed. His Lordship affirms that the old philosophers rejected only those future punishments which were of a gross and corporeal nature; meaning to say that they still held the doctrine of a future retribution. To this account of the matter, there are two objections:—1. No

witness is produced specifically to show, that any one, who eschewed the vulgar notion of rewards and punishments, adhered to the principle which the notion involved;—2. On His Lordship's own representation, the passage of Strabo leads to a contrary conclusion; for the points under consideration are—not modes of future punishment, more or less gross and corporeal—but "the lessons of philosophy" on the one hand, and "the popular doctrine" on the other....With respect to the *τιμωρίαι ξέναι* of Timæus the Locrian, Lord Brougham is not quite correct in thinking that they apply to the foregoing vulgar apprehensions only. They, in fact, immediately refer to the ancient Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls; and from the entire passage there is reason to suppose that those who inculcated even that doctrine in public, did not in secret believe it.*.... I now proceed to the next paragraph:

* See the passage, in Divine Legation, B. III. Sec. 3. The following extract may here suffice: *τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργομες ψευδέσι λόγοις, εἴκα μὴ ἄγηται ἀλαθέσι· λέγοιντο δ' ἀναγκαίως καὶ τιμωρίαι ξέναι, ὡς μετενδυομέναν τᾶν ψυχᾶν, τῶν μὲν δειλῶν ἐς γυναικέα σκάνεα ποθ' ὕβριν ἐκδιδόμενα· τῶν δὲ μιαιφόνων, ἐς θηρίων σώματα ποτὶ κόλασιν. κ. τ. ἐ.*

"2. Nothing can be more vague than the inference drawn from such passages as those in Cicero and Seneca, where a doubt is expressed on the subject of a future state, and a wish of more cogent proofs seems betrayed—as where Cicero makes one of his prolocutors, in the Tusculan Questions, say, that when he lays down the Phædo which had persuaded him, 'Assensio omnis illa elabitur' (I. 11.), and when Seneca speaks of the philosophers as 'rem gratissimam promittentes magis quam probantes,' and calls it 'bellum somnium.' *Epist.* 102. No one pretends that the ancients had a firm and abiding opinion, founded on very cogent reasons, respecting a future state; and with far sounder theologians than they were, the anxiety naturally incident to so momentous an inquiry may well excite occasional doubts, and even apprehensions." (pp. 291, 292.)

The turn of sentiment, through the whole of this paragraph, is not only founded on the knowledge of human nature, but indicates the most becoming feeling for human weakness, with regard to the concerns of a future life. To my mind, there is something so pleasing in the view which Lord Brougham has taken of this matter, that I wish to retain the impression unimpaired. Whether in this instance, as in some other cases, Warburton went rudely to work—I do not recollect, and will not examine. I am ready, with-

out farther inquiry, to acquiesce in the justness of the Noble Author's animadversions..... The next paragraph now demands attention:

"3. When Strabo speaks of the Brahmins having invented fables, like Plato, upon future judgement, it is plain that he alludes to those speculations in the Phædo, which are avowedly and purposely given as imaginary, respecting the details of another world. To no other part of the Platonic doctrine can the Brahminical mythology be likened; nor would there be any accuracy of speech at all in comparing those fables to the more abstract doctrines of the immortality of the soul as the words literally do—ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων περί τε ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς." (p. 292.)

Having already mentioned the object of the first and second sections of the third book of the Divine Legation, this may not be an improper place to observe, that the third section of the same book is mainly occupied by an examination of the character and genius of the Pythagorean, the Platonic, the Peripatetic and the Stoic Sects; with a view of showing that not one of them believed the doctrine of a future retribution. From the remarks of antiquity respecting the public and private instructions given by Pythagoras, and his principle of a transmigration of souls without any moral purpose—

from the double doctrine of Plato and *his* principle of transmigrations and purgations, by which the soul was prepared for absorption into the divine substance, whence it was taken—from the sceptical intimations of Aristotle and the Peripatetics—and the decided language of the Stoics—Warburton inferred that a state of rewards and punishments hereafter could not be an article of faith amongst those philosophers. The Noble Lord's last-quoted paragraph relates to a passage from Strabo, tending to prove a long existing persuasion, that Plato's descriptions of future rewards and punishments were rather put forth with popular views, than as conveying his own sentiments. This, indeed, appears to be His Lordship's opinion; although he does not, on that account, admit Plato's infidelity on the subject. With regard to the similarity between the Brahminical and Platonic speculations on the origin, nature and destination of the soul, as mentioned by Strabo, there appears to be a greater degree of it than his Lordship supposes. But this point is of so little consequence to our present inquiry, that I pass on to the subsequent paragraph:

"4. The quotation from Aristotle may refer to this world merely; but it is certainly made a good deal stronger in Bishop Warburton's translation—*φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γὰρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.* 'Death is of all things the most terrible; for it is the final period of existence; and beyond that, it appears, there is neither good nor evil for the dead man to dread or hope.' This is at best a mere paraphrase. Aristotle says—*Death is most terrible, for it is an end (of us) and there appears to be nothing further, good or bad, for the dead.* Even were we to take this as an avowal of the Stagyrite's opinion in the sense given it by Bishop Warburton, it proves nothing as to Plato." (p. 292.)

Lord Brougham's version appears to be very nearly as adverse as Bishop Warburton's, to the idea of any credit being given, by Aristotle, to the existence of good or evil, after this life. The commentators indeed are unwilling to think that Aristotle is there expressing his own sentiments; and Dr Gillies, in his translation, dexterously introduces a parenthesis, which removes the opprobrium from the philosopher and fastens it upon the people—"death seems of all things the most formidable; because, *in common opinion*, it is the ultimate limit of all our pains and pleasures, beyond which there is neither

good nor evil." On this interpretation I shall merely remark, that, when the translator ventured upon it, he ought to have given his readers some reasons for the step he had taken.*.... However, what only concerns Aristotle, Lord Brougham truly observes, "proves nothing as to Plato"—or indeed the other philosophers; and therefore this being probably the only remaining occasion of referring to their religious tenets, I will here put down what will at least evince that Warburton is not singular in his notions, respecting the ancient opinions of a future state. The following is the testimony of Grotius—and a more competent, and in every way more unexceptionable witness cannot be named—to the general unbelief, or utter uncertainty, prevailing upon the subject, in those remote ages:

"Gentes nullam habebant de ea re [sc. de resurrectione et vita æterna] Divinam revelationem. Epicurus et Aristoteles nihil ejus credebant. Stoici animas putabant manere, sed non ultra quam ad tempus ἐκπυρώσεως. Platonici animas perpetuis vicibus nunc beatas nunc verò miseras fieri. Quicquid dicebant, conjecturæ erant incertæ, vagæ, fragiles."†

* See Arist. Eth. Nic. III. 6. Also Gillies' Translation, Vol. I. p. 309.

† Grotii Annotata in Ep. ad Ephesios ii. 12.

When Warburton published the third book of his Divine Legation of Moses, he might with great propriety have formally announced that the preceding passage was the text on which he was about to enlarge. What Grotius had affirmed, as the result of his own reading—*that* Warburton undertook to establish, by proofs from the writings of the philosophers themselves. I am well aware of the difficulty of the subject; and by no means disposed to assert that Warburton always placed every thing he discussed in the precise point of view in which it ought to be seen; but justice requires that he should be cleared of what Lord Brougham's animadversions tend to fix upon him—the suspicion of having availed himself of an unheard of paradox, for the purpose of supporting a favourite hypothesis.... Of all the ancient Grecian sages, Socrates is universally allowed to be the one who had the clearest conceptions and the firmest conviction of a future state; and yet, at the very close of his life, in what terms of hesitation and doubt, according to Plato, he expressed his sentiments on the subject! At the end of the *Apology*, he is made to say — *But it is now time to depart; I indeed*

to die, but you to live. To which of us is assigned the happier lot, is known to God only; and in the *Phædo* he again and again speaks dubiously of the future — not without hope, but with great uncertainty.* On these passages the learned Gataker has written so fairly, that I am tempted to extract his remarks:

"Dissertationem denique de argumento hoc suam his tandem verbis concludit [Socrates] *Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit:* quid sunt autem hæc omnia, nisi ignorantiæ hac in re propriæ ingenua confessio, claram satis et illorum perstrictionem in se continens, qui certi aliquid de ea statuerent?"..... "Sunt enim utique et hæc, prout priora illa, optantis sperantisque potius quam spondentis statuentisve vera esse quæ opinatur; et in minore damno ponentis, etiamsi falsa autumet. Scite proinde Tertullianus *de anima* c. 1. *Adeo omnis illa tunc sapientia Socratis de industria venerat consultæ æquanimitatis, non de fiducia compertæ veritatis.* Ita summi illi philosophi, sapientiæ nomine turgidi, animæ æternitatim vitamque futuram, *fide dimidiata,* ut

* Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις. ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. *Apol.* ..... Νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διϊσχυρισαίμην, κ.τ.ἐ. *Phædo.* There is, moreover, something mortifying in the concluding scene: Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.

Minutius loquitur, credebant, et quasi per nebulam ista intuebantur, conjecturis meris atque humanis suspicionibus nitentes."*

If such was the uncertainty of Socrates, who relied, far more than the other philosophers were accustomed to do, upon the natural feelings and apprehensions of the mind—what must have been the perplexity of those who, if they held a future state at all, had to reconcile the notion to the transmigrations and purifications and revolutions and diffusions and absorptions, to which they deemed human souls to be destined? There are some verses of Milton, descriptive of those ancient sages; and when we consider TO WHOM the sentiments are assigned, we cannot doubt the sincerity with which they were entertained by the Poet himself—

> "Much of the soul they talk, but all awry,
> And in themselves seek virtue, and to themselves
> All glory arrogate, to God give none;
> Rather accuse him under usual names,
> Fortune and Fate, as one regardless quite
> Of mortal things."†

Lord Brougham's next paragraph refers to the Stoics, of whose opinions, respecting a future

* Gataker, Annot. in Marc. Ant. de rebus suis, IV. 21.

† Paradise Regained, IV. 313.

retribution, His Lordship is too wise to undertake the defence. Nothing, therefore, now remains, but proceed to the case of Cicero:

"The authority of Cicero presses our author the most closely; and accordingly he makes great efforts to escape from it. After shewing some circumstances, rather of expression than anything else, in his philosophical treatises, he cites the oration *Pro Cluentio*, where, speaking of the vulgar superstition, he says it is generally disbelieved; and then asks, 'Quid aliud mors eripuit præter sensum doloris?' But this at best is a rhetorical flourish; and being delivered in public (though before the judges) never could be seriously meant as an *esoteric* attack on the doctrine." (p. 293.)

Let us examine the case somewhat more particularly. The charge under consideration was, that Oppianicus, a man living in exile and wretchedness, had been destroyed by poison, under the direction of his enemy Avitus. Cicero contends that the enmity of Avitus, instead of prompting him to compass the death of Oppianicus, would have been exerted in prolonging, to the uttermost, a life so miserable and ignominious. "For what evil," he asks, "has death inflicted upon him — unless, indeed, we are induced by silly fables to imagine that he is enduring the punish-

ments of the wicked in the infernal regions? .... But if these things be fictions, as all understand, of what has death deprived him beyond the sense of pain?"* Here, then, we have again presented to us the very argument which was employed by Cæsar, in the case of Catiline's conspirators; without more appearance of "rhetorical flourish" in the one instance than in the other. The argument, as employed by Cicero, distinctly proves two points: 1. the slight degree of credit given, to a future retribution, by the higher ranks of the Roman people at that time; and 2. the absolute rejection of a future retribution, by those who rejected the vulgar notions on the subject. It is on the vulgar notions that the idea of such a state is made entirely to depend.... There is far greater difficulty in the matter than is admitted by Lord Brougham. But I now proceed with his Lordship's animadversions:

"The doctrines in the *De Officiis* relate only to the Deity's being incapable of anger or malevolence, on which

* Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? nisi forte ineptiis et fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos impiorum supplicia perferre ..... quæ si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit, præter sensum doloris?" *Pro Cluentio*, 61.

account he praises Regulus the more for keeping his oath, when all philosophers knew *nec irasci Deum nec nocere;* which shows, according to our author, that Cicero could not believe in a future retribution. But this is said by Cicero only in reference to immediate punishments, or judgments, as the vulgar term them. At any rate, the passage is quite capable of that sense ..... We may here observe, in passing, the gratuitous manner in which works are held *esoteric* and *exoteric*, just as suits the purposes of the argument. The Offices contain the above passage; and therefore, Bishop Warburton says it is the work which 'bids the fairest of any to be spoken from the heart'." (p. 294.)

Punishment can proceed only from anger: the Deity is not susceptible of anger: therefore the Deity will not punish .... Such appears to have been the reasoning of ancient times; and that reasoning was one of the difficulties which the Christian doctrine, of future punishments for evil-doers, had to contend with. Cicero declares the belief, that the Deity could not be angry, to belong to philosophers of every sect. His words are remarkable: "At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, et nihil exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam qui Deum semper agere aliquid et moliri volunt,

NUNQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM NEC NOCERE.* With the validity of the reasoning we have no concern. We are sure, however, that the reasoning was understood to be universal; and so, according to the views then entertained, would hold good for a future life as well as the present. This is another indication of the broad line of distinction between the philosophical and the popular creed.... Let me here intimate a reason, which may have moved Warburton to think the work *de Officiis* to be the one which "bids the fairest of any to be spoken from the heart." It is a better reason than Lord Brougham has given; and, I venture to predict, will be received without a dissentient voice. CICERO WROTE THE TREATISE *DE OFFICIIS* FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF HIS OWN SON.... To the passage from the *Somnium Scipionis*, subsequently quoted by the Noble Author—"Omnibus qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in cœlo definitum locum ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruantur"—similar passages might be added, from

* De Officiis, iii. 28. My limits do not now allow me to dwell on subjects. I can only suggest hints. The reader will find this reasoning of the ancients very ably discussed by Warburton, Divine Legation, III. 4.

the works of Cicero, representing the future felicity of GREAT MEN. Whether Warburton's explanation of the existence of such passages be correct I will not affirm. The difficulty is, to account for them in a manner which shall not be entirely at variance with the philosophical principles avowed on other occasions; on the occasions, for instance, alluded to by Lord Brougham, in this last quotation from the 'Discourse' which will require attention:

"The main proof, however, against Cicero's belief is drawn from the Epistles, where alone, says our author, we can be sure of his speaking his real sentiments. Yet never did proof more completely fail. Writing to Torquatus, he says, 'Nec enim dum ero, angar ullâ re, cum omni vacem culpâ—et si non ero, sensû omni carebo', (VI. 41); and to Toranius, 'Ima ratio videtur, ferre moderate, præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum.' (VI. 21). And this which really means nothing more than a common remark on death ending all our pains and troubles, the learned author calls 'professing his disbelief in a future state of retribution in the frankest manner'." (p. 295.)

Now, the Noble Author having first stated that Warburton's "main proof is drawn from the Epistles", and having then proceeded to particulars, the natural inference is, that the whole

of the proof—or, at the least, the principal part of it—is given. His Lordship, however, has contented himself with a selection; and, as it appears to me, not without an eye to the maxim of Horace—

—— Et quæ
Desperat tractata nitescere posse relinquit.

The first passage adduced by Warburton, and left by Lord Brougham without notice, is from an epistle to L. Mescinius: "Sed ut illa secunda moderate tulimus, sic hanc non solum adversam, sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debemus; ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contemnere debeamus, propterea quod *nullum sensum* esset habitura, nunc sic affecti non modo contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare." Now if, in this passage, Cicero has not expressed his belief, that the consciousness of good and evil is terminated by death, I am at a loss to imagine in what manner that belief could have been expressed, in the Latin language .... The next passage is that, from the epistle to Torquatus, given by Lord Brougham—"Nec enim dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa—et

si non ero, *sensu omni carebo;*" the import of which Warburton illustrated, by adducing the similar language of the Epicureans, from Lucretius:

> "Scilicet haud nobis quidquam, qui non erimus tum,
> Accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere."

From another epistle to Torquatus, Warburton quotes what Lord Brougham has not quoted: "Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitæ, non ab ea republica avellar, qua carendum esse doleam, presertim cum id *sine ullo sensu* futurum sit." And then finally appears the passage indicating that death is "omnium rerum extremum." So that many proofs might be mentioned which "more completely fail" than the proof here drawn out by the author of the Divine Legation. For the purpose of more distinctly perceiving the effect of such declarations, expressed under such circumstances, in deciding the character of the writer, let us consider what would be our feelings if it should appear that our own Locke, for instance—or our own Johnson—had, in their confidential letters, avowed the same Ciceronian views of human destiny. Could we

any longer place reliance upon that regard for a life to come, which is manifested in their published works? Are we not, indeed, the more strongly affected by the religious tendency of their writings, because we know that they really have availed themselves of the unreserved intercourse of friendship, to impress the very sentiments they have enforced as the instructors of the world? How striking is the language of Locke, in the Letter written, to be delivered after his own decease, to his friend, Collins: "I know you loved me living, and will preserve my memory now I am dead. All the use to be made of it is, that this life is a scene of vanity, that soon passes away; and affords no solid satisfaction, but in the consciousness of doing well, and in the hopes of another life. This is what I can say, upon experience; and what you will find to be true, when you come to make up the account." Let it not, however, be supposed that I would measure the faith of Cicero and of Locke, as to a future state, by the same standard. My only wish is that every thing, appertaining to the subject under review, should be fairly estimated. Passages, indicating a per-

suasion that death brings with it a total and eternal extinction of consciousness, have been produced from the familiar letters of the great Roman Orator. Now, the most effectual method of averting the conclusion, to which that circumstance naturally leads, would be the production of passages of a different character, from the Epistles. That passages, from the Epistles, expressing hopes as to the future, cannot be cited, I will not assert — not having gone through them, for the purpose of ascertaining the point; but there is to myself a strong presumption against the existence of such passages, arising from the recollection that Dr Middleton — with all his zeal, and it was great, to establish the opinion of Cicero's *belief*—has not availed himself of a single passage from the Epistles. Dr Middleton seems reluctantly to admit that Warburton's quotations relate to *an utter extinction of our being;* and entreats his readers to bear in mind that Cicero was *an Academic* — that he might probably be writing *to Epicureans* — or that he might be stating the impression *of a melancholy hour.** But, as I have already ob-

* Middleton's Life of Cicero, Vol. II. p. 561. 4to 1741.

served, a more convincing argument would have been that, when writing to those who were not Epicureans or when writing altogether under happier auspices, he had adopted a loftier strain of sentiment. I should be glad to see the case of Cicero in a more favourable light than is permitted by the facts by which it is encompassed. My own notion is, that there was something, in the nature and genius of the old philosophy, which withdrew the minds of its adherents from those simpler considerations which would have led them to THE TRUTH.

Enough, I trust, has now been adduced—as well with regard to what Lord Brougham has called Bishop Warburton's "grand paradox," as to "the minor paradox" concerning "the real opinions of the ancients"—to show that the great prelate had far stronger grounds, for his opinions, than His Lordship appears to have suspected. I cannot, however, take leave of the subject, without recommending to the Noble Author's attention—if he should do me the honour to glance his eye over these pages—a short treatise on the opinions of the ancients, respecting the Deity, human duty and a future life, by a Bishop, of

the English Church, still living—and, if I mistake not, one of his Lordship's most intimate friends—I mean, Dr Maltby. The treatise in question will be found in that learned person's 'Illustrations of the truth of the Christian Religion.' It is, in fact, a Thesis maintained in the Divinity Schools of this University, as an exercise for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity. In that Thesis, Lord Brougham will find precisely the same views, of "the opinions of the ancients," as those which pervade the Divine Legation—presented too in the purest Latinity. It would be an injury to the reader not to extract a few sentences.

"Scitè et compositè, dum in exercitatione umbratili versabatur, Cicero de hâc quæstione [sc. de animi immortalitate] diseruit. At verò, cùm ad verum ei ventum est, languescere cœpit et infringi, qualiscunque demùm esset, ejus persuasio.—Nullum ei attulit doloris levamentum, nullum ægritudinis remedium, nullum contra mortis timorem solatium. Tulliola illa tantoperè amata cùm ei erepta esset, neque in patris mœstissimi, neque in amici, qui eum consolabatur, argumentis locus est datus ei opinioni, quæ mortem statuit, 'non interitum esse omnia tollentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi migrationem commutationemque vitæ.' Næ in oratione coràm populo habitâ Cicero ipse, quæ viri inconstantia fuit, nullâ

omninò pœnâ apud inferos sceleratissimum hominem affici contendit .... Verba hæc à sapientissimorum virorum sententiis minimè fuerunt aliena. Fuit enim plerisque eorum persuasissimum, animam, etsi post mortem durâsset, nullis esse suppliciis obnoxiam: omnia ea quæ de Orco dicerentur, poetarum esse portenta ad plebeculam minaciter et inaniter terrendam aptissima: Deos, si qui essent, ab irâ esse vacuos;—homines igitur, si revivescerent, omninò omnes futuros esse felices."*

Those sentiments, therefore, of the author of the Divine Legation, which, in Lord Brougham's judgement, could be entertained only by a man who, having, with "preposterous and perverted ingenuity," discovered one paradox in the Law of Moses, went forth into the regions of ancient philosophy, resolved to find another paradox to uphold the first—those very sentiments have been publicly avowed and defended by a personage still living amongst us—of the greatest eminence for learning—not because he had any hypothesis to support, but simply because he believed them to express the truth of the case.

* Illustrations, &c., pp. 396—398. ed. 1802.

Lord Brougham's great object appears to have been, to give stability to Natural Theology, by connecting it with such departments of human knowledge as are the most remarkable for truth and certainty. In the attainment of that object, His Lordship has, in numerous instances, manifested those extraordinary powers, by which he is distinguished. While, indeed, the leading principles of his volume are generally entitled to commendation, their developement and application too often call for animadversion. That, in the preceding pages, many serious mistakes—some of them highly injurious to the characters of deservedly-celebrated individuals—have been pointed out, is beyond controversy. Yet it must be considered, that Natural Theology, as viewed by Lord Brougham, is a science of vast extent; and that, in discussing such a subject, no talents, however splendid, can supply the place of long-continued study and reflection.

THE END.

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